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Valuing Farm Animal Welfare in a Market Economy 
A Philosophical Study of Market Failure 
 
Marcus Ventin 
 
Abstract: 
Do people in the UK care about farm animal welfare? How well are their concerns represented 
in society? How can we use economic policy to build a society that reflects public attitudes 
towards farm animals and their welfare? 
In this thesis, I contend that markets in animal products – which facilitate many people’s 
quotidian interactions with farm animal welfare – are susceptible to four forms of market failure: 
externalities, public good problems, information asymmetries and uncompetitive consumer 
behaviour. I analyse how these market failures can subvert the expression of altruistic 
preferences and prevent markets from reflecting the public’s concern for farm animal welfare, 
before considering how policymakers can address these market failures. 
I conclude that preference satisfaction theories of utility and welfare do not provide a suitable 
grounding for economic farm animal welfare policy, which should instead seek to ensure that 
public values are appropriately represented in society. I develop a policy framework that draws 
upon public values and facts about farm animal welfare in society to assist policymakers in this 
work. 
Where the public is almost universally opposed to certain husbandry practices, government 
intervention to directly protect farm animal welfare is likely to be in almost everyone’s interests, 
and animal welfare should be viewed as a public good. Where significant groups of people are 
opposed to the use of certain practices, market intervention through externality policies may be 
justified as a means of affording greater representation to the public’s altruistic concern for farm 
animal welfare: farm animal welfare should be viewed as a merit good in these cases. Where 
public values are largely represented in society, farm animal welfare should be treated as a 
private good: policymakers should empower consumers to express any further dissatisfaction 
towards animal agriculture through market mechanisms.
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Introduction 
 
1. The Lives (and Deaths) of Others 
Animal agriculture in the UK is big business. Despite the recent rise in self-reported animal 
welfare-conscious lifestyles such as vegetarianism, veganism, pescatarianism and flexitarianism, 
consumption of animal products remains the norm for the overwhelming majority of people in 
Britain: in one recent survey, 97% of respondents claimed to have eaten animal products at 
some point in 2018 (Waitrose and Partners 2018: 6-7). The animal product industry is 
correspondingly large: the processed poultry and red meat (£5.648bn), unprocessed poultry and 
red meat (£6.635bn), milk, milk drinks and cream (£4.118bn), cheese (£2.561bn), egg (£1.035bn) 
and fish and seafood (£3.684bn) sectors produced sales of an estimated £23.681 billion in 2017 
(Mintel 2017a: 10; Mintel 2017b: 11; Mintel 2018: 11; Mintel 2017c: 10; Egg Info 2019; Mintel 2017d: 
11). 
This combination of widespread animal product consumption and a large animal agriculture 
industry entails that animal products have a significant impact upon the UK. Animal agriculture 
was responsible for 10% of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2017 (DBEIS 2019), and many 
writers have proclaimed that, as a society, we need to reduce our consumption of animal 
products, in particular red meat, if we are to avoid a climate catastrophe (EAT-Lancet 
Commission 2019: 21; WRI 2019: 2; Harwatt et al. 2019; Gulland and Wilson 2019; Milman 2018; 
Carrington 2018). Additionally, the regular consumption of some animal products, namely red 
and processed meats, has been linked with chronic illnesses such as heart disease and various 
cancers. Treating these illnesses comes at a cost to society – one study estimated these costs 
could be as large as £5 billion per year by 2020 (Springmann et al. 2018a). 
Then there are the animals themselves. A large animal agriculture industry must raise and 
slaughter huge numbers of animals to satisfy consumer demand for animal products. In 2018, 
producers in the UK raised approximately 10,004,000 cattle, 4,969,000 swine, 181,818,000 
poultry and 34,832,000 sheep, as well as millions of farmed fish, the numbers of which are not 
counted (DEFRA 2019a: 6). 
Many consumers want more from their animal products than just something to eat, however: 
they care about farm animal welfare and want the animals that produce their food to die good 
deaths and live good lives, or at the very least not bad ones (Eurobarometer 2016: 10, 13; Brook 
Lyndhurst 2010: 40; Harper and Henson 2001: 19). After a cursory examination of modern 
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husbandry practices, though, you could be forgiven for concluding that producers are failing to 
meet this demand: mutilations, deprivations of the ability to perform natural behaviours and 
selective breeding-induced health issues are the norm in intensive production rather than the 
exception (FAWC 2009: 8; World Animal Protection 2019; Wasley et al. 2017; Safran Foer 2010: 
126). 
I first became aware of the apparent rift between the demand and supply of animal welfare as a 
fresh-faced eighteen-year-old on the brink of starting university. I was the first of three children 
to move any meaningful distance away from home, and my mother’s response to her impending 
empty nest was to make the metaphor reality and replace her departing child with actual birds 
– three chickens. 
These were no ordinary chickens, however: these were hens with a history. When hens used in 
industrial egg production reach about two years of age, the rate at which they lay eggs begins to 
decline. They become less productive to the extent that it is no longer economically viable for 
producers to maintain them. These hens – who, in the UK, number more than 40 million per 
year – are sent to slaughter (HSA 2014). Charities such as the British Hen Welfare Trust (BHWT) 
rescue some of these hens (the BHWT takes in over 60,000 per year (BHWT 2019)) and find 
homes for them as pets. We adopted three of these ex-layers. 
We received the hens shortly after they had been collected from the farm. The condition they 
arrived in was therefore likely typical of the millions of hens who have reach the ends of their 
productive lives in these systems. The hens were in a bad way, to put it mildly. One was almost 
entirely bereft of feathers. Another sat dazed in the garden for days, simply staring at the sky as 
if the sight of the sun was a novelty to her. 
But they improved. With time, the feathers returned, the sight of the sky became familiar and 
freedom to roam became the norm. As the scars of their previous lives began to heal, the hens’ 
personalities emerged. They could be by turns affectionate, curious and bossy, with unique 
preferences for people and parts of the garden. They would happily jump up onto a knee for a 
stroke, or the opportunity to peck at an unsuspecting victim’s ice cream. If the back door was 
left open, they would migrate to the house and surprise everyone by turning up to dinner 
unannounced with an indignant cluck for having not been invited. In short, it was clear to me 
that there was a spark behind the eyes, that these birds, who had suffered such hardships in 
order to satisfy human demand for their eggs, were both mentally and emotionally complex and 
deserved better than they had been given. 
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These hens were part of a lucky minority whose stories end with a happily ever after, but the 
overwhelming majority of egg-laying hens, and other farmed animals, are not so fortunate. They 
are sent to slaughter. That is the point: their deaths are an essential part of the production 
process. As part of a public policy internship carried out in summer 2019, I visited a cattle 
slaughterhouse to witness how the lives of most farmed animals are brought to an end. This 
slaughterhouse was something of an anomaly in the sense that each step in the production 
process was carried out by hand – industrial-scale slaughterhouses tend to rely more on 
machines than manual labour. The slaughterhouse prided itself on the quality of care shown to 
its animals: its commitment to manual labour allowed greater attention to be paid to the 
animals’ welfare, while they also required cattle to be bussed in from local farms to reduce 
transport-related stress. In addition, the slaughterhouse made sure to adhere to the many 
regulations surrounding meat production: it employed Official Veterinarians and Meat Hygiene 
Inspectors from the Food Standards Agency to ensure that animal welfare legislation was being 
followed, that the animals were healthy and good food hygiene was being practised. 
The slaughter process begins with a cow being herded into a small metal pen, in which it has 
little space to move, and none to turn around. A worker stood above the pen then applies what 
is referred to as a ‘permanent stun’, a bolt gun shot between the eyes. The term ‘stun’ is 
something of a misnomer: when applied correctly, part of the cow’s brain is destroyed, instantly 
rendering it unconscious and causing a cessation of breathing. It is no longer capable of thought 
or feeling. Legally, the animal cannot yet be declared dead, although for all intents and purposes 
it is. It is only after the next stage, where the cow is hoisted up by a hind leg, its throat slit and 
left to drain for half a minute, that it officially dies. At this point, a swarm of industrious hands 
get to work. The skin is removed, the ribs sawed apart, the innards carefully removed, and the 
animal carved into two to be hung out to dry. The whole process, from living creature to 
something that very closely resembles food, takes perhaps three minutes per animal. 
The cattle die quickly. I would be reluctant to say, however, that they die well. Some met their 
end with stoic indifference, but others put up a fight. They were vocal in their resistance and 
refused to enter the slaughter pen for as long as they could. When finally forced in, they would 
kick out at the door to prevent its closure. But the slaughterman always wins. Eventually, the 
cow tires and is stunned, slaughtered and butchered like the millions across the country that 
came before and the millions that will inevitably come after. 
When casually browsing the homogenous packaged steaks, burgers and mince in the 
supermarket’s freezer counters, the consumer learns nothing of the beings that produced them. 
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They do not know whether the animal that will provide their dinner clung to its life for as long 
as it possibly could, that it staved off the butcher’s cleaver with a fiery passion – a quality which, 
in humans, is lauded and has historically been turned into the stuff of legend. In fact, these little 
packets of meat provide practically no indication that they were once parts of living, breathing 
creatures: we even use different terms to refer to the flesh, beef, and the animal itself, cow, 
further facilitating consumer disengagement from the lived experience of the animal. 
Many consumers would be horrified, or at least severely discomfited, to learn about the lives 
and deaths of farmed animals. Surveys repeatedly indicate that there is substantial public 
demand for farm animals to live good lives and to die good deaths, but my own experiences 
make me think that this demand is not being satisfied. In technical terms, I contend that 
markets are providing a socially suboptimal level of farm animal welfare. 
The majority of this thesis is dedicated to supporting this claim. My argument proceeds in 
several stages. I begin by considering the circumstances in which improving farm animal welfare 
might be beneficial to society. I argue that, for the economist, welfare improvements are most 
justifiable when there is sufficient consumer demand for them, and I note that there appears to 
be considerable concern for farm animal welfare in the UK. I then propose that four factors 
might be limiting the effectiveness of animal product markets in accommodating consumers’ 
preferences for farm animal welfare, leading to a socially suboptimal provision of farm animal 
welfare. I analyse these factors in greater detail and explore the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of numerous policies in rectifying these market failures. 
In conducting this analysis, I reveal some fundamental problems with preference satisfaction 
theories of welfare, which have played a central role in many of the leading economic studies in 
this field (see Lusk 2011, McInerney 2004, and Harvey and Hubbard 2013 for instance). These 
problems render many of the tools of conventional economic analysis largely inappropriate and 
ill-suited to accounting for concern for farm animal welfare in a market environment. To rectify 
these issues, I propose a new way of thinking about the objectives of economic farm animal 
welfare policy that moves away from the prevailing and problematic preference satisfaction 
foundations of conventional economic analysis and instead draws upon public values and facts 
about animal welfare in a society. Such a shift allows economic farm animal welfare policy to 
better recognise different ways of valuing farm animal welfare, and therefore promotes policies 
that better reflect people’s attitudes towards farm animals. 
Although this project is interdisciplinary in the sense that it engages with concepts and theories 
from disciplines as various as philosophy, economics, animal ethology, marketing, psychology, 
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and public policy, the analysis is primarily philosophical in nature. Food policy is a sprawling 
and multidisciplinary area of study, and so engaging with a range of fields is necessary to build 
support for my conclusion that a values-based framework is a more appropriate way of 
approaching economic farm animal welfare policy than traditional preference-based 
approaches. 
 
2. Talking About Talking About Animal Welfare 
Given that this is a thesis about animal welfare, it is necessary to provide a definition of this 
concept. In line with the definition of human welfare that I adopt in Chapter 1 (p.34), I 
understand animal welfare as referring to how well (or poorly) an animal’s life is going for it. 
The welfare of farm animals is likely to be influenced by factors including production inputs 
(feed, shelter, etc.), production outcomes (health outcomes, mental states, opportunities to 
express certain natural behaviours, etc.) and the husbandry practices that an animal is exposed 
to. 
When we talk about animal welfare, though, much of what we say contains dimensions that are 
not captured by this definition: we might, for example, want to make normative claims about 
what constitutes good and bad welfare, or relative claims about what constitutes higher and 
lower welfare. Normative and relative claims about animal welfare are of central importance to 
this thesis and so it is important to explain what they refer to in my analysis. Normative claims 
about farm animals and their welfare can be found in abundance in the field of animal ethics, 
and I will discuss the works of several animal ethicists in this thesis. I am, however, primarily 
interested in how economic policy can be used to create a society that reflects public concern 
for farm animal welfare. Whether this is a morally desirable end, as it can promote 
improvements in farm animal welfare, or a morally undesirable end, as it implicitly condones 
both the continued treatment of farm animals as human property and their slaughter to satisfy 
human appetites, is a question that is not addressed here. My own views on the permissibility 
of treating animals as property, slaughtering them for human consumption, and inflicting 
suffering upon them in pursuit of greater productivity are irrelevant to this project and thus 
remain unstated in what follows. For the purposes of this thesis, I will instead adopt a stance 
popularised by the retailer Harry Gordon Selfridge, and hold that the consumer is always right1 
– normative claims about animal welfare will be understood in terms of consumers’ beliefs. 
 
1 Well, maybe not always. 
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I adopt a parallel stance towards relative claims about animal welfare. Making relative claims 
about farm animal welfare is not always straightforward, as elements of welfare can conflict with 
each other, casting uncertainty over what is best for an animal. Things that, in isolation, we 
might think are good for an animal’s welfare might come at a cost in other areas of welfare (for 
instance, outdoor access and freedom to roam can expose an animal to harmful pathogens and 
leave it at risk of attack and predation). The reverse is also true: things that, in isolation, we 
might consider detrimental to an animal’s welfare could make a positive contribution in other 
areas of welfare (mutilations such as beak trimming and tail docking can inhibit cannibalistic 
behaviours, for example). In an attempt to enable us to make relative claims about farm animal 
welfare, researchers have sought to synthesise various factors into models that produce an 
overall welfare score that captures these trade-offs (see De Mol et al. 2006’s FOWEL model of 
laying hen welfare, for instance), but these models have been subject to criticism (Cotra 2017; 
Bollard 2016). Because there is not currently a generally-accepted model upon which to base 
relative claims about animal welfare, and given that this thesis is chiefly interested in how 
markets influence farm animals’ welfare, I will primarily understand relative claims in terms of 
consumer beliefs about what constitutes higher and lower welfare: these beliefs inform 
consumers’ preferences for particular welfare attributes, and these preferences can in turn 
motivate their actions in the market. 
In line with these consumer-centric definitions of normative and relative claims about farm 
animal welfare, I hold that the satisfaction of public preferences for farm animal welfare is an 
appropriate policy aim. There can be other appropriate policy aims in this area, namely ethical 
concern for the lives of farm animals, but, for pragmatic reasons, my focus in this thesis is on 
economic farm animal welfare policy. Ethically motivated calls for a broad proscription on the 
consumption of animal products have fallen on deaf ears for decades. Engaging with the policy 
debate from an economic perspective, however, and highlighting areas where consumers’ voices 
are not being heard in the market, might provide a more viable way of influencing policy and 
improving the lives of farm animals. 
Consequently, I will assess the desirability of a state of the world, and the appropriateness of 
the provision of farm animal welfare, according to how far it reflects what matters to people. 
For the majority of this thesis, this will be understood in terms of preference satisfaction, 
although, due to the limitations of this approach – which will be outlined in my final chapter – 
I will contend that policymakers should instead seek to engage with public values. 
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3. Overview 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 1, I introduce two key concepts that 
underpin welfare economics: utility as preference satisfaction and economic efficiency. I unpack 
the different types of preference that can motivate demand for farm animal welfare, and contend 
that, because many consumers dissociate themselves from the ultimate fate of farm animals, 
moral concern can stimulate purchases of higher-welfare products. 
In Chapter 2, I assess the extent of consumer demand for farm animal welfare in the UK. I argue 
that, within the production space bounded by the UK’s farm animal welfare legislation, welfare 
improvements tend to be detrimental to productivity and thus lead to price increases, meaning 
that there is no universal reason for UK consumers to prefer higher welfare standards. The 
question of whether there is demand for higher farm animal welfare should therefore be treated 
as an empirical one, and I argue that recent surveys provide good evidence that UK consumers 
are prepared to pay more for higher-welfare products and production practices. 
In Chapter 3, I explore the market, the institution which theoretically reconciles consumer 
demand with supply. I explain why ideal markets are a highly efficient means of distributing 
resources, before outlining how many real-world markets, including markets for animal 
products, fail to live up to this perfectly competitive ideal. 
In the following four chapters, I focus on the forms of market failure that are especially relevant 
to demand for farm animal welfare, and consider how policy can be, and in many cases has been, 
used to rectify market inefficiencies. Chapter 4 concerns externalities, Chapter 5 looks at 
public goods and Chapter 6 examines information asymmetries. In Chapter 7, I draw on 
insights from behavioural economics and consumer psychology to make the claim that the 
environment in which consumers most frequently make decisions affecting farm animal welfare 
– the supermarket – primes them to discount other-regarding preferences for animal welfare in 
favour of more self-interested ones. I then discuss how consumers can be nudged to express 
other-regarding concerns for farm animal welfare. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, I consider what economic farm animal welfare policy should seek to 
achieve, and propose a policy framework to facilitate this. I contend that preference satisfaction 
accounts of welfare are not suitable guides with which to assess the efficacy of interventions in 
animal product markets: what consumers prefer in a supermarket context may not be what they 
prefer in other types of choice environment. Instead, I propose that policy in this area should 
be guided by people’s values, rather than their preferences, with the aim of ensuring that 
different ways of valuing farm animal welfare are afforded appropriate representation in society.  
Introduction 
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I proceed to argue that policymakers should consider facts about both farm animal welfare in 
society and public values to determine whether farm animal welfare should be viewed primarily 
as a public, merit or private good. Consequently, policy aims evolve according to the extent of 
public concern for farm animal welfare. I link these different classifications of farm animal 
welfare to the market failures developed in Chapters 4-7, and argue that the form of market 
failure that policymakers should be most concerned with, and thus the animal welfare policies 
that they should concentrate their energies upon, is primarily determined by whether farm 
animal welfare is viewed as a public, merit or private good. I thus place public values and facts 
about animal welfare in society at the heart of economic farm animal welfare policy.  
1 | The Fundamentals 
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Chapter 1 
The Fundamentals: Utility and Efficiency 
 
In this Chapter 
• A brief discussion of classical utilitarianism, and why it is ill-suited to welfare economic 
aims. 
• A detailed account of preference utilitarianism. 
• A discussion of the kinds of preferences which will be relevant to this thesis, including 
support for the claim that ethical concern can motivate purchases of higher-welfare animal 
products. 
• An outline of the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. 
• An introduction to the concept of efficiency as a means of making interpersonal utility 
comparisons. 
• An overview of the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks accounts of efficiency. 
• A defence of the claim that the Kaldor-Hicks account can identify improvements in 
efficiency only when compensation is actually paid. 
 
1. Introduction 
Before examining the numerous ways that markets affect the expression of preferences for farm 
animal welfare, it is useful to introduce the economic concepts which underpin this thesis. This 
chapter concerns utility and efficiency, two concepts which, by enabling economists to 
determine whether policies are beneficial to society (Blackburn 2008: 375), are essential to 
welfare economic policy analysis. 
I begin with an outline of the multi-disciplinary concept of utility. In line with mainstream 
welfare economics, I will adopt a preference satisfaction interpretation of utility, and will briefly 
outline why classical or hedonistic utilitarianism is ill-suited to the discipline’s needs. I then 
develop my account of preference utilitarianism by exploring the assumptions that underpin 
preferences. Next, I list the types of preferences that are relevant to this thesis’ project, and 
argue that ethical concern can motivate purchases of animal products. After this, I discuss 
whether preference utilitarianism provides an acceptable account of human welfare and explore 
its limitations in enabling interpersonal utility comparisons. 
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In order to overcome the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, I introduce the second 
fundamental concept that underpins this thesis, efficiency. I explore the Pareto and Kaldor-
Hicks accounts of efficiency, and consider how far they enable economists to determine whether 
a policy benefits society. I conclude that the Pareto account is ill-suited to dealing with the 
interests of large numbers of people, while the Kaldor-Hicks account offers a viable means of 
measuring improvements in social utility, provided that compensation is actually paid to people 
left worse-off by policies. 
 
2. Classical Utilitarianism 
The concept of utility originated in philosophy, and lies at the heart of the ethical theory of 
utilitarianism. The doctrine was first explicitly formulated by Jeremy Bentham in his 1789 An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, although elements of the theory can be 
traced at least as far back as Epicurus in the late 4th century BCE (Russell 2004: 233). Bentham 
defined utility as the usefulness of a thing in bringing about pleasurable consequences, 
describing it (2004: 66) as: 
[T]hat property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or 
happiness … or … to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party 
whose interest is considered. 
Bentham (2004: 65) further linked utility to the foundations of morality through the claim that 
what is pleasurable is morally good and actions that bring about pleasure are morally right, 
while what is painful is morally bad and actions that cause pain are morally wrong. This 
interpretation of utility forms the basis of classical utilitarianism, and, when linked to welfare, 
theories of hedonism.  
Classical utilitarianism also has a long history in the field of animal ethics, largely thanks to 
Bentham, who famously stated in 1789 that the relevant question regarding the moral 
considerability of beings is not ‘Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’ 
(quoted in Singer 2015a: 7). Bentham was not, however, the first to justify compassion towards 
animals in terms of the capacity to experience pleasures and pains, referred to in the modern 
literature as sentience. As early as 300CE, the Roman philosopher Porphyry claimed that animals 
deserve moral consideration because of their capacity to suffer (Fraser 2012: 190). Even in Britain, 
Bentham was not the first to argue that animal sentience warrants moral concern. More than 
60 years before Bentham, the scholar William Wollaston (1725: 139) wrote: ‘[i]t is grievous to see 
or hear (and almost to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in torment’. Writing 13 
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years before Bentham, British author Humphry Primatt declared (1776: 7-8) ‘[p]ain is pain, 
whether it be inflicted on man or beast; and the creature that suffers it… being sensible of the 
misery of it whilst it lasts, suffers Evil’. Further instances of the argument that animal sentience 
demands moral consideration are found in the works of other 18th century thinkers, including 
the poet Christopher Smart, author John Lawrence, philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
John Oswald, and clergyman James Granger, all of whom predate Bentham (Thomas 1984: 175-
76). 
Classical utilitarianism was also a key component of the theories advanced by 19th century 
economists such as F.Y. Edgeworth, W.S. Jevons, Léon Walras and Alfred Marshall (Edwards 
1954: 383; Heilbroner 2000: 172-77). Today, however, classical utilitarianism plays a much-
reduced role in the discipline, where it is primarily used to explain decision-making in situations 
of risk and uncertainty (Edwards 1954: 391-2). The decline in classical utilitarianism’s influence 
in economics can be attributed to two factors. First, there are occasions where we seek to bring 
about certain states of affairs independent of the pleasures and pains they bring us (Harsanyi 
1977a: 644-45): we might be motivated by factors such as a concern for others, a sense of duty 
or respect for tradition. Consequently, classical utilitarianism cannot account for many common 
human motivations. Second, the theory has struggled to support the claim that we can measure 
utility (High and Bloch 1989: 354; Schumpeter 2006: 1028). Bentham and many other classical 
utilitarians treated utility as a calculable quality that can be measured in hedons or utils (Henson 
1971: 323; Blair 1974: 124). This ‘enabled’ them to determine the right action by summing each 
option’s anticipated pleasures and pains and choosing the one that maximised pleasure. The 
measurement of hedonistic utility remains, however, a purely theoretical enterprise: we lack 
both an objective unit of pleasure and pain, and a ‘hedonimeter’-like device with which to 
measure it (Edgeworth 1881: 101; Colander 2007: 216; Feldman and Serrano 2010: 13). Without an 
objective and measurable unit of pleasure, statements of the form ‘policy y yields x hedons’ 
cannot be justified (Köbberling 2004: 375).2 This issue is problematic for this thesis, as I will be 
considering whether society can be made better-off by improving farm animal welfare. As 
classical utilitarianism does not provide a practicable way of measuring a policy’s impact, it is 
not suitable for my purposes, despite its long history in animal ethics and economics. 
Fortunately, the limited applicability of classical utilitarianism to policy discussions does not 
 
2 Other measures, notably best-worst scaling, may overcome these difficulties by allowing researchers to 
calculate the extent to which one option is preferred relative to another. As best-worst scaling examines the 
strength of preferences relative to other preferences, however, it does not rely upon the existence of an 
objective unit of pleasure. Despite the promise of this technique, I will nonetheless move away from classical 
utilitarianism, in line with much of economics. 
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derail this project. Over the centuries, utilitarianism has been adapted into new forms, one of 
which, preference utilitarianism, has assumed an influential role in both economics and animal 
ethics and is better suited to my aims. 
 
3. Preference Utilitarianism 
a. History 
Preference utilitarianism rather self-explanatorily defines utility in terms of the satisfaction of 
preferences or desires (Qizilbash 1998: 58; Hare 1981: 91). In short, what satisfies a person’s 
preferences is utility increasing. This theory is better-suited to economic and policy analysis 
than classical utilitarianism, because its basic unit – the preference – can generally be identified 
either by observing people’s behaviour or by asking them. As with its classical counterpart, 
preference utilitarianism also maintains a respect for individuals by defining the good in terms 
of what matters to each person rather than in objective terms. 
Preference utilitarianism appears in economics as early as 1821, when J.B. Say (1971: 62) defined 
utility as the ‘inherent fitness or capability of certain things to satisfy the various wants of 
mankind’. In 1906, Vilfredo Pareto demonstrated that preference utilitarianism could provide a 
viable foundation for economics when he showed that indifference curves, a cornerstone of 
classical economics – economics predicated on classical utilitarianism – could be replicated 
using preferences (Pareto: 2008). His work was developed further by J.R. Hicks and R.G.D. Allen 
(1934a; 1934b), who showed that, from this preference utilitarian foundation of indifference 
curves, we can derive all of the claims that classical economics makes about consumer demand 
(Edwards 1954: 384-85). With preference utilitarianism shown to be capable of facilitating the 
same level of economic analysis as classical utilitarianism, while bypassing its difficulties, the 
theory was well-placed to provide a grounding for economics. 
In contrast to its place in economics, preference utilitarianism is a relatively recent addition to 
the field of ethics. It was first formally proposed in J.C. Harsanyi’s paper ‘Morality and the 
Theory of Rational Behaviour’ (1977a). Harsanyi connects economic theories of rational 
behaviour with the works of three moral philosophers. From Bentham, he takes the idea that 
the basic criterion of moral action is to maximise utility; Harsanyi’s concept of utility diverges 
from Bentham’s, however, by drawing from economics and defining utility in terms of 
preference satisfaction. From Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, he takes the idea that 
adopting a moral viewpoint involves acting as an impartial but humane and sympathetic 
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observer. Last, Harsanyi draws from Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
when he recognises that moral laws ought to be universalizable. 
Preference utilitarians have also made large contributions to animal ethics. No discussion of the 
theory in this field can ignore Peter Singer, whose seminal 1975 book Animal Liberation brought 
animal welfare issues, explained through the lens of preference utilitarianism, to the public’s 
attention. Although Singer’s work predates Harsanyi’s by two years, he did not yet explicitly 
identify as a preference utilitarian. The theory clearly underpins Singer’s thought, however: he 
argues that sentience is sufficient for possessing interests, and we have a duty of equal 
consideration to all beings that hold interests (Singer 2015a: 7-8; Rowlands 2009: 39-40). Singer’s 
work has inspired others to approach animal ethics from a preference utilitarian perspective 
(see Matheny 2006 for example) and has laid the foundations for the application of the effective 
altruism movement to the issue of animal suffering (see Singer 2015b: 137-47). 
As a leading theory in both economics and animal ethics, preference utilitarianism is therefore 
well-placed to ground the analysis in this thesis. Before this analysis takes place, however, it is 
useful to consider four aspects of preference utilitarianism in greater detail: the nature of 
preferences, utility functions and preference utilitarian interpretations of both human welfare 
and social utility. 
 
b. Preferences 
Preferences are subjective comparative evaluations of bundles of goods (Hansson and Grüne-
Yanoff 2018) which, in welfare economics, are assumed to satisfy three assumptions. First, they 
are transitive: if x is preferred to y and y is preferred to z, x will also be preferred to z (Fishburn 
1968: 336). Second, preferences are continuous: if a is preferred to b, then situations 
appropriately similar to a are also preferred to b (Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 85). Third, 
preferences are independent of context: a preference for x over y is not affected by the presence 
or absence of alternatives (Hausman and McPherson 2009: 5). 
Preferences can be collected in preference sets, which represent a person’s attitudes towards 
various states of affairs. For instance, we could construct a preference set containing my 
preferences for the different sandwich fillings available at my local supermarket, which, when 
a, b, c and d represent different fillings, might look like this: 
𝑎 > 𝑏 > 𝑐 > 𝑑 
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Preference sets are assumed to be complete, meaning that agents have ranked, or at least can 
rank, all possible alternatives (Edwards 1954: 381). 
 
c. Types of Preference 
i. Self-Interested Preferences 
Preference utilitarians recognise that human behaviour can be motivated by many types of 
preferences, one of which is self-interest. Self-interest refers to what a person believes will 
benefit them the most and has long been viewed as a particularly strong motivator of economic 
behaviours, with Adam Smith (1999: 119) famously proclaiming: 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to 
their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. 
It is self-interest that motivates producers to make goods, as doing so provides an income with 
which they can purchase goods to satisfy their own preferences. Similarly, as consumers, many 
of our purchases are motivated by considerations of how a good will benefit us. 
Preferences for farm animal welfare can be self-interested in nature, as many consumers 
associate it with a range of quality attributes (Brook Lyndhurst 2012: 21; Matthews 1996: 41-42; 
Jago et al. 2000: 163-64; Harper and Henson 2001: 21-22; Verbeke et al. 2010: 285; Heng et al. 2013: 
425; RSPCA 2006: 23). One such attribute is physical quality: some consumers believe that 
animals raised in higher-welfare systems will produce goods with greater physical integrity or 
other desirable physical attributes (RSPCA 2006: 23). This association does not always hold, 
however: a low-welfare broiler system will likely produce more higher-grade carcasses than 
higher welfare systems (Proudfoot et al. 1979), and the historical production of high-quality veal 
involved depriving calves of iron and severely restricting their movement (Singer 2015a: 133; 
Rowlands 2002: 108; Mason and Singer 1990: 12-13; Marcus 2005: 37). 
Another quality attribute that consumers associate with farm animal welfare is greater food 
safety (RSPCA 2006: 23; Brook Lyndhurst 2012: 22). In many cases, this association does appear 
to hold true. Giving animals the space and conditions to express natural behaviours can reduce 
stress, which in turn increases the shedding of harmful bacteria and improves animals’ 
resistance to pathogens, reducing the risk of products being contaminated by pathogens such 
as E. coli, salmonella and campylobacter (Norwood and Lusk 2013; Callaway et al. 2006: 65; 
Haslam et al. 2004: 293-94). The opposite also holds true in some circumstances: conditions 
that produce higher levels of stress, such as extreme temperatures or anxiety-inducing 
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conditions before slaughter, can facilitate bacterial growth and thus produce goods that carry a 
higher risk of causing foodborne illness (Voogd 2009). 
The connection between higher welfare and product safety does not always hold, however. 
Chickens raised in free-range systems can experience higher rates of aggression than in cage 
systems. This increases animal stress, which can facilitate the growth of harmful bacteria in the 
final product. Raising animals in outdoor environments may enable the expression of natural 
behaviours, but it also exposes animals to potentially harmful pathogens from wild animals. 
Pathogens such as those responsible for avian influenza can mutate and spread rapidly in large 
flocks and herds, decreasing food safety and contributing to the spread of zoonoses. In some 
cases, therefore, food safety can be improved by confining animals, at the expense of welfare 
(Norwood and Lusk 2013; Norwood and Lusk 2011: 135-36).3,4 
Many consumers also associate higher-welfare goods with a superior nutritional profile, 
typically because they believe that more ‘natural’ production methods produce healthier goods. 
Some think that healthy feed produces healthier animals, which in turn produce healthier 
products; others think that higher-welfare goods are less likely than conventional goods to 
contain harmful and unnatural additives. Still others believe that access to free range enables 
animals to exercise more, which produces more muscle tissue and higher-protein products 
(Moran and McVittie 2008: 49; IGD 2007: 39-40; Brook Lyndhurst 2012: 22). 
In certain instances, higher-welfare goods, both organic and otherwise, are nutritionally 
superior to their conventional counterparts. Organic, free-range and other forms of higher-
welfare beef, lamb, pork, eggs, milk and chicken possess a healthier ratio of omega-3 to omega-
6 polyunsaturated fatty acids than conventionally-produced alternatives, and higher-welfare 
beef and chicken contain less fat and more protein than conventional counterparts. Despite 
public perceptions, however, protein content, along with the ratio of saturated to unsaturated 
fatty acids, is largely unaffected by whether production is higher-welfare or conventional 
(Średnicka-Tober et al. 2016a, 2016b; CIWF 2012: 3-5; Lawrence 2016). 
Some consumers also identify higher welfare with superior taste (Eurobarometer 2007: 78-79; 
Harper and Henson 2001: 21; IGD 2007: 40; Heng et al. 2013: 425; Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 26; 
 
3 Indeed, the use of indoor systems in US pig production has been linked to a decline in swine dysentery and 
trichinosis (Fraser 2012: 200). 
4 By some accounts, the effect of confinement upon overall welfare is unclear, as it requires us to understand 
the consequences of the trade-off between an animal’s freedom to express natural behaviours and freedom 
from harm or disease. De Mol et al.’s FOWEL account of hen welfare (2006) indicates that typical enriched 
cage systems provide lower welfare than non-cage systems, but for other species and other systems, models 
may favour greater confinement, or, more likely, the utilisation of lower flock or herd numbers. 
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RSPCA 2006: 22-23; Moran and McVittie 2008: 49). This may stem from the belief that an animal 
with a more natural diet will produce better-tasting goods (Fearne and Lavelle 2016: 11), but a 
general association between higher-welfare production methods and taste is also reported 
(Pettersson et al. 2016: 2009). As with the connections between welfare and quality and safety, 
the link between welfare and taste is not consistent: blind taste tests have shown that consumers 
cannot taste the difference between free-range and caged eggs (Haspel 2010; López-Alt 2010), as 
well as pork produced at different levels of welfare (Dransfield et al. 2005: 68; Jonsäll et al. 2002: 
77). This supports the already-established idea that expectations play a major role in affecting 
both our perceived sense of taste and neural response to taste stimuli (Just 2011: 111; McClure et 
al. 2004; Nitschke et al. 2006). Given the perceived connection between higher welfare and taste, 
it may therefore be enough for consumers to simply believe they are eating higher-welfare goods 
for them to enjoy a more pleasurable gustatory experience. 
In short, the perceived associations between animal welfare and product quality, food safety, 
nutritional profile and taste provide consumers with self-interested reasons to hold preferences 
for higher animal welfare. 
 
ii. Altruistic Preferences 
By adopting a theory of preference satisfaction that only recognised self-interested preferences, 
we run the risk of creating a warped understanding of human behaviour. Even Adam Smith, 
who is often cast as believing that human beings are entirely self-interested, recognised that 
many actions are motivated by concern for others. His moral treatise, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (2002), begins:  
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, 
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though 
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. 
Of particular relevance to this thesis are two models of altruism developed by K.E. McConnell 
(1997). His model of pure paternalism recognises that someone can value the quantity of services 
that another receives from a particular resource, even if the ‘beneficiary’ in fact feels that they 
have been made worse-off by this. McConnell illustrates this point with the example of parents 
insisting on children eating their vegetables: the parents are better-off in the knowledge that 
their children have eaten their greens, even if the children themselves feel worse-off. In contrast 
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to pure paternalism, models of mixed paternalism acknowledge that people can derive value not 
only from the provision of the resource itself, but also from the beneficiary’s gain.5 
Preferences for farm animal welfare can be altruistic in nature. Below, I will consider ethical 
concern for farm animal welfare as a subset of altruistic preferences. Beyond this, some 
consumers hold altruistic preferences for the welfare of certain types of animals, such as ones 
perceived as cute (Zickfeld et al. 2018), that may be motivated by mere liking. 
Of the two models of altruism outlined by McConnell, the model of pure paternalism will likely 
be of most use to my analysis, as many consumers of higher-welfare goods are driven by a desire 
for farm animals to experience certain goods, such as access to free range, without 
understanding how these goods actually affect welfare. In fact, many consumers will 
deliberately avoid or otherwise ignore detailed information about the impact of husbandry 
practices upon animal welfare, as this can cause feelings of guilt and discomfort (Harper and 
Henson 2001: 17; Miele 2010: 4). 
Instead, engagement with animal welfare generally occurs on an emotional level. This claim is 
supported by a range of studies which assess consumer willingness to pay for animal welfare 
improvements by asking consumers how much they would be prepared to pay to move 1, 100 or 
1,000 animals into higher-welfare housing. As the number of animals increases, willingness to 
pay per animal declines precipitously. In one study, participants were willing to pay an average 
of $1.08 to move one laying hen from a cage system to a free-range one, but only $0.19 per animal 
to move 100 hens and $0.08 to move 1,000 hens. Similarly, participants were willing to pay $2.85 
to move one sow from a confinement crate to a shelter-pasture system, but only $0.08 per 
animal to move 100 sows and $0.02 to move 1,000 sows (Lusk and Norwood 2012: 207). Another 
study that examined willingness to pay to save seabirds from an oil spill found that average total 
contributions were largely unaffected by the number of birds affected: willingness to pay to save 
2,000 birds was $80, to save 20,000 birds was $78 and 200,000 birds was $88 (Desvousges et al. 
1993). While diminishing marginal utility may partly explain this phenomenon – just as the 
pleasure gained from eating a second slice of cake is lower than that of the first, the pleasure of 
improving the life of the 2,000th bird is lower than that of the first – the precipitous rate of 
decline could be taken to support the claim that people engage with animal welfare emotionally, 
rather than rationally (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 208, 298). This means that they react to an 
 
5 These models show that a person’s utility can increase as a result of another’s consumption. This is 
particularly relevant to the issue of farm animal welfare, where consumers’ altruistic preferences may be 
satisfied by an animal’s consumption of a bundle of goods with certain perceived welfare attributes. 
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image, whether it be of a hen in a cage, a sow in a stall or a seabird drowning in an oil slick 
rather than the number of animals involved (Kahneman 2012: 93). 
The emotional nature of engagement with animal welfare leads consumers to seek cues that 
broadly indicate that an animal has lived a happy life (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 40; Harper and 
Henson 2001: 19). One such cue is naturalness (Harper and Henson 2001: 15; Brook Lyndhurst 
2010: 39), which may explain why sheep and cattle are generally viewed as enjoying some of the 
highest welfare standards (IGD 2007: 20): these animals can often be seen grazing on pasture. 
Similarly, free-range egg production is generally perceived to provide high welfare (Pettersson 
et al. 2016), perhaps because access to an outdoor space evokes images of natural production.  
Naturalness cues do not guarantee high levels of animal welfare, however, with access to free 
range providing a prime example. One measure of laying hen welfare ranks access to free range 
as the 19th most significant element of welfare, out of 25 (De Mol et al. 2006: 160), and free-range 
production is compatible with harmful practices such as beak trimming and the use of high 
stocking densities. 
Purchases motivated by a desire for animals to live more natural lives are therefore best 
understood through models of pure paternalism. Consumers with these motivations take 
satisfaction from the idea of animals living in conditions believed to be natural, irrespective of 
how these conditions affect animal welfare, information about which many will actively avoid 
(Harper and Henson 2001: 17; Miele 2010: 4). This is not to say that models of mixed paternalism 
are not also applicable to farm animal welfare issues. People who care about animal welfare, 
engage with it on a rational level and make welfare-informed purchases of animal products are 
likely to be mixed paternalists, as they care about the benefits received by animals rather than 
the mere provision of certain resources. 
 
iii. Ethical Preferences 
One type of altruistic preference that warrants further consideration is the ethical preference. 
Many consumers buy goods because doing so supports environmental or social causes. Some 
internet users use the search engine Ecosia, for instance, because the firm spends 80% of its 
profits on tree-planting initiatives in biodiversity hotspots around the world (Ecosia 2019), while 
other consumers actively seek out the Fairtrade logo on products such as chocolate and coffee 
to ensure that farmers receive a fair wage. 
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The claim that ethical preferences can motivate purchases of higher-welfare animal products 
requires detailed justification. It is clear that people can hold ethical preferences for farm animal 
welfare: some people care about farm animals because they believe that their welfare is an 
appropriate object for ethical concern. Although there are many ethical theories that can 
ground this belief, the philosophical literature is dominated by two. Some people have adopted 
a welfarist position, which draws heavily from utilitarianism by attributing moral significance 
to animal interests, which in turn are predicated upon the capacity for sentience. One version 
of this position is articulated by Peter Singer in Animal Liberation. The welfarist position states 
that, while we ought to consider the preferences of all sentient beings, the capacity of sentience 
does not endow its holder with inviolable rights. 
Other philosophers disagree with Singer and the welfarists on this point and propose a rights-
based approach to animal ethics. This position was perhaps most famously advanced by Tom 
Regan, who argued that a being is morally significant if it is likely to be a subject-of-a-life, i.e. 
whether it is a being with:  
[B]eliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; 
an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; 
a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential 
life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically 
independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests (Regan 2004: 243). 
Those beings that fulfil the criteria for a subject-of-a-life possess a right to life that humans are 
morally obliged to respect, and, Regan argues, we ought to err on the side of caution with respect 
to those beings whose capacities we are uncertain about. 
A rights-based position does not have to be grounded upon the subject-of-a-life criterion, 
however. Gary Francione and Anna Charlton (2015) also hold a rights-based position, although, 
in contrast to Regan, they base it upon the quality of sentience. Their position is frequently 
referred to as abolitionism, due to their claim that sentient beings possess a basic right not to 
be the property of humans, which demands the abolition of animal ownership. 
There are several forms of animal product production that threaten to expose divisions between 
welfarist and rights-based theories. Some producers achieve higher levels of welfare by giving 
their animals more natural diets, using lower stocking densities, providing access to natural 
environments and refraining from noncurative operations such as beak trimming and tail 
docking. Many of these producers also farm in a sustainable manner that benefits both the local 
and global environment (Pollan 2011: 123-238; Solotaroff 2013). Such production methods may 
be amenable to welfarists. Indeed, Peter Singer and author and attorney Jim Mason remain open 
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to the possibility that – in certain, very limited circumstances – the consumption of some animal 
products may be morally acceptable. In a 2006 interview with The Vegan magazine, Singer 
indicates that, if suffering is our primary concern, the occasional consumption of meat produced 
by animals that have lived natural lives and are humanely killed on the farm may not be 
objectionable (Raha 2006: 19). Singer and Mason point out that land in the Welsh hills is 
unsuitable for crop production, but has been used to raise lambs using traditional forms of 
husbandry. If the sheep live good lives, and would not have existed if they were not to be killed 
and eaten, Singer and Mason (2006: 255) conclude that the production and consumption of such 
goods may be beneficial to both humans and animals. 
While meat produced in conditions of extremely high welfare may be acceptable to the welfarist, 
the ultimate killing of the animal will make it unacceptable to most rights-based thinkers, as, 
although the animals are given a much higher quality of life than in conventional production, 
their inevitable slaughter still violates their right to life and thus requires them to be treated as 
mere means to human ends. Abolitionists will also oppose extremely high-welfare products, as 
their production still requires sentient animals to be treated as property. 
A second form of animal product production that threatens to expose divisions both within the 
animal rights camp and between rights-based and welfarist positions is that of cultivated (lab-
grown) meat. This emerging technology grows meat from animal cells that can be collected 
without causing harm to the donor – the US firm JUST, for instance, can cultivate animal-free 
chicken nuggets using cells taken from a chicken feather (Morris and Cook 2018). The cells are 
then placed in a liquid called a culture medium, which induces them to multiply (proliferate) 
before differentiating into muscle cells (van Mensvoort and Grievink 2014: 10-11).6 These cells 
are placed around a scaffold, which encourages them to merge into myotubes and grow into 
muscle fibres. These fibres are then harvested and processed into a final product. Proponents of 
cultivated meat claim that the technology has the potential to resolve many of the welfare, 
health, food safety and environmental issues that stem from animal agriculture (Reese 2018: 73-
94; Datar et al. 2016: 125; Mattick and Allenby 2012; Mattick et al. 2015; Shapiro 2018). Many also 
anticipate that cultivated meat will one day be cheaper to produce than its conventional 
counterpart, as the production of cultivated meat does not require energy to be expended on 
metabolisms, movement, digestion, bones and internal organs, as is the case in conventional 
animal agriculture (Post 2012: 299) – instead, resources are expended almost entirely on the 
growth of consumable products. For our purposes, the technology may offer a way of producing 
 
6 The technology can also be used to produce fat cells. 
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meat without inflicting suffering or death upon animals. Despite the potential benefits of the 
technology, it may create divisions among animal ethicists. A welfarist is unlikely to take issue 
with cultivated meat, provided that any animals used to supply the cells are treated well (Singer 
and Mason 2006: 263). Given that cultivated meat does not require animal deaths, the 
technology may also win support from those supporters of animal rights who believe that farm 
animals possess a right to life. Cultivated meat is likely, however, to remain unacceptable to 
abolitionists, as the most viable forms of cell-cultivating technology require the maintenance of 
host animals from which tissue samples are harvested (Francione 2018; Ventin forthcoming). 
Despite their disagreements on these issues, however, both welfarists and supporters of animal 
rights are likely to agree that the overwhelmingly majority of animal products are produced in 
ways that are morally unacceptable. Seemingly intrinsic elements of modern production such 
as high stocking densities, large flock or herd sizes and mutilations are incompatible with 
welfarist concerns, while the ownership of sentient beings and use of subjects-of-lives for 
human ends renders these forms of production incompatible with abolitionist and animal rights 
positions. Given that modern intensive farming is incompatible with the welfarist, animal rights 
and abolitionist positions, the outputs of these systems, i.e. their products, must surely also be 
incompatible. Adopting a rights-based or abolitionist position currently seems to require people 
to become vegans or vegetarians, and, given the animal suffering that permeates modern 
farming – including in systems perceived as being higher welfare, such as free-range eggs, where 
mutilations and high stocking densities are common – welfarists also seem obliged to abstain 
from most animal product markets. The suffering and killing of animals in modern farming thus 
seems to preclude the possibility that ethical concern for animal welfare can justify purchases 
of higher-welfare goods, and therefore gives us reason to be sceptical of the claim that ethical 
concern can motivate higher-welfare purchases. 
Nevertheless, many consumers of animal products do claim to assign moral significance to farm 
animals. This apparent incompatibility between their values and behaviour is often referred to 
as the meat paradox (Loughnan et al. 2010: 156). Consumers respond to the meat paradox in 
many ways.7 Many people hold consistency to be valuable for its own sake (Cialdini 2007: 59), 
and awareness of inconsistency between one’s behaviour and values can be a source of anxiety, 
known as cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957: 1-2; Rothgerber 2014: 32). Because consistency is 
often viewed as valuable in itself and inconsistency can be a source of anxiety, some people will 
 
7 This section is not intended to provide a comprehensive account of consumer responses to the meat 
paradox. A more detailed discussion can be found in Rothgerber 2014. 
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respond to perceived inconsistencies by becoming more consistent (Cialdini 2007: 73). One way 
that some people do this is by adjusting their values to reflect their behaviour, leading them to 
reduce their ethical concern for farm animals. Loughnan et al. (2010) found that omnivores who 
had just eaten beef jerky were more likely to attribute lower moral significance to cows and 
other animals than a control group that was given cashews, a finding that can be explained by 
the subjects wanting their attitudes to be consistent with their behaviour. Alternatively, people 
may adjust their actions to reflect their ethical concern for animal welfare by becoming 
vegetarian or vegan, or reducing their consumption of animal products: exposing test subjects 
to issues of animal welfare has been found to reduce willingness to eat meat (Hoogland et al. 
2005; Berndsen and van der Pligt 2004). 
While these findings demonstrate one way that consumers can reduce the cognitive dissonance 
associated with becoming aware of their personal meat paradox, it does not show that ethical 
concern is capable of motivating purchases of higher-welfare goods. Instead, the consistency 
response suggests that people must in fact reduce their ethical concern if they are to continue 
consuming animal products. 
Another way that consumers respond to the meat paradox is by avoiding engaging with their 
ethical values at points of interaction, often by dissociating animal products from living animals 
(Harper and Henson 2001: 11). Although some consumers care about farm animals, and can 
experience feelings of guilt and even disgust when they think about the fact that an animal has 
died in order to produce a good (Kunst and Hohle 2016; Harper and Henson 1999: 17; McEachern 
and Seaman 2005: 582), their ethical concern may not be at the forefront of their thought at 
points of purchase and consumption (Safran Foer 2010: 213). Dissociation may be encouraged 
by environmental cues: I argue in Chapter 7 that supermarket choice architecture assists 
dissociative processes by nudging consumers to subdue their ethical preferences at points of 
purchase.  
Dissociation can also have internal causes: some people engage in ‘voluntary ignorance’ by 
avoiding or ignoring information that links animal products to the living farm animal, and thus 
evokes feelings of guilt or disgust (Harper and Henson 1999: 17; Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 32-33; 
Pettersson et al. 2016: 2000; Singer 2015a: 217). Consumer engagement in voluntary ignorance is 
assisted by the fact that animal products are frequently processed and prepared in a way that 
hides their animal origins (a chicken nugget has very little in common visually with a live 
chicken) (Gruzalski 2004: 126). Additionally, dissociation is aided by the fact that English 
speakers tend to use Norman words such as beef and pork to refer to the flesh of animals that 
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they call by their Saxon names, cows and pigs (Ryder 2000: 93). This enables consumers to put 
further distance between the food on their plate and the animal that produced it. Even in the 
case of chicken and lamb, where the flesh and the animal share the same name, product names 
such as mince, burger, nugget and drumstick help consumers distance the product from its 
animal origins (Hoogland et al. 2005: 16; Kunst and Hohle 2016: 770-71; Rothgerber 2014: 33).  
Despite initial appearances, dissociative strategies can enable consumers’ ethical concerns to 
motivate higher-welfare purchases. This may appear counterintuitive: after all, if a consumer 
engaged in dissociation fails to consider his ethical beliefs at points of purchase and 
consumption, how can his actions be ethically-motivated? 
This claim can be supported with reference to the nature of consumer engagement with farm 
animal welfare. We saw earlier (p.26) that many people engage with farm animal welfare on an 
emotional level, preferring to focus on the idea and imagery of ‘happy animals’ rather than the 
discomfort that often follows engaging with the detail of modern animal agriculture (IGD 2007: 
16; Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 40). Consequently, consumers’ ethical concern for farm animal 
welfare is often manifested through purchases of goods labelled as free-range, grass-fed, etc. 
that imply higher welfare and happy animals. Dissociative strategies, on the other hand, serve 
to distance consumers only from the elements of animal agriculture that they find discomfiting, 
namely suffering and the animal’s ultimate fate. 
It seems, therefore, that, despite the apparent incompatibility between ethical values and 
conventional animal agriculture, ethical concern can still motivate higher-welfare purchases. 
Consumers may dissociate themselves from the parts of animal agriculture – such as animal 
deaths, animal suffering and low-welfare production – that cause them to feel discomfort or 
guilt, and instead selectively focus their attention, and ethical concern, on elements they are 
more comfortable with, in particular the idea of happy animals living natural lives in higher-
welfare systems. Their ethical preferences can thus motivate them to seek out cues that farm 
animals have lived good lives, while ignoring cues that remind them of suffering and death. 
This kind of ethical preference can be contained within the altruistic frameworks discussed 
earlier. Ethical preferences for farm animal welfare may be purely paternalistic (McConnell 1997: 
32), where consumers take pleasure in the knowledge that farm animals have been provided a 
particular set of resources, such as access to free range.8 Ethical motivations can also be 
explained with reference to a third theory of altruism called impure or warm glow altruism, 
 
8 Models of mixed paternalism do not appear relevant because many consumers appear uninterested in 
learning about the real impact of certain resources upon animal welfare. 
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which recognises that many consumers experience a feeling of intrinsic satisfaction that results 
from a belief that their actions have made a positive difference (IGD 2007: 16; Andreoni 1990). 
Irrespective of whether consumers’ ethical preferences are purely paternalistic, impurely 
altruistic or a combination of the two, it is likely that ethical motivations for purchases of 
higher-welfare goods can in fact operate within the bounds created by dissociation. 
In sum, I have argued that ethical concern for farm animal welfare can serve as a motivator for 
higher-welfare purchases, provided consumers disengage from animal suffering and death in 
the production process. More broadly, I have proposed that preferences for welfare can be 
altruistic and self-interested in nature. It is important to recognise that welfare economics 
affords no special value to any of these preferences: seemingly arbitrary altruistic preferences 
are afforded as much significance as preferences motivated by ethical concern, which are in turn 
as significant as self-interested preferences. All are regarded simply as matters of taste. This is 
unlikely to sit well with ethicists, who tend to enshrine matters of ethics with a special 
significance that extends beyond mere taste. Nevertheless, given that this thesis is situated 
within the discipline of welfare economics, I will continue to subscribe to the idea that ethical 
preferences for farm animal welfare are held on the same level as matters of taste, although I 
recognise that this assumption is highly contentious and tends not to reflect the way people 
think about ethical concern. 
Beyond self-interest, altruism and ethical concern, other writers recognise that economic agents 
can also be concerned with purposes, personal and social values, beliefs about what others are 
like and the actions that they are likely to take, natural events that may occur, as well as 
psychological attitudes, peer group pressures, personal experiences and the general cultural 
environment (Dasgupta 2005: 231; Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 86). Having a theory that is 
capable of recognising a range of different types of preferences allows economists to develop 
models that more realistically-explain and predict behaviour, and also allows preference 
utilitarianism to better capture what matters to economic agents. 
 
d. Utility Functions 
When we gather preferences (of all types) together in a preference set and assign them 
numerical values, we create a utility function. Utility functions are ordinal in nature, meaning 
that the numerical values assigned to preferences only indicate their positions in the ranking, 
rather than their relative strengths (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013: 80; Dasgupta 2005: 229). 
Because utility functions are ordinal, the assumptions of transitivity, continuity and 
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independence all hold under monotonically increasing transformations, i.e. transformations 
that preserve the order of numbers rather than the distance between them (Mandler 2006: 1114). 
Figure 1 provides an example of an ordinal utility function containing preferences for drinks. 
Despite the difference between utility values in Figure 1 varying between each ranking, they all 
indicate the same thing: the Big Blue is preferred to the Tripod, which in turn is preferred to the 
Tickler. Ordinal utility rankings therefore do not reveal the extent to which one option is 
preferred to another (Köbberling 2004: 375; Strotz 1953: 384; High and Bloch 1989: 354). 
 
e. Welfare 
When writers use preference utilitarianism to ground the claim that a policy is beneficial to an 
individual or a society, they implicitly link utility to welfare, which refers to ‘how good people’s 
lives are for them, … how well their lives are going’ (Hausman 2012: 78; Hausman and McPherson 
2009: 2).9 The implication is that if a policy increases a person’s utility, i.e. if it satisfies their 
preferences, it must therefore be to their advantage to see this policy enacted, i.e. the policy 
must be welfare-increasing. The identification of preference satisfaction with welfare is 
contentious, however. Detractors have claimed that there are at least four types of case where 
the satisfaction of preferences is either irrelevant or even detrimental to how well a person’s life 
goes for them, implying that preference satisfaction is not a good basis for welfare. 
First, most people will hold at least some preferences that are not concerned with their own 
experience or life. Additionally, some people might hold preferences for states of the world that 
they will never knowingly experience (Harsanyi 1986: 3; Hausman and McPherson 2009: 6; Parfit 
 
9 There are other definitions of welfare, such as Stiglitz et al.’s claim that welfare concerns what is ultimately 
good for people, i.e. what contributes to their quality of life (Stiglitz et al. 2010: 67). Accounts of this type tend 
to claim that there are objective constituents to welfare that matter independently of whether an individual 
cares about them. I will not explore these accounts in this thesis, as they are not relevant to the project. For a 
brief overview of objective list theories of welfare, see Reiss (2013: 222-25). For an example of an objective list 
theory of welfare, see Stiglitz et al. (2010: 67-90). 
Figure 1 – Ordinal Utility Function                                                                                                   
(adapted from Reiss 2013: 38) 
  Utility Ranking 
  A B C D 
D
ri
n
k Big Blue 2 1,002 -11.8 10,000 
Tripod 1 1,001 -11.9 1,000 
Tickler 0 1,000 -12 1 
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1987: 484): Aimee sees in the news that a summer heatwave has contributed to the deaths of 
thousands of chickens at a local farm (see Creaghan 2019 for one instance in the UK). She 
develops a preference that the farm installs appropriate ventilation and temperature control to 
prevent such an incident reoccurring. The farm in fact does take these measures, although, 
because this is not reported in the news, Aimee remains unaware of this. Despite Aimee’s 
preference being satisfied, it does not appear that her welfare – how well her life goes for her – 
has been affected (Fletcher 2016: 13, 34; Adler and Posner 2006: 36). Instead, it is arguably the 
feeling of satisfaction that arises after a preference is satisfied, as opposed to the satisfaction of 
the preference itself, that increases a person’s welfare (Parfit 1987: 494).10 
Second, many people hold preferences, often based on false or incomplete information, whose 
satisfaction can be harmful to their welfare (Harsanyi 1977a: 645-46; Hausman 2010: 323; Griffin 
1986: 12). As discussed earlier (p.23), some people hold preferences for higher welfare because 
they associate it with greater food safety. This association does not always hold true, however: 
access to outdoor spaces can increase an animal’s exposure to pathogens, which may 
compromise food safety. People who buy higher-welfare goods for reasons of food safety may 
be acting in a way that is in fact harmful to their welfare.11 This poses a problem for the 
preference utilitarian, who must seemingly hold that the satisfaction of these preferences is 
welfare-increasing. 
Some have suggested that this criticism can be circumvented, either by only regarding the 
satisfaction of fully-informed preferences as being relevant to welfare, or by laundering 
uninformed preferences to compensate for errors in reasoning and knowledge. Laundering 
‘fixes’ those preferences derived from false information by asking what someone who is both 
free from cognitive errors and fully-informed about herself and her circumstances would prefer 
(Railton 1986: 16; Hare 1981: 104-5; Harsanyi 1977a: 646). It may not be clear, however, when 
someone possesses an irrational preference (Hausman 2012: 84). As Julian Reiss writes (2013: 
216), ‘[w]e can observe only how people actually choose, not how they would choose if they were 
fully informed, rational and possess infinite amounts of strength of will’. Without knowing what 
a rational and fully-informed version of someone would prefer and how she would behave, we 
 
10 The same point can be made for some self-interested preferences. Behzad might prefer to be descended 
from Charlemagne. It turns out that Behzad is in fact a descendant of Charlemagne, yet he is unable to trace 
his ancestry and so remains ignorant of the fact (Hausman 2012: 85-86). Behzad’s satisfied preference does 
not seem to affect his welfare. 
11 Other examples of preferences based on false or incomplete information include preferences for the 
consumption of large quantities of alcohol, drugs and cigarettes, or listening to loud music when not aware of 
the health risks. 
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cannot identify her ‘true’ preferences, and thus also cannot identify her ‘false’ preferences 
(Hausman and McPherson 2010: 129). While this is a problem regarding the measurability of 
laundered preferences and thus may not be philosophically fatal, it is surely relevant to the 
usefulness of preference satisfaction theories of welfare in applied contexts such as public policy. 
Third, some preferences conflict. This often occurs when people hold second-order desires, 
preferences about the kinds of preferences they wish to have (Frankfurt 1971: 6-7). Upon learning 
about the lives of hens in cage systems, Caroline may prefer not to prefer caged eggs. However, 
if Caroline is weak-willed or highly price-motivated, her first-order desire for cheap caged eggs 
may conflict with her second-order desire to not hold a preference for caged eggs. When 
preferences conflict, it is not clear which should be taken to be representative of a person’s 
welfare, and preference satisfaction theories appear unable to provide an answer to this 
problem. Without an answer, it is difficult to determine which course of action – in this case, 
whether or not Caroline should buy caged eggs – will improve a person’s welfare (Hausman and 
McPherson 2009: 7).  
Fourth, people can adapt their preferences to fit their circumstances. As noted earlier, 
preferences for farm animal welfare and animal products can be influenced by recent 
experience. Loughnan et al. (2010) found that people who had just eaten beef jerky were more 
likely to attribute lower moral significance to cows and other animals than a control group of 
omnivores that were given cashews, a finding that can be explained by the subjects having a 
desire for their attitudes to be consistent with their behaviour. Other studies have found the 
inverse to also be true: exposing subjects to issues of animal welfare can reduce willingness to 
eat meat (Hoogland et al. 2005; Berndsen and van der Pligt 2004).12 In short, some people will 
adapt their preferences to support their recent behaviour and experience. This raises a problem 
for preference theories of welfare: perceptions of how a person’s life is going for them may be 
arbitrarily or inappropriately influenced by environmental factors. 
In short, although the satisfaction of preferences may constitute a significant part of welfare, it 
does not appear to capture everything that affects how well a person’s life is going for them 
(Broome 1991: 4). Even though the satisfaction of preferences may not always be welfare-
 
12 More concerningly, many people have grown accustomed to, and satisfied with, living in challenging 
conditions, often where their rights are violated and their lives are of low quality (Sen 2001: 62-63; Nussbaum 
2001). Incredibly, some adjust to environments of oppression by preferring not to possess things such as 
liberties and protection. A preference utilitarian account of welfare could be forced to conclude that these 
people enjoy a high level of welfare, despite their lack of rights and liberties. In fact, a preference satisfaction 
account of welfare may even identify a harm to welfare if rights and liberties were provided, if people prefer 
not to have these things (Hausman and McPherson 2009: 8). 
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increasing, and some things may be welfare-increasing irrespective of how well they satisfy 
preferences, there is surely a strong evidential connection between preference satisfaction and 
welfare: the satisfaction of preferences is a good indicator that welfare has also increased 
(Hausman et al. 2017: 128-29). Adopting this position is useful because it does not require us to 
commit to any particular account of welfare; recognising that preferences and preference-
satisfaction are an indicator of someone’s welfare does not require us to claim that welfare can 
be entirely captured by the mere satisfaction of someone’s preferences (Hausman and 
McPherson 2009: 16-18). 
 
f. Social Utility 
Preference utilitarianism allows us to make claims about how policies affect a person’s utility: 
when more preferences are satisfied, utility increases, while utility decreases when fewer 
preferences are satisfied or preferences are thwarted. This thesis, however, is less concerned 
about individuals’ preferences and more concerned about the preferences of large groups of 
people. To be suitable for this end, preference utilitarianism must therefore be able to ground 
meaningful claims about social utility. 
By themselves, preference satisfaction theories only support some very basic claims about social 
utility. We see this when we examine the social utility function. The social utility function is 
derived from the preference rankings of every individual in a society, which are brought together 
using some sort of rule to form the basis of an overall social ranking, which in turn allows us to 
make claims about how policies affect social utility (Arrow 1963: 23). 
To create a social utility function, it is therefore necessary to show that utility functions can be 
aggregated, i.e. that they are commensurable. If commensurable, we should be able to make 
comparisons between individual utility functions. One proposed way of making these 
interpersonal utility comparisons is to look at utility levels, the position that people occupy in 
their preference sets. Figure 2 illustrates the principle. 
 
Figure 2 – Comparison of Utility Levels 
David Emily 
a x 
b y 
c z 
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Assume that David and Emily each possess three preferences about states of the world. Assume 
a>b>c and x>y>z. David’s a preference is satisfied, while Emily’s y preference is satisfied. We 
can therefore say that David’s preferences are better-satisfied than Emily’s as he occupies a 
higher position in his preference set, and so possesses a higher level of welfare (Hammond 1991: 
207-8). 
Utility level comparisons, however, are only possible when preference sets are finite in size. 
Unfortunately for the preference utilitarian, there are many cases, such as when dealing with 
preferences about states of the world, where preference sets are infinitely large: the addition of 
a token sum of money or another good will surely always be preferred to a state of the world 
where these things are absent. When preference sets are infinite in size, we cannot identify 
where someone stands in their preference set,13 seemingly rendering interpersonal comparisons 
impossible (Hausman 1995: 476). 
Several writers have argued that this objection is not fatal. One proposed way of overcoming 
the problem of infinite preference sets is to use what A.F. MacKay calls the ‘mental shoehorn 
manoeuvre’ to make judgements of extended sympathy or empathy. The mental shoehorn 
manoeuvre changes the nature of our judgements from interpersonal comparisons to 
intrapersonal ones (MacKay 1986: 310). Rather than asking whether Finley would be better off 
than Gowri in a given situation, we instead ask whether we would prefer to be Finley or Gowri. 
To make this assessment, we must distance ourselves from our personal characteristics, which 
would introduce non-empathetic influences to any preference for being Finley in situation x 
over being Gowri in situation y (Binmore 2009: 554; Hausman and McPherson 2010: 106). We 
must instead imagine ourselves entirely in the circumstances of the other, with his or her tastes, 
education, social background, cultural values and psychological make-up (MacKay 1986: 305, 
308; Harsanyi 1977a: 638). If the empathetic process is successful, there will be no difference 
between the preferences held by the person performing the mental shoehorn manoeuvre and 
the subject of that process (Binmore 2009: 555). Only once we have truly adopted the 
perspective of another and can treat his or her experiences as if they were our own can we 
reintroduce our own preferences to determine whether it is better to be Finley in situation x or 
Gowri in situation y (Harsanyi 1977b: 59; Sen 1979: 196). From this, we can construct what 
Hausman and McPherson dub a ‘universal extended preference ranking’, a complete ranking of 
the preferences of different people that serves as a social utility function. 
 
13 Except in those rare cases where they stand at the very top or bottom of their preference set. 
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Hausman and McPherson argue (2010: 107), however, that the universal extended preference 
ranking provides an answer to a question that is, for our purposes, irrelevant. When making 
interpersonal utility comparisons, the question is not ‘would I rather be Finley in situation x or 
Gowri in situation y?’, but rather ‘whose preferences are better satisfied?’. I might prefer to be 
Gowri in situation y, even though Finley’s preferences are better satisfied in situation x, simply 
because, for instance, I have greater admiration for Gowri. Consequently, preferences for being 
Finley in situation x over being Gowri in situation y may be influenced by our own personal 
preferences, which have no bearing on how well-satisfied Finely and Gowri’s preferences are. It 
therefore seems that the mental shoehorn manoeuvre fails to overcome the problem of infinitely 
large preference sets and thus does not enable us to make interpersonal utility comparisons: 
although it may help us to work out who we would prefer to be, it does not enable us to 
determine whose preferences are better-satisfied. 
Even if this objection should not prove fatal, the mental shoehorn manoeuvre is surely too 
demanding to be useful in a policy context, where it would require us to put ourselves in the 
shoes of every person in a society. To do this, we would need to possess incredibly high levels 
of empathy and have access to prohibitively large quantities of information about every member 
in a society. Consequently, even if we can overcome the theoretical issues that threaten our 
ability to make interpersonal utility comparisons, it appears that the mental shoehorn 
manoeuvre does not represent a serious option for policymakers looking to assess the impacts 
of policy upon social utility. 
Our apparent inability to make interpersonal utility comparisons makes it difficult to develop a 
rule that allows us to move from a collection of individual utilities to a social utility function. 
Without an effective universal extended preference ranking, it seems that attempts to create a 
social utility function must instead rely upon judgements about how much weight to afford the 
interests of one person relative to another. Making such judgements is problematic because any 
statement about the relative weighting of an individual’s utility in a social utility function 
requires us to make subjective value judgements that extend beyond the core assumptions of 
welfare economics (Robbins 1932: 123; Scanlon 1991: 17). In a two-person society, the statement 
‘Hassan prefers policy x to the status quo, and the status quo to policy y, while Ida prefers policy 
y to the status quo, and the status quo to policy x’ is one that can be made objectively: we can 
derive the preferences of Hassan and Ida by observing their behaviour or by simply asking them. 
Similarly, we can objectively ascertain that if x is chosen, Ida will feel worse-off than before, 
while if y is chosen, Hassan will experience a decrease in utility. 
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Preference utilitarianism does not, however, allow us to make statements such as ‘choosing 
policy x over policy y will increase social utility’ in an objective manner. This is because the 
ordinality of preference sets cannot recognise the magnitude of utility changes; the only thing 
we can know for sure is the direction in which Hassan and Ida’s utilities move. Should policy x 
be chosen over policy y, our knowledge of Hassan and Ida’s preferences only lets us say that 
Hassan will experience a utility increase, while Ida will experience a utility decrease – because 
of the difficulties we face in making interpersonal comparisons, we cannot say whether Hassan’s 
gain outweighs Ida’s loss. Accordingly, we cannot objectively state that choosing x over y will 
increase social utility. 
Because we cannot identify the size of utility changes, we can only justify choosing x over y if 
we assign more weight to Hassan’s preferences than Ida’s. However, making this claim requires 
us to make a normative judgement, to say that Hassan’s gain is more valuable than Ida’s loss. 
Judgements about how much weight to assign to people’s interests cannot be made using 
preference utilitarianism alone; consequently, we cannot determine how a policy affects social 
utility when some people experience utility increases and others experience utility decreases. 
In sum, it appears that, by itself, preference utilitarianism cannot provide a foundation for social 
utility functions. A basic theory of preference utilitarianism cannot justify assigning different 
weights to different people’s preferences, while attempts to construct a universal extended 
preference ranking by imagining what it is like to be other people in different circumstances 
seem destined to fail, as the mental shoehorn manoeuvre asks us to consider who we would 
rather be in these cases, rather than whose preferences are best-satisfied. 
Without a viable social utility function, we are severely limited in the kinds of policy analysis 
we can conduct. When, for instance, a policy makes someone worse-off and someone better-
off, we appear unable to assess how this affects social utility. Despite this, we can still make 
some, admittedly limited, claims about social utility. These limited claims provide the 
foundations of another fundamental economic concept, efficiency. 
 
4. Efficiency 
The concept of efficiency allows policymakers to assess the desirability of a resource distribution 
relative to alternatives, and thus provides a means of evaluating policies. Given the difficulties 
we have encountered in producing a viable social utility function, however, it would be easy to 
assume that a concept of efficiency derived from preference utilitarianism will be of little use: if 
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a change in resource distribution makes one person better-off and another worse-off, we appear 
to be unable to determine whether the new distribution is more efficient, i.e. whether it has 
improved social utility. This is not the case, however: the work of Vilfredo Pareto has turned a 
preference utilitarian-grounded concept of efficiency into a powerful economic tool. 
 
a. Pareto Efficiency 
Vilfredo Pareto was an Italian sociologist and economist whose 1906 Manuale di Economia 
Politica (Manual of Political Economy) has been hugely influential in the development of 
microeconomics. In this book, Pareto proposed his Pareto criterion,14 which has enabled 
economists working in the preference utilitarian tradition to identify, in certain situations, the 
effects of policy upon social utility, while avoiding the problems raised by interpersonal 
comparisons that hinder attempts to build a social utility function.  
The Pareto criterion avoids the difficulties of interpersonal utility comparisons by focusing on 
cases where individual utilities do not move in opposing directions. It states that, when a change 
in resource distribution is preferred by at least one person and nobody prefers the old 
distribution, social utility has increased. The distribution of resources is now more efficient, and 
has undergone what is known as a Pareto improvement (Hausman and McPherson 2010: 136; 
Kreps 1990: 153).15 A distribution is Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal when it is no longer possible 
to change it in a way that constitutes a Pareto improvement (Hausman and McPherson 2010: 
136). Consequently, from a Pareto-optimal distribution, nobody can be made better-off without 
making someone else worse-off (Stiglitz 1991: 2). It is only in those cases where some people 
prefer the new distribution while others prefer the old that the overall effect upon social utility 
is uncertain. This is because of the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons in preference 
utilitarianism, as discussed above, and neatly summarised by Pareto, who explains that ‘when 
we reach the point at which some [people’s changes in utility] are positive and others negative, 
we shall not be able to proceed further because we shall be favouring some individuals at the 
expense of others’ (Pareto 2008: 397). Consequently, the Pareto criterion cannot identify the 
overall effect upon social utility when some people are made better-off and others worse-off, 
 
14 Not to be confused with the Pareto principle, which was first identified in Pareto’s 1896-7 Cours d’Économie 
Politique (Course of Political Economy), and states that, in many cases, roughly 80% of the effects come from 
20% of the causes. 
15 If, on the other hand, the old distribution of goods is preferred by at least one person, and nobody prefers 
the new distribution, there has been a decrease in social utility: nobody has been made better-off and 
somebody has been made worse-off, therefore the system has become less efficient in its resource allocation. 
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and so can only be used to make claims about social utility in very limited circumstances (Begg 
et al. 2000: 258). 
This limitation surely hinders the usefulness of the Pareto criterion. While it may be easy to 
identify policies which benefit everyone, or at least do not harm anyone, in a two-person society, 
the same cannot be said in a 66 million-person society such as the UK. The more people in a 
society, the greater the number of interests that need to be considered when drafting policies, 
and the larger the likelihood of there existing conflicting interests. It is highly unlikely that 
policies could be developed in large societies that make some people better off without making 
anyone worse off, which severely limits the usefulness of the Pareto criterion as a means of 
assessing the impact of policy (Trumbull 1990: 203; Reiss 2013: 259). A more useful measure of 
efficiency must allow us to identify the overall effect upon social utility when a policy makes 
some people better-off and others worse-off. It was in recognition of this need that Nicholas 
Kaldor and John Hicks adapted the Pareto criterion to create a concept of efficiency that may 
be better suited for discussing social utility in larger societies. 
 
b. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency 
The Kaldor-Hicks principle16 recognises that when people are made better-off by a change in 
resource allocation, making them policy winners, they will be willing to pay for this reallocation. 
This payment could be used to compensate those made worse-off by the reallocation, the policy 
losers, who would be willing to accept a certain sum of money for the reallocation to occur. 
A similar idea can be found in Pareto’s Manuale, although it was largely overshadowed by his 
Pareto criterion. Although Pareto argued that individual utilities are incommensurable and thus 
a direct transfer of utility to compensate those negatively affected by changes in allocation 
would be impossible, he remained open to the possibility that utility could be indirectly 
transferred by being converted into a resource, namely money. If utility can be converted into 
money, policy winners will be able to compensate policy losers. If such a transfer is sufficient to 
cover the utility losses, while preserving at least some gain for the policy winners, the 
reallocation of resources will have increased social utility: at least someone has been made 
better-off and compensation ensures that nobody has been made worse-off (Pareto 2008: 398; 
Kemp and Penzanis-Christou 1999: 443). 
 
16 Also referred to as the ‘potential Pareto principle’ and the ‘test of hypothetical overcompensation’ (Mishan 
1988: xxix). 
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More than thirty years after Pareto’s Manuale, Nicholas Kaldor produced his Kaldor criterion, 
which has much in common with Pareto’s ideas. The Kaldor criterion states that a policy 
increases social utility if the gains of the policy winners are large enough to compensate the 
policy losers so that nobody is left worse-off by the change and at least somebody benefits 
(Kaldor 1939: 551). By itself, however, this criterion may not be a useful policymaking tool. Tibor 
de Scitovszky (1941: 88)17 identifies cases where introducing and then reversing a policy are both 
Kaldor improvements. The Scitovsky paradox occurs when the policy winner can compensate 
the policy loser for a change in allocation from a to b, but the policy loser can then compensate 
the policy winner to reverse this. 
To avoid such outcomes, we must combine the Kaldor criterion with a criterion developed by 
John Hicks. The Hicks criterion recognises that, if a policy makes people worse-off, they will be 
willing to pay to avoid its enactment, up to their subjective valuation of their impending loss. It 
states that a policy will be advantageous to social utility if the amount that policy losers are 
willing to pay to prevent the change is smaller than the gains of the policy winners. When the 
losses of the policy losers stand to be larger than the gains of the policy winners, it is possible 
to redistribute resources in a way that leaves some people better-off and nobody worse-off than 
they would be under the policy (Hicks 1940: 111). 
These criteria are combined into the Kaldor-Hicks account, which identifies increases in social 
utility where a policy creates a net gain for society: the gains of policy winners outweigh the 
losses of policy losers and the policy losers’ willingness-to-pay to prevent the reallocation is 
insufficient to compensate the policy winners for their foregone gains. When these criteria are 
met, policy winners can compensate policy losers so that nobody is made worse-off by the 
change (Lusk and Norwood 2011: 470; Dasgupta and Pearce 1972: 57; de Scitovszky 1941: 86-87). 
Four points need to be clarified. First, the Kaldor-Hicks account has been charged with unfairly 
favouring the status quo.18 The account compares a proposed distribution against the current 
state of the world, and therefore treats the current distribution as the gold standard without 
questioning whether it is desirable in the first place (De Scitovszky 1941: 88). Part of why the 
Kaldor-Hicks account favours the status quo stems from problems similar to those we 
encountered when trying to develop a social utility function. To say that a given distribution is 
desirable requires us to make value judgements about how society should be organised, which 
cannot be supported by basic preference utilitarian assumptions and are considered 
 
17 Sometimes called Tibor Scitovsky in the literature. 
18 This criticism can also be levied at the Pareto account. 
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inappropriate by many economists (Robbins 1932: 123). By comparing to the status quo, we are 
not describing distributions as desirable or undesirable in themselves, but rather as more or less 
desirable than the current distribution. The Kaldor-Hicks account allows such claims to be 
made independent of contentious value judgements about which kinds of distributions are 
desirable. It is thus only by comparing potential states of the world to our current circumstances 
that we are able to meaningfully speak of changes in social utility. 
Second, the use of compensatory payments in the Kaldor-Hicks account appears to couch the 
discussion in monetary terms, and so the role of utility may seem unclear (Snyder and Nicholson 
2012: 157). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency presents utility in monetary terms, through the concepts of 
willingness to pay (WTP) and its counterpart willingness to accept (WTA). WTP relates to the 
sum of money a person is willing and able to spend in order to enjoy another unit of a good or 
to avoid a unit of something undesirable (Lusk and Norwood 2011: 480; Varian 1992: 161; 
Norwood and Lusk 2011: 206; Dupuit 1969: 257-58). It is equivalent to the sum of money that 
someone places on the utility either received from enjoying a good or saved by avoiding a bad 
(Bannock et al. 1984: 89; Dupuit 1969: 256). For example, if I value my enjoyment of a sandwich 
at £5, I will not be willing to pay more than £5 for it.19 WTA, on the other hand, refers to the sum 
of money that a person is willing to accept as compensation to forego consuming an extra unit 
of a good, or to consume a unit of something undesirable (Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 158; Mas-
Colell et al. 1995: 82).20 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can thus be defined in terms of WTP and WTA. The Kaldor criterion 
states that a policy increases efficiency if the policy winners’ WTP is greater than the policy 
losers’ WTA. The Hicks criterion states that a policy increases efficiency if the policy losers’ WTP 
to avoid the change is less than the policy winners’ WTA to maintain the status quo. 
Third, it may appear that the interpretation of utility used by the Kaldor-Hicks account has 
more in common with Bentham’s classical utilitarianism than with preference utilitarianism. By 
determining the effects of a policy on social utility by summing the gains and losses of policy 
winners and losers – measured in terms of WTP and WTA – the Kaldor-Hicks account could be 
charged with treating utility changes as commensurable, which implies that we can talk 
meaningfully about different magnitudes of preference. It must be stressed, however, that the 
 
19 If I am only asked to pay £3 for the sandwich, then I enjoy a consumer surplus of £2, as my subjective 
monetary valuation of my utility gain is £2 greater than the price charged for the good (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
2013: 132). 
20 Due to features of human psychology such as loss aversion, endowment effect and status quo bias, it should 
not be assumed that WTP and WTA are symmetrical, i.e. what a person is willing to pay for a good is often less 
than they are willing to accept to give it up (Kahneman et al. 1991). 
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Kaldor-Hicks account does in fact still depend upon a preference satisfaction interpretation of 
utility. Both WTP and WTA are couched in terms of preference satisfaction, as they refer to the 
sum of money that makes someone indifferent between a policy and the status quo. They are 
not measures of preference strength, and are distinctly unreliable tools for this purpose. This is 
because the concept of willingness to pay incorporates both willingness and ability to pay. A 
billionaire may have a higher WTP to ransom a close family member who has been kidnapped 
than a pauper, but this does not mean that the billionaire has a stronger preference to save her 
loved one – she may simply possess a greater ability to pay. The same applies to WTA. The 
billionaire may turn down £1 million from a co-worker to switch parking spaces to a less 
desirable one slightly further from the office, while most people would gladly accept the offer. 
Accepting the offer does not mean that we must have a weaker preference for a desirable parking 
space, however: we may simply possess a higher marginal utility of wealth, meaning that an 
increase in wealth provides greater utility to people with less wealth than to people with more 
wealth (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 206; Dasgupta and Pearce 1972: 44). Essentially, because of his 
lower level of wealth, average Joe may have a stronger preference for £1 million than for a 
desirable parking space; he thus assigns a higher level of utility to increases in wealth than a 
billionaire.21 
Despite being an unreliable tool for comparing the strengths of preferences between people, 
using WTP and WTA to approximate utility in monetary terms can be useful, as doing so reveals 
how much compensation policy losers must be paid to leave them as well-off as if they had 
consumed a certain bundle of goods (Varian 1992: 109). It needs to be recognised, however, that 
when using the Kaldor-Hicks account for this purpose, these subjective monetary valuations 
cannot be converted back into utility terms (Mishan 1988: 27), meaning that WTP and WTA 
cannot be used to make interpersonal utility comparisons.22 
Fourth, claims about the effects of policies upon social utility can only be reliably made if 
compensation is actually paid. In contrast, Kaldor (1939: 551) writes: ‘[o]nly if the increase in 
 
21 Variations can also exist between people’s preferences for wealth independent of their current levels of 
wealth. Although a miser such as A Christmas Carol’s Ebenezer Scrooge and a spendthrift reality television star 
may possess similar levels of wealth, their different attitudes towards money may support our belief that, 
when both are willing to pay up to £10,000 for poltergeist-removal services, Scrooge’s preference to be rid of 
apparitions is the stronger. The concept of WTP does not enable us to make this claim, however: all it 
recognises is that, in financial terms, both Scrooge and the reality star value the ghostbusting services equally. 
22 On the level of policy assessment, where a large number of interests are being considered, it may be 
possible to compensate for different marginal utilities of wealth. Modelling techniques can assign greater 
weight to the preferences of people on lower incomes, results could be drawn from the median, rather than 
the total, WTP, or cost-benefit analysis could simply be treated as just one input in the decision-making 
process, to be considered alongside issues such as distributional effects (Rigby 2019). 
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total income is sufficient to compensate for such losses, and still leaves something over to the 
rest of the community, can it be said to be “justified” without resort to interpersonal 
comparisons’; Hicks (1940: 111) writes that ‘the real income of society is higher in Situation II 
than in Situation I if it is impossible to make everyone as well off as he is Situation II by any 
redistribution of the actual quantities acquired in Situation I’. Neither say that these 
redistributions need to be made, but instead imply that an improvement in social utility can be 
identified as long as it is possible to make them (Dasgupta and Pearce 1972: 58). 
It is not obvious, however, that the overall effect of a policy upon social utility can be identified 
when compensatory payments are not actually made, but exist only as a theoretical possibility. 
When compensation is not paid, policy changes will likely have a positive impact on the utility 
of some people and a negative impact upon the utility of others. It was shown before that, when 
some individuals are made better-off and others are made worse-off, the overall effect upon 
social utility is uncertain. This uncertainty can be attributed to differences between individuals 
in their marginal utilities of wealth. A wealthy factory owner could earn an extra £100,000 per 
year by bringing in a new machine. This machine makes the positions of two workers, each on 
a salary of £40,000, redundant. The Kaldor-Hicks account states that buying the machine is 
welfare-increasing: the gains of the factory owner are sufficiently large to compensate the now-
redundant workers. If compensation is not paid, however, it is possible that the benefit enjoyed 
by the already-wealthy factory owner may be less than the misery inflicted upon the newly 
unemployed and financially insecure labourers (Edwards 1954: 390). Even though the workers’ 
financial losses do not outweigh the factory owner’s financial gains, the difference in wealth 
between the factory owner and the labourers means that the utility loss might exceed the utility 
gains: subjective monetary valuations cannot be converted back into utility. Consequently, 
when compensation is not paid, the overall effect of a policy upon social utility is likely to be 
uncertain (Trumbull 1990: 203). If the Kaldor-Hicks account is to reliably identify the effects of 
policies upon social utility, compensation must be paid rather than exist as a mere theoretical 
possibility.23  
In short, the Kaldor-Hicks account can enable the preference utilitarian to determine how a 
policy affects social utility, even in situations where some people experience utility increases 
and others experience utility decreases. Moreover, the theory avoids interpersonal utility 
comparisons; all we need to know is how much each policy winner is willing to either pay for a 
policy to be enacted or accept to maintain the status quo, and how much each policy loser is 
 
23 This was also Pareto’s view (Pareto 2008: 398; Kemp and Penzanis-Christou 1999: 443). 
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willing to either accept for a policy to be enacted or pay to maintain the status quo. We must, 
however, recognise that claims about the effects of a policy upon social utility can only be 
reliably made if policy losers are actually compensated for their losses. 
With the two related concepts of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency outlined, we are now well-
placed to apply these ideas to issues of farm animal welfare and consumer demand, and to 
consider when improvements to farm animal welfare can be justified with reference to theories 
of efficiency. 
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Chapter 2 
The Actors: Consumers, Producers and Farm Animals 
 
In this Chapter 
• A defence of the claim that, within the UK’s legal frameworks, improvements to farm animal 
welfare tend to come at the expense of productivity, and thus lead to cost increases. 
• An assessment of the extent of consumer preferences for farm animal welfare. 
• An assessment of consumer willingness-to-pay for improved farm animal welfare. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I outlined two concepts that will underpin much of the analysis in this 
thesis: utility as preference satisfaction and efficiency. In this chapter, I apply these concepts to 
issues of farm animal welfare and consumer demand, by asking whether efficiency can justify 
improvements in farm animal welfare. I begin this chapter by discussing the relationship 
between product prices and animal welfare. Ceteris paribus, lower prices are more desirable to 
consumers than higher ones,24 and so, if improvements in animal welfare correspond with lower 
prices, we can expect to find both a universal consumer preference for animal welfare and 
opportunities for efficiency improvements. I argue, however, that positive associations between 
price and animal welfare tend to be found only at extremely low and high levels of animal 
management, rather than at the levels of management currently permitted in the UK. Without 
a universal reason to support animal welfare improvements, efficiency improvements in this 
area will require consumers to be willing to pay for improved welfare. 
In the second half of this chapter, I assess the extent of demand for farm animal welfare in the 
UK. I discuss the reliability of the survey evidence, in particular whether factors such as virtue 
signalling distort responses. Ultimately, I find that survey data provides good reason – but not 
certainty – to believe that preferences for improved farm animal welfare are widespread in the 
UK and that there is substantial willingness-to-pay for welfare improvements. 
 
24 There appear to be rare exceptions to this statement. In November 2013, the makers of the popular party 
game Cards Against Humanity recognised the Black Friday shopping event by announcing that, for one day 
only, they would be raising the price of their product: sales increased slightly (Cards Against Humanity 2013; 
Dicker 2013). 
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2. Price Motivations and Farm Animal Welfare 
Price is an influential driver of purchases of almost all goods, including foods such as animal 
products (Schroeder and Tonsor 2011: 801; Ince 2010; Darnton 2016: 5). Holding all else equal, 
lower prices are nearly always preferred to higher prices as they enable consumers to consume 
more on the same budget. The consumer preference for lower prices could therefore be said to 
be universal. The price of animal products is influenced by production processes, and so any 
discussion of the relationship between consumer price and animal welfare necessarily involves 
an examination of production. 
The producer’s role is to supply goods in response to consumer demand. A producer’s primary 
motivation is profit. There are two main ways of increasing profits. When the producer’s price25 
is greater than production costs, finding ways to increase sales, such as marketing campaigns, 
can increase profits. Alternatively, producers may reduce costs by improving productivity, 
which allows them to either sell more units at a lower price while maintaining the same per unit 
profit margin, or sell at an unchanged price, but with a higher profit margin. Profit may not be 
the only thing that matters to a producer: irrespective of the economic gains or losses, many 
producers of animal products also care about the welfare of their animals and will take steps to 
give them a higher quality of life. This compassion, while laudable, is not of primary concern in 
this thesis as it is contingent on the producer being the kind of person who feels compassion 
towards animals. In contrast, all producers of animal products must be concerned with 
productivity as they need to be responsive to the almost universal consumer preference for 
lower prices. 
Where productivity aligns with animal welfare, there is a universal reason for consumers to 
prefer greater farm animal welfare: higher welfare leads to greater productivity, which can lead 
to lower prices for consumers. When this happens, improvements in farm animal welfare can 
leave all consumers better-off and so might amount to efficiency improvements. To assess 
whether such efficiency improvements are possible, my analysis will be framed in terms of the 
Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks theories of efficiency. For each theory of efficiency, I will conduct both 
 
25 Consumer price refers to the sum paid for the final good, while the producer price refers to the price 
received by producers. Consumer prices tend to be higher than producer prices due to the involvement of a 
range of actors, such as distributors, retailers and processors, in the supply chain. In what follows, price will 
refer to consumer price unless otherwise stated. It will, however, be assumed that, when price changes are 
driven by productivity changes, producer prices will move in tandem with consumer prices, or at least will not 
move against them. 
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a speciesist analysis,26 which focuses solely on human preferences, and a non-speciesist analysis 
that considers both human and animal preferences. I begin with the Pareto account. 
 
a. Pareto Efficiency and Farm Animal Welfare 
The Pareto criterion states that efficiency improvements, and thus improvements in social 
utility, exist where a change in the allocation of resources leaves someone better-off and nobody 
worse-off. To identify a non-speciesist Pareto improvement, we need to find a reason why all 
consumers should hold preferences for farm animal welfare. The preference for lower prices is 
a plausible candidate for a universal preference, but more work needs to be done to determine 
how far this preference aligns with farm animal welfare. This proposition arouses scepticism; if 
such an alignment existed, surely low welfare production systems such as battery cages would 
never have found use or would have been quickly withdrawn? Nevertheless, S.E. Curtis, an 
animal scientist friendly to the industry, has attempted to prove through his account of animal 
welfare that an alignment between consumer and animal interests exists (Safran Foer 2010: 64). 
Curtis is critical of attempts to define animal welfare in terms of unobservable indicators such 
as subjective animal mental states, or animal behaviour, which is often taken to be indicative of 
these unobservable mental states (Curtis 2007: 577). He proposes that an account of farm animal 
welfare should instead be derived from directly measurable characteristics, namely the 
productivity of an animal relative to its species’ production potential. He writes (2007: 573): 
[T]he best single set of measurable … indicators of [an] animal’s state of being will be its rates of 
productive and reproductive performance relative to its predicted potential to perform. Feed-
conversion efficiency, interindividual variation in performance, body condition index, and rates 
of culling, morbidity, and mortality also will provide valuable information on animal state of 
being. 
According to Curtis, if a farm animal experiences a reduction in performance relative to what 
its species is capable of, its welfare has declined. Curtis thus argues that the most productive 
animals – where productivity is measured in terms of weight gain, egg or milk production – will 
have the highest levels of welfare, while less-productive animals will have lower levels of welfare 
(Curtis 1989: 172). Importantly, Curtis recognises that the relationship between performance 
and welfare can be disrupted by changes in rates of morbidity and mortality. 
By linking higher productivity with higher welfare, Curtis’ theory might be used to propose an 
alignment between consumer and animal interests. It is in a farm animal’s interests for rates of 
 
26 ‘Speciesist’ is used in a purely descriptive sense to delineate an analysis that does not directly consider 
animal interests. It is not intended to make claims about the moral propriety of such an analysis. 
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morbidity and mortality to decline and for its body condition to improve, so it has a 
corresponding interest in possessing a higher level of some of Curtis’ constituents of welfare. 
Consumers also have an interest in farm animals enjoying a higher level of welfare, as the greater 
productivity that this entails can contribute to lower prices (Curtis 1989: 172).27 Curtis’ theory of 
welfare therefore implies that non-speciesist Pareto improvements are possible: both 
consumers and farm animals are potential beneficiaries of some welfare improvements. 
This alignment of consumer and animal interests is most consistent at the lowest and highest 
levels of animal management. When no effort is made to manage farm animals they may suffer 
from starvation, predation, exposure and disease. Providing nourishment, protection, shelter 
and medical care will improve both animal health and productivity (McInerney 2004: 18; WSPA 
2014), while making efforts to manage animal stress at slaughter can prevent instances of PSE 
(pale, soft and exudative) flesh in pig meat and DFD (dark, firm and dry) flesh in cattle and 
sheep meat (FAO 2001: 3-4). At the other end of the scale, where production is extremely 
intensive, efforts to improve animal health can improve productivity. The most intensively 
farmed animals are often kept in environments with little stimulation. In pig farms, these 
environments contribute to vice behaviours such as tail-biting, which cause health issues such 
as spinal column abscesses (Malone 2019). Addressing tail-biting, through providing more 
stimulating environments, utilising lower stocking densities or docking tails, produces healthier 
and more productive animals. Similarly, producers of mink fur found that introducing novelty 
items such as toys or plastic pipes into previously barren cages reduced the animals’ stress levels 
and contributed to higher-quality pelts (Conniff 2016: 106). 
These findings may be of little use to UK producers, however: animal welfare legislation and 
guidelines already contain stipulations about housing, healthcare and protection, as well as 
stocking densities and opportunities to engage in natural behaviours (European Council 
Directive 1999/74/EC, for instance, covers welfare requirements for laying hens), while 
approved meat premises such as slaughterhouses are monitored by Official Veterinarians from 
the Food Standards Agency to ensure compliance with welfare regulations detailed in Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009. Producers are thus already prohibited from providing levels of 
welfare so low that they harm productivity.28 
 
27 As welfare improvements may be costly, prices can only decrease when the costs of improving animal 
welfare are offset by the corresponding increase in animal productivity (Dawkins 1980: 27). The structure of 
the market and supply chains may also prevent consumers from receiving the full benefit of reduced 
production costs. 
28 Given that I am defining relative statements about farm animal welfare in terms of consumer beliefs about 
what constitutes higher and lower welfare, this statement is true insofar as consumers believe that these 
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Although there likely exists an alignment between animal productivity and animal welfare at 
the lowest and highest levels of animal management, it is not apparent that this alignment 
persists within the production space created by the UK’s legal constraints. Bernard Rollin (2008: 
16) claims that the productivity-welfare alignment applies mainly to traditional agricultural 
societies where animals could only grow properly, or provide milk or eggs, when their physical 
and psychological needs were met. In such societies, animal health and productivity were 
extensionally equivalent. In modern industrial agricultural systems, however, Rollin argues that 
technological advances have driven a wedge between health and productivity to the extent that 
productivity is no longer a good indicator of welfare.29 Rollin presents two cases where 
productivity improvements have come at the expense of animal health, and, in the eyes of many 
consumers, animal welfare. 
First, producers have made ‘progressive efforts to exploit biological potential through the 
application of higher levels of inputs’ (McInerney 2004: 18), frequently at the expense of animal 
health: a prime example of this comes from the use of high stocking densities (Rollin 2008: 11-
12). When chickens are kept in cages at higher stocking densities, vice behaviours such as 
cannibalism become more prevalent. Additionally, close confinement provides ideal conditions 
for pathogens to rapidly mutate and spread, to the detriment of productivity. Despite this, high-
density systems are more productive than lower-density (higher-welfare) alternatives30 – 
California’s 2015 ban of caged eggs caused a 9% price increase (Mullally and Lusk 2018: 650), 
while, in the UK, eggs produced in free-range systems cost about 62% more than their enriched 
cage counterparts (see Appendix I). 
A second way that producers have historically made productivity gains by exploiting animals’ 
biological potential is through confinement, which limits an animal’s ability to move. The use 
of smaller stalls and cages represents a more intensive use of housing inputs by enabling more 
animals to be contained in the same space, and, by limiting an animals’ energy expenditure on 
movement, maximises its ability to turn feed into body mass. Confinement was historically used 
to produce veal: calves would be housed in a manner that left them unable to turn around and 
made it difficult to stand up and lie down.31 Giving calves space to roam and exercise would 
 
extremely low and high levels of animal management, which are detrimental to productivity, are also 
detrimental to an animal’s welfare. 
29 Again, this assumes that consumers believe animal health to be relevant to animal welfare. 
30 This does not mean that animals in high-density systems are more productive than their lower-density 
counterparts: cage systems are more productive than free-range ones because their higher population 
densities more than compensate for reductions in individual animal productivity (Proudfoot et al. 1979). 
31 The use of veal crates was prohibited in the UK in 1990 and is currently covered by The Welfare of Farmed 
Animals (England) Regulations 2007. The EU banned the practice in 2006. 
2 | The Actors 
53 
 
cause them to develop firmer muscles, burn energy and consume grass, which would cause their 
flesh to lose its much-vaunted paleness. Consequently, intensive housing maintains the softness 
and paleness of the flesh and increases the rate of weight gain. This came at a cost to health 
though, as, beyond having their movement severely curtailed, mortality rates of 10-15% were 
commonly observed across the 15 weeks of a calf’s confinement, although admittedly we cannot 
know how much of this is a result of confinement and how much is a result of factors such as 
inadequate diet and deprivation of social contact (Singer 2015a: 129-35). 
Last, producers can exploit animals’ biological potential for productivity gains by manipulating 
animal diets to maximise weight gain. This is common in beef production, where cattle are 
frequently raised on diets largely based upon cheap and energy-rich corn, which leads to faster 
growth than a more natural grass diet (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 152-53; Singer 2015a: 139-40). 
Similar to force feeding, the use of higher levels of feed inputs exploits an animal’s ability to 
turn energy into body mass. A corn-rich diet enables cattle to grow fat and promotes marbling 
of the flesh; when this diet is combined with protein and fat supplements and nontherapeutic 
medications, a steer can grow from 80 pounds to 1,100 pounds in just 14 months. Once more, 
however, it seems that this productivity comes at a cost to health, as ruminant digestive systems 
have evolved to digest grass, not grain. Consequently, a grain-rich diet with little grass can cause 
health issues such as bloat, acidosis, liver damage and abscesses (Pollan 2011: 71-79; Singer 2015a: 
140).  
In addition to a more intensive use of inputs, the connection between productivity and animal 
health has also been severed by the use of selective breeding. Selective breeding has typically 
been used to produce farm animals that have higher rates of weight gain or produce greater 
quantities of eggs or milk.32 An early instance can be found in America in 1946, where the Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company poultry retailer ran a nation-wide ‘Chicken of Tomorrow’ 
competition, a five-year saga that encouraged participants to breed a new chicken that provided 
more breast, thigh and drumstick meat with less feed (Mason and Finelli 2006: 105). The $5,000 
prize, awarded by US Vice-President Alben Barkley, was won by Charles Vantress, who 
combined a New Hampshire female with a California Cornish male to produce a broad-breasted 
chicken that was approximately twice as heavy as a typical barnyard chicken of the time (Lawler 
2014). The Chicken of Tomorrow competition kickstarted the use of selective breeding in 
intensive broiler production, and the subsequent increase in productivity has been startling: 
 
32 More recently, selective breeding has been used for environmentally-friendly ends: Dr Eileen Wall from 
Scotland Rural College has used the technique to produce cows that produce lower methane emissions (BBC 
Newsday 2019). 
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between 1935 and 1995 the average weight of broilers increased by 65% and the time required to 
reach market weight fell by 60% – all using 57% less feed (Safran Foer 2010: 106). At the end of 
the Second World War, broilers took more than 13 weeks to grow to 2kg; today, selective 
breeding means that birds can reach 2kg in under six weeks, and at a cost to consumers of less 
than £5 (Appleby 1999: 96). Productivity similarly increased in the egg industry, where, today, 
selectively-bred layers produce twice as many eggs per year as chickens in the 1940s (Mason and 
Finelli 2006: 105). Modern dairy cows also produce three to four times more milk than their 
counterparts did 70 years ago (Rollin 2008: 12). Technological advances have also allowed 
producers to use genetic testing to introduce desirable traits or remove undesirable ones. The 
pork industry used this technique to remove carriers of a gene connected to pig stress, with the 
intention of reducing stress-related deaths, particularly from transportation (Safran Foer 2010: 
154). 
Although selective breeding has significantly increased yields, it frequently has a detrimental 
effect upon animal health, particularly in species that are modified to grow faster or develop 
quicker. Breeding animals for increased growth rates or yields without regard for health can 
lead to weakened immune systems, damaged cardiovascular health, reproductive failure, 
lameness, metabolic disorders and joint and bone problems (Fearing and Matheny 2007: 162; 
Almeida Pez et al. 2008: 103; Marcus 2005: 12-13; Rowlands 2002: 103; Voogd 2009; Appleby 1999: 
97; Fraser 2012: 194; Norwood and Lusk 2011: 148). This is evident in battery cage systems, banned 
in the European Union since 2012: the demands placed on hens’ bodies by the intensity of egg 
production, combined with the constricted movement afforded by their environment, results 
in 30% of live battery hens arriving at the slaughterhouse with at least one freshly-broken bone 
(Knowles 1994: 60).33 
Broiler chickens also endure serious health problems. The aim of selective breeding in this 
sector has been to develop birds with faster-growing muscle and fat tissue. Consequently, these 
parts of the bird grow faster than its bones, which often leads to deformity and disease.34 Three-
quarters of broilers suffer from some form of walking impairment, and one-quarter of them 
suffer a significant walking impairment (Safran Foer 2010: 126). Similarly, dairy cows raised in 
 
33 Knowles acknowledges that the quality of the removal team tasked with getting laying hens from their cages 
to the slaughterhouse plays a role in this statistic, but also notes that bone strength is significantly reduced in 
battery hens compared to hens from other production systems (Knowles 1994: 61). The wing strength of 
battery hens, who live in conditions which do not allow wing exercise, can be just 54% of birds living in higher-
welfare systems (Knowles and Broom 1990: 78). 
34 Breeder birds must therefore be semi-starved so they can live long enough to produce eggs for hatching; if 
fed ad libitum, these birds would likely collapse and die under their own weight (D’Silva 2008: 36).  
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traditional agricultural systems could remain productive for as long as 15 years, while it is 
common for selectively-bred cows in intensive systems to suffer metabolic burnout and become 
spent after little more than two lactations (Rollin 2008: 13).35 
There remain perhaps two further areas where the productivity-welfare alignment could hold 
true. Producers could identify costless welfare-enhancing changes to husbandry practices 
(Harvey and Hubbard 2013: 107). This option may be of limited use, however, as leading accounts 
of hen, pregnant sow and dairy cattle welfare indicate that most constituents of welfare are not 
linked to costless husbandry practices (De Mol et al. 2006: 160; Bracke et al. 2002: 1822; Ursinus 
et al. 2009: 547). Instead, the majority of welfare constituents are linked to an animal’s living 
environment. Seeking welfare improvements through costless changes to living environments 
is also unlikely to be a fruitful approach: welfare-increasing changes to an animal’s living 
environment tend to be costly, and, at more intensive levels of production, are likely to have a 
negative impact upon total unit productivity. 
In short, attempts to identify an alignment between animal welfare and consumer preferences 
for lower prices – a non-speciesist Pareto improvement – appear destined to fail. Beyond very 
low and very high levels of animal management, there is a conflict between animal health and 
the consumer preference for higher productivity and lower prices. Efforts to improve animal 
health will likely lead to higher prices, while efforts to reduce prices will come at the expense of 
animal health.36 Without a clear alignment between consumer and farm animal interests, a non-
speciesist Pareto analysis cannot identify efficiency improvements. 
A speciesist Pareto analysis is unlikely to yield positive results either, and in fact may be more 
likely to advocate harms to animal welfare. The existence of concern for farm animal welfare is 
a contingent fact about society, while the consumer preference to pay a lower price for the same 
good is nearly universal. Successful producers must be responsive to consumer preferences in 
order to remain economically viable in highly competitive markets (McMullen 2016a: 21-22). A 
speciesist Pareto analysis conducted in a society with little concern for farm animals could 
advocate lower animal welfare as a way of satisfying preferences for lower prices. The universal 
 
35 Although the scale of selective breeding, and its associated detriments to health, has expanded in recent 
decades as animal products have become perceived as staples rather than luxury items in western diets, the 
practice is not a new phenomenon. In the 16th century, dwarf fowl was perceived as a luxury food, and an 
analysis of chicken bones found in a feast deposit in Chester concluded that it was likely that chickens were 
being selectively bred to promote dwarfism in a manner that was contributing to skeletal disorders (Gordon et 
al. 2015). 
36 This conclusion is in keeping with economists including Blandford and Fulponi 1999: 416 and McInerney 
2004: 32. 
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preference for lower prices could therefore create a downward pressure on producers to reduce 
welfare standards and engage in a race to the bottom, with the bottom being marked as either 
the point where consumer preferences for welfare are satisfied, where further decreases in 
welfare standards will cause a decrease in overall productivity, or where welfare reaches legal 
minimum standards. 
There are, however, two ways that producers might seek to avoid this race to the bottom. First, 
they may focus on producing high-quality goods. Proudfoot et al. (1979) found that the quality 
of broiler chickens declines when stocking densities increase. The percentage of high-quality 
Grade A male broiler carcasses declined from 58.4% at a low stocking density of 0.927m2 per 
bird to 27.6% at a high stocking density of 0.372m2 per bird, while the percentage of Grade A 
female broiler carcasses declined from 80.5% at the low stocking density to 58.6% at the high 
stocking density. Producers could therefore try to avoid lowering welfare standards by focusing 
on producing higher-quality carcasses, which sell for a higher price than lower-quality ones. 
This strategy is destined to end in failure, however, should the figures produced by Proudfoot 
et al. hold true across the industry. Assume that a broiler producer has a 1000m2 barn, and must 
select a stocking density. She could choose a low density of 0.927m2 per chicken, which would 
fit roughly 1079 birds in the barn, or a high density of 0.327m2 per chicken, which would fit 3058 
birds in the barn. If the chickens in the low-density scenario are male, she can expect 58.4% 
(about 630) to produce Grade A carcasses. If they are female, 80.5% (869) of carcasses should 
be Grade A. In the high-density barn, however, the producer can expect 27.6% of male broilers 
(844) and 58.6% of female broilers (1792) to be Grade A carcasses. When even those carcasses 
that are too damaged to be Grade A are still profitable, it seems that producers looking to 
maximise their output of Grade A carcasses subject to space constraints ought to use higher 
stocking densities. While the rate of production of Grade A carcasses declines, this is more than 
offset by the increase in population size, leading to an overall increase in the production of 
Grade A carcasses, as well as an increase in the still-profitable lower-quality carcasses. 
Alternatively, producers could overcome the incentive to reduce animal welfare through 
product differentiation. Rather than reducing animal welfare to satisfy consumer preferences 
for lower prices, producers could instead charge a premium for not engaging in low-welfare 
practices. If at least some people care about the welfare of the animals they consume, higher-
welfare producers will avoid competing with low-welfare ones in terms of price or quality, as 
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they will instead compete in a separate market for higher-welfare animal products.37 This can 
only be an effective strategy, however, when consumers hold preferences for farm animal 
welfare. A reliance upon contingent preferences for welfare will therefore likely preclude the 
possibility of animal welfare improvements amounting to a Pareto improvement, which would 
require almost everyone in a society to prefer a higher level of farm animal welfare. 
In contrast, if an adequate mode of reparation can be established to compensate those who are 
left worse-off by improvements to farm animal welfare, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency improvements 
may be achievable. 
 
b. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and Farm Animal Welfare 
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion defines an improvement in efficiency, and thus in social utility, as a 
change where the gains of the policy winners are greater than the losses of the policy losers. In 
technical terms, policy winners’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the change is greater than policy 
losers’ willingness to accept (WTA), and policy losers’ WTP to maintain the status quo is less 
than policy winners’ WTA. Although Kaldor and Hicks seemed to think that the mere possibility 
of compensation was sufficient for improvements in social utility, in the previous chapter (p.45) 
I argued that, due to differences in marginal utility of wealth, we cannot be sure that a Kaldor-
Hicks ‘improvement’ actually increases social utility until compensation is paid. As with the 
Pareto criterion, we can conduct both a non-speciesist and speciesist Kaldor-Hicks analysis. I 
begin with a non-speciesist analysis. 
One precondition of a non-speciesist analysis is that the concepts of WTP and WTA must be 
applicable to farm animals. The concepts are essential to the compensatory payment 
mechanism that lies at the heart of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and so, if they are not applicable to 
animals, a non-speciesist Kaldor-Hicks analysis will not be possible. Both WTP and WTA 
require us to be at least theoretically capable of determining the subjective monetary value of 
changes in utility. While farm animals cannot tell us the monetary value they attach to utility 
changes, it may be possible to determine these values by observing their behaviour: in fact, 
experimental evidence sheds light on the trade-offs animals make between goods. L.R. 
Matthews and Jan Ladewig (1994) compared the value that pigs place on access to feed and 
access to social contact. They trained pigs to push levers in order to access either feed or social 
contact, and then counted how many times a pig was willing to press the lever, i.e. how much 
 
37 Indeed, if at least some people hold preferences for farm animal welfare, cost-cutting measures that are 
detrimental to animal welfare cannot amount to a speciesist Pareto improvement. 
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effort it was prepared to exert, for these things. The authors calculated a demand elasticity of 
0.02 for feed and 0.49 for social contact, meaning that, when the number of lever presses 
required for a reward increased by 1%, the pigs’ willingness to press the lever decreased by 0.02% 
for feed and 0.49% for social contact: this also indicates a preference for feed over social contact. 
The study’s results can also be used to roughly estimate the extent to which a pig would be 
willing to trade food for social contact. Through this, we can calculate a pig’s WTP for an 
increase in social contact in terms of the feed it is prepared to sacrifice. A pig’s WTP for an extra 
unit of social contact can be calculated by dividing the demand elasticities for social contact 
and feed: 
0.49
0.02
= 24.5 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 
If we assume, in line with F.B. Norwood and J.L. Lusk, that one unit of feed refers to a pound of 
corn, and the market value of a bushel of corn is £4 (£0.0714/lb), then 24.5 units of feed amounts 
to a WTP of £1.75 for a unit increase in social contact (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 218). 
This is clearly a rudimentary method, and the above results should not be taken for granted, 
especially considering that Matthews and Ladewig used a sample size of just eight pigs. These 
calculations also do not consider that pigs possessing a higher level of a good might attach a 
lower value to an additional unit relative to pigs with less of it. Additionally, preferences for 
goods might vary between individuals: some pigs may value social contact more highly than 
others, irrespective of provision. Last, the issue of different marginal utilities of wealth seems 
especially salient here: a WTP of £100 is likely to indicate a much stronger preference when it 
comes from a farm animal, which has very few (if any) resources of its own, compared to a 
human. 
Despite these limitations, the Matthews and Ladewig experiment shows that, like humans, farm 
animals are willing and able to make trade-offs between goods and that we can capture the 
relative value they place on each good. Comparing these relative valuations to a good that has 
a clearly defined financial value, such as feed, allows us to calculate an animal’s WTP and WTA. 
Consequently, the application of WTP and WTA to non-humans is not obviously incoherent, 
and a non-speciesist Kaldor-Hicks test could in theory be used to identify efficiency-increasing 
welfare improvements. 
For farm animals to have a WTP for something, however, they need to also be able to pay, which 
requires the possession of property. This raises both theoretical problems, as it requires support 
for the contentious claim that animals possess property rights, and practical problems, because 
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farm animals possess no property: it is the animal’s owner who possesses any feed, shelter etc. 
that farm animals consume and make use of. 
Consequently, a non-speciesist Kaldor-Hicks analysis is not well-suited to identifying efficiency 
improvements in this area. Although farm animals may have preferences for constituents of 
welfare, their lack of property means that they have zero willingness to pay for welfare 
improvements.38 A speciesist Kaldor-Hicks analysis that focuses on human altruism, however, 
may yield more success. 
I recognised in Chapter 1 (p.25) that people can hold altruistic preferences for farm animal 
welfare. These people may merely like certain kinds of animals, or they may attach ethical 
significance to farm animals and their welfare. A group of animal lovers that is sufficiently large 
and has a sufficiently high level of altruism may find that, collectively, they value their utility 
increase from an animal welfare improvement enough to pay for it. If so, animal lovers may be 
able to compensate cost-bearing policy losers39 to the extent that nobody is made worse-off by 
the welfare improvement. Because compensation is human, rather than animal, in origin, there 
is no need to directly consider animal interests, and thus the analysis is speciesist in nature.  
A speciesist Kaldor-Hicks analysis appears to be the most plausible way of identifying efficiency-
increasing animal welfare improvements. In contrast to a non-speciesist analysis, animals are 
not required to somehow provide compensation for their own welfare improvements; instead, 
animal welfare is treated as a subset of human welfare (McInerney 1991). This removes the direct 
consideration of farm animal welfare from the analysis; I will proceed holding the assumption 
that farm animal welfare is significant only insofar as consumers are willing to pay for it.  
Such a stance is rightly susceptible to criticism, and there exists an entire literature that defends 
the idea that animal interests and lives are important in and of themselves, rather than insofar 
as they satisfy human preferences. My analysis in this chapter, however, finds that economic 
measures of efficiency are ill-suited to recognising this fact in a way that supports animal welfare 
improvements: consumer preferences for lower prices clash with animal preferences for greater 
welfare, which renders the Pareto criterion impotent, while farm animals’ lack of WTP means 
that the direct consideration of their interests contributes nothing to a Kaldor-Hicks analysis.  
 
38 WTA will not help here either, as compensation restores policy losers to their pre-change level of welfare, 
rather than bringing about welfare improvements. 
39 Those who bear the costs of welfare improvements are primarily the animals’ owners, i.e. producers of 
animal products. In essence, consumers must have a sufficient WTP for a welfare improvement to compensate 
the animals’ owner for implementing the improvement. 
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Some would argue that the most appropriate response is to change the entire economic 
paradigm to recognise the moral worth of animals and to value farm animals and their welfare 
in themselves (see Francione and Charlton 2015 for example), but this is unlikely to happen any 
time soon. Working within the existing paradigm to justify welfare improvements in the short-
to-medium term is therefore the path that I take in this thesis, and considering animal welfare 
indirectly, through self-interested and altruistic human preferences, may be the most effective 
way of doing this. Improvements to farm animal welfare will count as efficiency improvements 
only where consumers are willing to pay for them.  
Given the contingent nature of consumer preferences for farm animal welfare, I must first 
explore the extent of these preferences. This requires an empirical examination of preferences 
for welfare through the consideration of survey evidence. 
 
3. Consumer Preferences for Farm Animal Welfare  
Perhaps the most convenient way of determining whether people hold preferences for farm 
animal welfare is to simply ask them. Numerous surveys pose this question, and all indicate that 
there exists significant support for farm animal welfare. In the 2016 Eurobarometer survey,40 for 
instance, 98% of British respondents answered that it was either very important or somewhat 
important to protect the welfare of farm animals, and 86% stated that the welfare of British farm 
animals ought to be better-protected (Eurobarometer 2016: 10, 13). In the Food Standards 
Agency’s biannual public attitudes tracker (2019: 11), 43% of respondents reported that farm 
animal welfare was an issue of concern with respect to food, while, in another survey, 24% of 
UK meat-eaters identified concerns about animal welfare as a reason why they would be 
interested in reducing the amount of red meat and poultry in their diets (Mintel 2017e: 12). 
More work needs to be done, however, to confirm that these results are a reliable indicator of 
attitudes towards animal welfare. At least three confounding factors could be undermining the 
validity of these surveys, and we must be able to confidently dismiss them before accepting their 
results. First, the surveys’ questions could have been worded in a way that led respondents to 
overestimate their concern for animal welfare. Second, respondents may have been virtue 
signalling; talk is cheap in surveys, as respondents do not have to put their money where their 
 
40 This survey, funded by the European Union, used the responses from 27,672 citizens from all member 
states, including 3,461 from the UK, to determine European attitudes towards farm animal welfare. 
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mouths are. Consequently, instead of honestly reporting their preferences, respondents may 
have been trying to build or support a reputation as a virtuous person.41 
The international focus of the 2016 Eurobarometer survey gives us good reason to dismiss the 
first of these concerns. The survey was carried out across the European Union and the country-
by-country results reveal clear national divisions. In the UK, 78% of respondents stated a belief 
that the protection of farm animal welfare is very important, in contrast to 33% in Hungary and 
34% in Poland (Eurobarometer 2016: 10). Assuming that the question was faithfully translated 
into other languages, the low reported concern for farm animal welfare in these countries gives 
us reason to believe that the question’s wording did not prompt respondents to provide pro-
animal welfare answers. 
The international differences in reported concern for farm animal welfare cannot, however, be 
used to dismiss the virtue signalling objection, as there may exist cultural or social reasons that 
motivate Britons but not Hungarians or Poles to engage in virtue signalling in this area. 
A third reason to be cautious of accepting the Eurobarometer results is that respondents might 
have failed to consider that higher animal welfare might come at a personal cost in the form of 
higher prices. This concern is perhaps best addressed by examining willingness to pay studies 
for animal welfare improvements. 
 
4. Willingness to Pay for Farm Animal Welfare 
Although there are few recent studies of UK consumers’ willingness to pay for farm animal 
welfare, the 2016 Eurobarometer survey indicates that many people are prepared to pay more 
for higher welfare, or at least say they are. The survey asked respondents whether they would 
be willing to pay more for higher-welfare products, to which 72% of UK respondents answered 
in the affirmative (Eurobarometer 2016: 50) – 47% were prepared to pay up to 5% more for 
higher-welfare goods, 16% between 5% and 10%, 6% between 11% and 20%, and 3% over 20%.42 
At face value, these results lend credence to respondents’ earlier claim that farm animal welfare 
is important to them, and implies that many people factor the possibility of higher prices into 
their support for greater animal welfare. We must be careful, however, not to take these results 
at face value: they are stated preferences, and so once again may be influenced by virtue 
 
41 Concerns such as these are often referred to as a hypothetical bias. 
42 Additional studies have identified a substantial WTP in British consumers for a range of perceived welfare 
improvements, including: legislation to prohibit battery cages (Bennett and Blaney 2003); legislation to ban the 
export and import of live animals; and broiler legislation (Moran and McVittie 2008). 
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signalling. As there is no cost to stating a pro-animal welfare attitude in a survey, respondents 
may inflate their WTP simply to portray themselves as virtuous. As before, though, the 
international differences in WTP give us reason to reject this possibility: in Portugal and 
Bulgaria, for instance, only 22% and 28% of respondents stated a positive WTP for higher-
welfare products. Although there may be UK-specific cultural or social reasons that encourage 
respondents to engage in virtue signalling that do not apply to Portuguese or Bulgarian 
respondents, these international discrepancies lend credence to the claim that many people in 
the UK genuinely value farm animal welfare and are willing to pay for it. 
To further support the claim that stated WTP for farm animal welfare is genuine, one meta-
analysis of willingness to pay studies found that, contrary to expectations, stated preference 
studies tended to provide a lower valuation of animal welfare than revealed preference studies, 
where willingness to pay is derived from consumer behaviour (Clark et al. 2017: 119).43 This 
suggests that fears of virtue signalling and cheap talk in WTP studies may be exaggerated, 
although perhaps cannot be dismissed entirely. As a result, although we cannot be certain, the 
available research provides evidence for the claim that UK consumers hold preferences for 
higher-welfare goods and are willing to pay more for improved animal welfare.  
 
5. Summary 
In this chapter, I set out to assess how far the concept of efficiency could justify improvements 
in farm animal welfare. I began by considering the almost universal consumer preference for 
lower prices and considered the extent to which this preference could contribute to a Pareto 
improvement by aligning with animal welfare improvements. On the production side, 
incentives to adopt higher-welfare practices are primarily found either where husbandry is 
undeveloped and animals have little by way of shelter, adequate feed and protection from 
predators, or where husbandry is extremely intensive and animals are provided with little space 
or freedom to express natural behaviours. Given that the UK has legislated against both of these 
outcomes, there is little scope for further productivity-increasing welfare improvements. In fact, 
a speciesist Pareto analysis is more likely to justify harms to animal welfare. Instead, some form 
of compensation is likely necessary if welfare improvements are to amount to efficiency 
improvements. 
 
43 This may be a result of extremely effective ‘cheap talk scripts’, short statements presented at the start of 
stated preference surveys intended to reduce the gap between stated and revealed preference studies. 
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A Kaldor-Hicks analysis reveals that animal preferences add little to our assessment, as animals 
are incapable of contributing to welfare improvements and so possess zero WTP. Instead, the 
most plausible overlap between welfare and efficiency improvements appears to be found in a 
speciesist Kaldor-Hicks analysis. If consumers are prepared to compensate policy losers for 
improving farm animal welfare, then producers have an incentive to shift to higher-welfare 
forms of production. 
In short, whether an animal welfare improvement can be a Kaldor-Hicks improvement is an 
empirical matter, dependent on people’s preferences for farm animal welfare and how much 
they are willing to pay for these preferences. Survey evidence indicates that UK consumers hold 
preferences for farm animal welfare and are willing to pay for welfare improvements. The 
evidence is limited, however: we cannot be certain of the reliability of these survey findings 
because they elicit stated preferences, which means that respondents are not required to put 
their money where their mouths are. Consequently, cheap talk and virtue signalling may 
undermine survey data. I have sought to alleviate these concerns by showing that attitudes 
towards farm animal welfare vary across the EU, meaning that, if virtue signalling affects UK 
results, it must be motivated by factors unique to the UK. The finding that stated preference 
willingness to pay studies tend to produce lower valuations than revealed preference studies 
provides further evidence for the existence of genuine consumer demand for improved animal 
welfare, even if it cannot provide certainty. 
At this stage in the thesis, all appears to be well. Although producers have little motive to utilise 
high-welfare systems for reasons of productivity, they do have an incentive to respond to 
consumer demand. In the UK, many consumers hold preferences for farm animal welfare, and 
there appears to be a willingness to pay for higher welfare. For this reason, we may be forgiven 
for thinking that there is no problem: consumers demand a certain level of animal welfare and 
it is in producers’ interests to respond. The reality is rather different, however: this simple 
mechanism of demand and supply can be disrupted in a plethora of ways to frustrate the 
expression of consumers’ preferences for farm animal welfare. To understand why this happens, 
we first need to consider the stage upon which consumers and producers interact: the market. 
By understanding how markets work, and where they go wrong in the case of animal product 
markets, we achieve a greater understanding of what the role of policy will be in this domain.
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Chapter 3 
The Imperfect Stage: Markets and their Failures 
 
In this Chapter 
• An introduction to markets, both theoretical and real-world.  
• An outline of the various ways that markets can fail to ensure an efficient allocation of 
resources. 
 
1. Introduction 
I concluded the previous chapter with the claim that animal welfare improvements will amount 
to efficiency improvements – and thus improvements in social utility – only when consumers 
are willing to pay for them, i.e. if there is sufficient demand. This chapter extends this analysis 
by introducing the market, the institution where consumers express their preferences. I begin 
this chapter by examining what perfectly competitive markets look like and why they are viewed 
as desirable institutions. I then argue that almost all real-world markets fail to live up to this 
perfectly competitive ideal. In some cases, the factors preventing markets from achieving 
perfect competition also contribute to an inefficient allocation of resources: these inefficiencies 
are known as market failures. I finish the chapter by outlining the four forms of market failure 
that are especially salient to the market provision of farm animal welfare, which will be the focus 
of the following four chapters. 
 
2. Free Markets 
An economic market is an institution where buyers and sellers can exchange goods. Properly-
functioning markets allow people who wish to buy or sell goods and services to contact each 
other for the purpose of making exchanges, enable households to make consumption choices, 
let workers decide how much and for whom to work, and permit firms to choose what to 
produce and how to produce it (Begg et al. 2000: 9). The market reconciles all of these decisions 
through the price mechanism, where the price of a good moves towards an equilibrium where 
supply equals demand. The market clears when this equilibrium is achieved, meaning that there 
is no surplus or deficit of a good (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013: 7). Figure 3 provides a 
demonstration of the price mechanism in action when a good is priced too high at P0. As the 
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good’s price is higher than many potential buyers are willing to pay, demand is low (Q0D). In 
contrast, sellers are willing to supply more of the good (Q0S), as they receive more money for 
selling it at current prices. The result is that supply outstrips demand and there is a surplus of 
the good, measured by (Q0S - Q0D). To reduce the surplus, or to prevent its further increase, the 
good’s price must decrease. As the price declines, supplying the good becomes less attractive to 
sellers, causing a reduction in supply. The cheaper good becomes more appealing to buyers, 
causing an increase in demand. This process continues until the price of the good is at a level 
(P1) where demand is equal to supply and the market clears. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – The Role of the Price Mechanism at Non-Equilibrium Prices                                              
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013: 25) 
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Disrupting the price mechanism can affect supply and demand for a good. Governments can 
impose taxes or establish a price ceiling or a price floor to regulate markets. The price 
mechanism may also be disrupted by the actions of a price-setting monopoly. Markets where 
the price mechanism is not limited in these ways, and thus operates freely, are called free 
markets (Bannock et al. 1984: 180). 
 
3. Perfectly Competitive Markets 
The free operation of the price mechanism, although sufficient to create a free market, is just 
one of the characteristics of a perfectly competitive market. Perfectly competitive markets also 
require the presence of many buyers and sellers, each of whom is responsible for only a very 
small portion of the total quantity of the good traded on the market. These buyers and sellers 
must act as price-takers, as if their actions have no effect upon prices (Kreps 1990: 263; Begg et 
al. 2000: 127; Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 371). 
Third, goods in a perfectly competitive market are homogenous, meaning that competing firms 
produce identical, or nearly identical, goods (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013: 280; Bannock et al. 
1984: 337). This means that the goods or services sold in each market are perfect substitutes; 
each producer thus competes in the market solely on the basis of the product’s price, rather 
than quality or brand or another factor. We could not speak of a perfectly competitive market 
for apples, for instance, as there are different varieties of apple, but perhaps a market for 
braeburn apples could be perfectly competitive, as consumers looking to buy braeburns will 
likely compare them to other braeburns solely on the basis of price.44 
Fourth, participants in a perfectly competitive market will possess perfect information. Buyers 
must be aware of and understand the attributes of the goods they are buying – without this 
knowledge, they may be unable to recognise that each firm in the market is offering the same 
product, and so may make consumption choices based on non-price factors, such as mistaken 
beliefs about product quality (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013: 127-28). In addition, buyers must 
hold perfect information about how sellers price their goods (Kreps 1990: 264). This allows them 
to take their custom to other vendors if they find a lower price, and also provides sellers with 
an incentive to price their products competitively. Sellers are also assumed to have perfect 
 
44 This is perhaps an over-simplification – some consumers care about other attributes, such as country of 
origin and whether a product is organic. 
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information about how rival vendors price their goods, allowing them to adjust their prices to 
remain competitive (Bannock et al. 1984: 337; Kreps 1990: 264). 
Fifth, entry to, exit from and transactions in a perfectly competitive market are costless (Kreps 
1990: 264; Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 371). This means that new sellers can freely enter the 
market and sell goods under the same conditions as more established sellers, should these 
vendors not be pricing their goods competitively (Bannock et al. 1984: 337; Kreps 1990: 264). 
Similarly, there are no costs to a firm leaving the market if it is no longer able to compete. 
Sixth, the price of goods in perfectly competitive markets will capture all costs and benefits; 
only the buyer and seller should be affected by a good’s production and consumption (Nechyba 
2017: 520; Kreps 1990: 202). This means that there are no unpriced externalities from the 
production of a good. Although externalities will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter, it is worth providing an example here. Suppose that a good’s production creates air 
pollution. This pollution affects people who are not involved in the transaction between 
consumer and producer and imposes a cost upon them. The cost of this pollution is unlikely to 
be captured by the good’s market price (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2012: 663). As a consequence, 
those who are affected by the air pollution are unlikely to be compensated for the ill effects they 
suffer. The full social cost of the good is therefore not reflected in its market price, contributing 
to an inefficient level of supply; in this instance, the market will oversupply the good. 
Externalities are not confined solely to a good’s negative effects: goods can also benefit those 
who are not involved in the transaction, and these benefits are not always reflected in the good’s 
price. When this happens, the market will supply an insufficient quantity of the good (Nechyba 
2017: 753); those paying for the good do not receive its full benefit, and are therefore not willing 
to pay for a level of supply that is socially-optimal (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013: 665). Instead, 
they will consume the good up to the extent that their own personal benefit is equal to the price 
they are charged, irrespective of the benefit received by others (Begg et al. 2000: 265). 
Consequently, markets in goods with externalities, both positive and negative, cannot be 
perfectly competitive. 
Seventh, and last, both buyers and sellers behave competitively in a perfectly competitive 
market. This means that buyers will not pay more for a good when they can purchase the same 
good elsewhere at a lower price, and sellers seek to receive as high a price as possible; they are 
utility-maximisers and profit-maximisers respectively (Kreps 1990: 264; Kaneko and Wooders 
1994: 73). In short, both buyers and sellers are self-interested. This implies that perfectly 
competitive markets will tend towards just a single price for a good, with sellers who charge 
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above the market price losing their customers to rivals and being run out of the market (Begg 
et al. 2000: 127; Kreps 1990: 264). Those charging below the market price will either make a loss 
on each unit sold and eventually leave the market, or will draw customers away from other 
sellers, forcing less-competitive rivals out of business. Their lower price will then be established 
as the new market price. 
These seven characteristics (free operation of the price mechanism, consumers and producers 
who act as price takers, homogenous goods, perfect information, free entry to and exit from the 
market, absence of externalities and competitive behaviour) must all be present for a market to 
be perfectly competitive. When these conditions are met, markets will lead to a Pareto-efficient 
distribution of resources.45 This is largely a result of decision-making being decentralised, which 
provides two key benefits. First, consumers can pursue their own advantage by exploiting local 
information. This in turn transmits information to the rest of the economy through price 
changes, which encourages producers to respond to changes in demand and satisfy consumer 
preferences. Second, competitive pressures encourage innovation and experimentation, 
meaning that goods will be produced at the lowest possible costs (McMullen 2016b: 35-36). 
 
4. The Problem with Perfectly Competitive Markets 
Although real markets may possess some of the seven characteristics of a perfectly competitive 
market, it is rare to find a market that possesses them all. Commodities that we encounter on a 
day-to-day basis are often differentiated using brand names (Hill and Myatt 2007: 63); some 
markets naturally tend towards monopoly (Posner 1969: 548); market entry can be prohibitively 
expensive for newcomers (Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 449-51); we often possess incomplete 
information about the goods that we buy (Nelson 1970: 311-12; Darby and Karni 1973: 68-69); and 
 
45 The connection between perfectly competitive markets and Pareto efficiency is made by the first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics, which states that ‘any Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto-efficient’ 
(Reiss 2013: 212). The concept of Walrasian, or general, equilibrium was named after 19th century economist 
Léon Walras, who noted that changes in one market have knock-on effects in others. A product surplus in one 
market indicates that a good’s price is too high, and means that there must exist another market where a good 
is priced too low. These knock-on effects can be a result of one good being a substitute or a complement to 
another, or alternatively because a good serves as a production input in another market (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 2013: 595). A Walrasian equilibrium exists when all markets within an economy are in equilibrium, 
i.e. when all markets are perfectly competitive. In a state of Walrasian equilibrium, all consumers maximise 
their utility subject to their budget constraints, all firms maximise profits subject to production constraints, 
and supply equals demand in all markets; all markets clear (Reiss 2013: 212). A consequence of this is that 
there is no way of changing the distribution of resources in such a way that the utility of at least one individual 
is improved without making another person worse-off – a general equilibrium is therefore Pareto-efficient 
across all markets. Contrary to many economists’ claims (see Mas-Colell et al. 1995: 524; Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 2013: 609; Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 428; Begg et al. 2000: 259; Kreps 1990: 200), the first 
fundamental theorem is not a formal statement of Adam Smith’s invisible hand theory (Blaug 2007: 188-89). 
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habit often causes consumers and producers to behave in ways that are not competitive (IGD 
2007: 35). The theory of perfect competition is thus rarely a descriptive account of everyday 
markets, but rather an ideal system of resource allocation that real markets tend only to 
approximate to a greater or lesser degree (Bannock et al. 1984: 338). 
In some cases, a market’s failure to achieve the perfectly competitive ideal can result in an 
inefficient distribution of resources. Such markets suffer from a malaise known as market 
failure, a dramatic-sounding term used to denote any degree of distributive inefficiency, no 
matter how small (Begg et al. 2000: 264). These market failures could be structural in nature, as 
in those markets that naturally lead towards monopoly or monopolistic competition, or in those 
with high costs of entry. Other markets suffer failure due to the nature of the goods being 
exchanged: a good might bear externalities, or it might be a public good, one which is 
nonexcludable and non-rival in nature.46 Alternatively, market failure can stem from the 
participants themselves: to give two examples, agents may not possess complete information 
about a good, a transaction or the market as a whole, or they may not behave in an entirely 
rational manner. There may be scope for governments to intervene in markets suffering from 
some forms of market failure, if these interventions improve efficiency by leaving at least some 
people better-off and nobody worse-off. 
 
5. Summary 
The ideal form of market is often held to be the perfectly competitive market, one that requires 
the possession of a range of characteristics that real-world markets simply cannot achieve. Real-
world markets fail to live up to the perfectly competitive ideal in many different ways, some of 
which contribute to an inefficient distribution of resources. Four forms of market failure – 
externalities, public goods, information asymmetries and uncompetitive consumer behaviour – 
appear to be especially salient to the market provision of farm animal welfare. 
Over the next four chapters, I address these market failures in greater detail, and discuss how 
policy can be used to rectify them. In Chapter 4, I explore externalities, and consider the extent 
to which taxes, subsidies, cap and trade and market creation can encourage markets to reach a 
socially-optimal level of supply. In Chapter 5, I discuss public goods, and discuss how legislation 
and taxes can be used to directly supply these goods. In Chapter 6, I consider the impact of 
informational asymmetries and how policies such as labelling schemes can empower consumers 
 
46 Public goods will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
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to make purchase decisions based on preferences for farm animal welfare. In Chapter 7, I 
investigate uncompetitive consumer behaviour with reference to findings from behavioural 
economics and discuss how policy can be used to change decision-making environments in ways 
that encourage pro-animal welfare behaviours. 
In Chapter 8, I pull these findings together to propose a new way of thinking about the 
objectives of economic farm animal welfare policy, and develop a policy platform that 
determines policy aims by considering facts about both consumer concern for animal welfare 
and farm animal welfare in a society. 
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Chapter 4 
Externalities 
 
In this Chapter 
• An introduction to externalities. 
• An outline of externalities created by animal agriculture. 
• An assessment of the effectiveness of externality policies in internalising the externalities 
created by animal agriculture. 
• A discussion of how health and environmental policies could be detrimental to animal 
welfare. 
 
1. Introduction 
Your neighbour buys an expensive and powerful new sound system and pumps out bass-heavy 
music until the early hours of the morning, depriving you of your much-needed beauty sleep. 
After several disturbed nights, the sound system has provoked so much stress and rage that you 
become ill and are forced to take a day off work. The costs of the sound system thus extend 
beyond what your neighbour paid for it: it has imposed costs upon you as well. The sound 
system has undoubtedly adversely affected your quality of life and yet you were neither 
consulted before its purchase, nor compensated for the disruption it has caused you. In addition 
to its thumping bass, the sound system also produces what is referred to in economics as an 
externality, the focus of this chapter. 
I begin this chapter by developing the technical concept of externalities, before discussing the 
extent to which they exist in animal agriculture. I then consider the role of policy in this area, 
and in particular the extent to which four policies – taxes, subsidies, cap and trade, and market 
creation – can resolve externality effects in animal product markets. 
 
2. Externalities 
Externalities are costs or benefits that are imposed upon individuals and firms not directly 
involved in the production or consumption of a good or service (Nechyba 2017: 744). 
Externalities can be technological, pecuniary or psychological in nature. Technological 
externalities relate to physical effects such as pollution. Many manufacturers emit pollution, the 
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harmful effects of which are rarely captured by their production costs. Pecuniary externalities 
concern financial effects such as losses arising from increased competition. In a hypothetical 
city dominated by a hypothetical university, an increase in student numbers leads to a rise in 
property prices as residential houses are turned into student houses and land is purchased to 
build student accommodation. This imposes a pecuniary externality upon local residents, who 
find themselves no longer able to afford property in the city. Another example of a pecuniary 
externality can be found in the decline of the local high street as a consequence of the rise of 
online shopping and out-of-town superstores (Halpern 2015: 223). Last, psychological 
externalities are feelings of pleasure or displeasure that stem from a transaction but do not affect 
prices (Mann 2005a: 371). Many people get into the festive spirit by purchasing and displaying 
extravagant Christmas decorations, which provide festive cheer to passers-by. These passers-by, 
however, make no financial contribution to the Christmas lights, despite the pleasure they draw 
from them.47 
Economists do not believe that governments should intervene to rectify all externalities, as 
poorly informed interventions can be detrimental to a market’s efficiency. Additionally, it is 
widely held that pecuniary externalities do not warrant intervention as they do not affect the 
efficiency of a market. Even though they may harm some people’s welfare, these externalities 
may in fact be necessary for markets to operate efficiently (Holcombe and Sobel 2000: 157; Prest 
and Turvey 1965: 688).48 In contrast, technological externalities and some psychological 
externalities are generally viewed as warranting some sort of policy response, when 
circumstances permit these responses to be effective.  
Externalities can also be positive or negative. Positive externalities exist where someone receives 
no payment for benefits they have produced for others. In the smartphone industry, firms 
frequently co-opt the innovations of rivals to produce goods that are similar, but not so similar 
as to infringe patents, and so do not require the payment of license fees. Research and 
development thus creates positive externalities for copycat firms (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013: 
665). Positive externalities also arise from market transactions (Narveson 2003: 208). Keith buys 
himself a watch which he uses to remind Louise that her important meeting is starting soon, 
saving her from arriving late. Louise’s benefit did not influence Keith’s decision to buy the 
watch, and she pays nothing for it, yet it is undeniably a utility-enhancing side-effect. Both those 
 
47 Although it may seem that psychological externalities appear to draw from classical utilitarianism, they can 
also be understood in terms of preference satisfaction: in the example above, people have preferences to see 
Christmas decorations and the satisfaction of these preferences creates feelings of pleasure. 
48 Responses to pecuniary externalities may, however, be justified for social reasons. 
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directly involved in a market transaction and those who circumstantially benefit from it are 
made better-off, yet purchase decisions are generally based on a good’s private benefits and 
costs rather than its wider social effects. Consequently, markets tend to undersupply goods with 
positive externalities. 
Negative externalities, on the other hand, occur when someone imposes a cost upon another 
for which they do not provide compensation (Koutsoyiannis 1980: 541). Suppose a cattle farm 
releases pollution into a river, which affects a downstream corn farm that uses the water as a 
production input. The corn farm is required to treat the water in a costly process, which the 
cattle farm does not pay for. The social costs of the cattle farm’s beef are thus greater than its 
private costs, as the price received by the producer does not include the costs of pollution (Begg 
et al. 2000: 266). As purchase decisions are typically based on a good’s private costs and benefits 
and not its wider social impacts, markets tend to oversupply goods that produce negative 
externalities.49, 50 
Externalities can also be categorised according to whether they stem from production or 
consumption. Production externalities are caused by a firm expanding its output, which imposes 
costs or benefits upon others for which the firm neither pays nor receives payment (Salvatore 
2003: 606). If the aforementioned cattle farm expands production, it will release more pollution 
into the river, increasing the corn farm’s spending on water treatment. This constitutes a 
negative production externality. Conversely, consumption externalities stem from the 
consumption pattern of consumers. These consumption habits can impose costs or benefits 
upon others, for which consumers neither pay nor receive payment (Koutsoyiannis 1980: 544; 
Perloff 1999: 656). Keith’s watch, for example, provides a positive consumption externality when 
it helps Louise arrive on time for her important meeting. 
Last, externalities can exist between firms, between firms and people, and between people. 
Positive inter-firm externalities exist between orchard owners and beekeepers. If an apple 
farmer increases the size of his orchard, he will create more nectar for the bees, to the 
beekeeper’s benefit; on the other hand, if the beekeeper expands her production, there will be 
more bees to pollinate the apple farmer’s orchards (Meade 1952: 56). Firms can also impose 
externalities upon individuals. Manufacturers’ pollution may harm people’s health, but 
polluters tend not to bear these costs. Similarly, people can impose externalities upon firms – 
 
49 Some externalities can be simultaneously positive and negative. Some people enjoy the smell of tobacco 
emanating from a nearby smoker, or the sight of wind turbines against a bucolic backdrop, while others find 
these things offensive (Bagus 2011: 118; Perloff 1999: 656). 
50 A graphical treatment of both negative and positive externalities can be found in Appendix II. 
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transport pollution can harm the productivity of farmers (Nicholson and Snyder 2010: 520). Last, 
people can impose externalities upon other people. Someone smoking in a public space imposes 
an externality upon non-smokers, although this externality can be either positive or negative 
depending on the preferences of those affected (Koutsoyiannis 1980: 544). 
In short, externalities are costs or benefits that are imposed upon a third party (Bannock et al. 
1984: 164). Where externalities exist, the producer price of a good or service does not reflect its 
full social value, which results in an inefficient level of supply (Koutsoyiannis 1980: 542). 
Although all externalities are forms of market failure, they are generally deemed to only warrant 
an intervention if they are a technological externality, or in some cases a psychological 
externality.51 
 
3. Externalities in Animal Agriculture 
Animal agriculture produces numerous production-side externalities. The rise of large-scale 
industrial animal farms has created pecuniary externalities by forcing many small-scale farmers, 
who often used traditional husbandry techniques that were more environmentally- and animal-
friendly, out of business. In the United States, the number of pork producers declined 87.8% 
between 1980 and 2005, while output rose from 69 million pigs per year to over 103 million 
(Rollin 2008 15; Singer and Mason 2006: 43).52 The decline of small-scale agriculture has 
decimated many communities and left them to contend with high levels of unemployment. 
Of additional concern are the industry’s technological externalities, which a 2011 UK 
government report claimed that, if left unchecked, ‘will lead to irreversible environmental 
damage and long-term threats to the viability of the food system’ (Foresight 2011: 33). Intensive 
farming produces huge quantities of animal waste which, if improperly managed, can release 
ecologically disastrous levels of acids, nitrogen and phosphorus into the local environment and 
water sources (Fearing and Matheny 2007: 163; Mason and Finelli 2006: 119; Singer and Mason 
2006: 31-32, 65). Animal agriculture produces further technological externalities through its 
 
51 The question of which psychological externalities warrant policy interventions is a difficult one that lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis. A satisfying account must be able to discriminate between seemingly 
irrelevant psychological externalities, such as a dislike of socks and sandals, hateful psychological externalities, 
such as a dislike of people of a certain race, and more appropriate psychological externalities, for instance 
concern for farm animal welfare. 
52 UK figures tell a different story, with a decline in the number of producers corresponding with a decline in 
total herd size (AHDB 2019b, 2019c). As we will see in Chapter 5 (p.114), this result is anomalous, and is 
primarily a result of legislative interventions that left the domestic industry unable to compete with cheaper 
imports. 
4 | Externalities 
75 
 
contribution to water shortages, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, soil depletion and land 
erosion (Durning and Brough 1995: 154-59; Francione and Charlton 2015: 71). The industry also 
harms the global environment as it is a major producer of greenhouse gases. UN research 
concluded that livestock supply chains are responsible for 14.5% of the world’s greenhouse gas 
emissions – more than the transport sector’s direct emissions – primarily in the form of 
methane, but also nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide (Gerber et al. 2013: 15; Koneswaran and 
Nierenberg 2008: 580; Bailey et al. 2014: 4).53 One report found that the emissions of the world’s 
largest three meat producers – Brazilian firm JBS and American firms Cargill and Tyson – were 
higher than that of France in 2016 (Majot and Kuyek 2017). In the UK, animal agriculture was 
responsible for about 10% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2017, with the meat and 
dairy sectors the biggest polluters (DBEIS 2019; Garnett 2009: 492). 
Pollution from animal agriculture has been linked to illnesses including nervous-system 
impairments, cancer and ‘blue-baby syndrome’, as well as the rise of antibiotic-resistant diseases 
such as MRSA (Durning and Brough 1995: 155; Safran Foer 2010: 175-76). High stocking densities 
also provide ideal conditions for diseases to mutate into forms that are both more virulent and 
transmittable to humans, with a 2005 UN task force concluding that high-intensity farming was 
a fundamental cause of outbreaks of avian influenza (Singer and Mason 2006: 34). 
The consumption of animal products produces additional technological externalities through 
its contribution to acute foodborne illnesses. Intensively-produced meat products are a source 
of foodborne illnesses caused by contamination from intestinal pathogens such as 
campylobacter, E. Coli and salmonella. The Food Standards Agency estimates that, in 2018, 
campylobacter imposed a cost of £712.6 million upon the UK, salmonella £212 million and E. Coli 
£3.9 million, with costs primarily borne by individual sufferers and carers (Daniel et al. 2020).54 
While not all cases of campylobacter, salmonella and E. Coli can be attributed to animal 
products (dogs and cats can be carriers of campylobacter, person-to-person transmission of 
salmonella is possible, and exposure to contaminated faeces can cause E. Coli infections, for 
instance), a significant proportion of the societal costs of these illnesses stem from exposure to 
contaminated animal products. 
 
53 Goodland and Anhang’s (2009) research, which factors in animal agriculture’s indirect contributions to 
greenhouse gas emissions, concludes that the industry accounts for at least 51% of global annual emissions. 
54 The FSA’s model is one of the more comprehensive cost of illness models, as, unlike many alternatives (see 
Tam and O’Brien 2016 and Santos et al. 2010 for instance), it assigns a value to the pain and suffering endured 
by individuals, in addition to the direct costs of medical care and indirect costs associated with loss of 
productivity. 
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The consumption of some animal products also contributes to chronic diseases. A 2015 study by 
the World Health Organisation concluded that processed meat is carcinogenic. Red meat was 
found to be ‘probably carcinogenic’, meaning that positive associations between its 
consumption and cancer have been observed, but certain confounding factors cannot be ruled 
out (IARC 2015). Each additional 100g portion of red meat consumed per day increases a person’s 
risk of colorectal cancer by 17%, while each additional 50g daily portion of processed meat 
increased the risk by 18%. Increased rates of prostate and pancreatic cancers were also linked to 
consumption of red meat, while the consumption of processed meat was connected to a higher 
risk of stomach cancer (Bouvard et al. 2015: 1599). Consumption of red and processed meat has 
also been linked with higher rates of diabetes, heart disease, strokes and overall mortality 
(Springmann et al. 2018a: 2; Sinha et al. 2009). These diet-related illnesses impose significant 
costs upon healthcare systems, governments and societies: Springmann et al. (2018b: 40) 
estimate that the UK’s annual expenditure on health problems caused by red and processed 
meat consumption will reach £5 billion by 2020, through government healthcare expenditure, 
patient spending, opportunity costs of informal care and loss of productivity as a result of illness 
and death. In addition to these direct costs are the nonfinancial costs of illness relating to pain, 
suffering and grief, which are harder to quantify but no less significant. Springmann et al.’s 
model does not consider these nonfinancial costs and so likely underestimates the full social 
costs of red and processed meat-related illnesses. 
Although these externalities are serious issues that surely demand government action, they lie 
beyond the focus of this thesis, which is concerned with farm animal welfare.55 Animal 
agriculture produces externalities that affect animal welfare in a multitude of ways. A farmer 
who pays to vaccinate himself against avian influenza simultaneously protects his fowl against 
the risk of his infecting them, even if this was not his intention when purchasing the vaccine. A 
tree-planting initiative intended to make the local community more aesthetically pleasing also 
improves air quality, a benefit that is enjoyed by both humans and farm animals with access to 
an outdoor space.  
These positive externalities must be contrasted with the negative externalities produced by 
animal agriculture, however. Intensive production harms vast numbers of animals – in 2018, the 
UK farmed roughly 10,004,000 cattle, 4,969,000 swine, 181,818,000 poultry and 34,832,000 sheep, 
as well as millions of farmed fish, the numbers of which are not counted (DEFRA 2019a: 6). 
 
55 I will, however, return to health and environmental externalities (p.78) to consider how responding to these 
issues might impact farm animal welfare. 
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Intensively-farmed animals are frequently kept in densely-populated production systems that 
offer few environmental stimuli and deny them the opportunity to express important natural 
behaviours (Pollan 2011: 218; Singer 2015a: 99-102, 121-22). Farm animals commonly respond to 
these conditions with so-called vice behaviours such as feather pecking and tail biting. Many 
producers address these vice behaviours through noncurative operations such as beak trimming 
and tail docking, which are typically performed without anaesthesia. 
Although it is clear that farm animals can be both positively and negatively affected by 
externalities, this thesis is primarily concerned with human responses to farm animal welfare, 
which are prime examples of psychological externalities (McMullen 2016a: 33). As discussed in 
Chapter 1 (p.26), many people derive satisfaction from the belief that the animals that provide 
their food have lived happy lives (FAWC 2011: 6; IGD 2007: 16; Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 40), 
indicating that farm animal welfare creates positive psychological externalities. Conversely, low 
welfare can distress people who care about animals (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 294-95, 311; Lusk 
and Norwood 2011: 474). These two ways of valuing animal welfare may at first sight seem to be 
two sides of the same coin but in fact demand different responses from consumers. If consumers 
mainly experience negative psychological externalities from animal agriculture, they are likely 
to respond by boycotting low-welfare products. Should, on the other hand, animal welfare be 
experienced primarily as a positive externality, consumers will more likely purchase higher-
welfare products. 
Importantly, psychological externalities can be experienced by both consumers and non-
consumers of animal products. Vegetarians and vegans may be upset by low-welfare conditions, 
but consumers of higher-welfare goods may also feel the same way. Conversely, a consumer of 
lower-welfare goods can also derive satisfaction from the existence of higher animal welfare, 
even if she does nothing to contribute to its provision. 
 
4. Externality Policy Aims 
Because externalities indicate that a good’s producer price does not reflect the full value of its 
social costs or benefits, markets in externality-bearing goods will not distribute resources 
efficiently. Consequently, there is scope for policy to increase social utility by internalising 
externality effects within a market so that a good’s price reflects its full social benefits and costs. 
The aim of policy is thus to encourage people to support goods with positive externalities and 
to discourage the support of goods with negative externalities. In animal product markets, this 
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may take the form of encouraging purchases of higher-welfare goods and discouraging 
purchases of lower-welfare ones in order to internalise psychological externalities. Policies such 
as taxes, subsidies, cap and trade, and market creation could be used to achieve this end. 
 
5. Taxes 
Taxes were first proposed as a means of responding to externalities by Arthur C. Pigou, in his 
1920 book The Economics of Welfare. For this reason, they are often referred to as Pigouvian or 
Pigovian taxes. Externality taxes are intended to make prices reflect the full social value of a 
good; they are thus levied on participants in an externality-producing market.56 
Because taxes reduce demand for a good or service by increasing its price, they are most effective 
when used to target goods that create negative externalities. There are thus limits to how they 
should be used as economic farm animal welfare policy tools. We have seen that low animal 
welfare can cause people displeasure and so can be viewed as a negative psychological 
externality. A tax on animal products or low-welfare modes of production may be a suitable 
policy in these cases. In those cases where people view farm animal welfare as a positive 
psychological externality, however, a tax will not be an appropriate response as it reduces the 
supply of animal products from low-welfare systems, but does not guarantee a corresponding 
increase in supply from higher-welfare systems. 
The mere implementation of a tax in order to address negative externalities does not guarantee 
success, however, as three factors can limit its effectiveness. First, an externality tax must be 
levied on the externality itself to avoid producing counter-intuitive outcomes. For example, a 
government may try to tackle pollution by levying an externality tax upon output in a polluting 
industry. When the tax is levied on output rather than pollution, however, a firm that uses low-
pollution technology will pay the same tax per unit of output as more polluting firms. This 
reduces the incentive to develop low-pollution technology, contrary to policymakers’ intentions 
(Nechyba 2017: 748). It is therefore more appropriate to levy taxes based on firms’ contributions 
to negative externalities, rather than output. Accordingly, a welfare-motivated externality tax 
ought to be based on the welfare provided to animals, rather than the number of animals farmed 
or quantity of goods produced.57 
 
56 A graphical treatment of externality taxes is found in Appendix III. 
57 This could be linked to a tiered labelling system of the kind discussed in Chapter 6, or simply levied on the 
number of animals subjected to certain practices. Such a tax could be levied on the producers themselves, or 
on the final products. 
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Second, an externality tax must be applied consistently across all relevant industries. If a 
welfare-motivated externality tax is applied to the beef industry but not the dairy industry, for 
instance, the market may respond by reallocating cattle to the dairy industry, which will prove 
counterproductive should dairy cattle receive lower levels of welfare than beef cattle. 
Consequently, if low-welfare taxes are not levied consistently on all animal industries, they may 
in fact diminish welfare (Cowen 2006: 42).  
Third, the political viability of an externality tax must be considered, in particular the size it 
must be to have a meaningful effect upon consumer demand. Demand for animal products 
tends to be inelastic in the short run (Fearing and Matheny 2007: 170; Cowen 2006: 44; Malone 
and Lusk 2016: 519; Bennett 1997: 286; Tiffin et al. 2011), meaning that a price rise is likely to 
cause a smaller decrease in demand: if a tax increased the price of eggs by 5%, demand would 
decrease by less than 5%. The price inelasticity of animal products means that any tax aiming 
to substantially reduce demand will have to be large: Springmann et al. (2018a; 2018b) predict 
that a health-motivated externality tax of 79% on processed meat and 14% on red meat would 
reduce processed meat consumption by 22% and, because of substitution effects, would leave 
the consumption of red meat unchanged.  
A large welfare-motivated externality tax may not be politically viable. A survey of the literature 
finds no instances of an animal welfare tax being enacted, and just a single instance of an animal 
welfare tax being called for: the conservative Christian Democratic Union’s Barbara Otte-Kinast, 
the agriculture minister for Lower Saxony, Germany, called for an animal welfare tax on animal 
products, the proceeds of which would be used to support welfare improvements (Schulz 2020). 
The lack of support for a welfare-motivated tax implies that this policy is simply not politically 
viable in the current climate. 
A welfare tax, along with other food taxes, also has implications for food justice. While, with 
certain goods at least, questions of justice may not be quite so salient, this is not the case with 
meat, which is a key source of dietary protein for many people. Increases in food prices 
disproportionately disadvantage people on lower incomes (Lang 2019: 815; Noor 2019), who 
spend a higher percentage of their incomes on subsistence; a welfare tax thus may deprive 
people on lower incomes of a key source of protein. Springmann et al.’s health-motivated red 
and processed meat tax, for instance, stands to have the greatest impact upon those on lower 
incomes, who not only spend a higher proportion of their income on food, but also consume 
more red and processed meat than those on higher incomes (Maguire and Monsivais 2015: 185). 
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When introduced in isolation, an animal welfare tax may even contravene the UN’s 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which recognises the universal 
human right to adequate food. ‘Adequate’ is defined not only as being sufficient to prevent 
hunger, but also as being acceptable within a given culture, and thus affords significance to the 
‘non-nutrient-based values attached to food and food consumption’ (United Nations Human 
Rights Officer of the High Commissioner 1966). Animal products constitute a large part of the 
UK’s culinary heritage – a traditional Christmas dinner, for instance, would surely be incomplete 
without a roast turkey or chicken, and a mind’s-eye representation of a full English breakfast 
will likely include some, if not all of, eggs, bacon, sausages and black pudding. As such, a 
welfare-motivated externality tax risks alienating the worst-off in society from certain food 
styles. 
Consequently, policy ought to ensure the fair representation of different food styles to preserve 
the dignity of everyone in society. A fair representation of food styles requires that different 
styles are similarly priced, to give people a freer choice of which food style to follow (Korthals 
2012: 104-7). A tax on lower-welfare animal products, which are invariably cheaper than higher-
welfare ones, denies people on lower incomes a free choice about which food style to follow and 
ignores the cultural and social significance that animal products may hold for them. This is not 
to say that internalising these externalities is undesirable, but rather to point out that, in this 
case at least, concerns about market efficiency must be weighed against questions of justice. 
Although the issue of political viability may discourage policymakers from implementing an 
animal welfare tax in isolation, this does not mean that externality taxes should be entirely 
rejected as a means of responding to animal welfare issues. Research from Chatham House 
indicates that climate change-motivated interventions in animal product markets, such as the 
levying of taxes or removal of subsidies, are more likely to win public support, particularly when 
trustworthy information about the impact of meat and dairy production on climate change is 
provided. In addition, when the rationale for these policies was convincingly and clearly 
communicated, any public backlash was likely to be short-lived: people in fact expected 
governments to take action (Wellesley et al. 2015: 39-41). In short, a climate-motivated 
externality tax may be politically viable; one 2017 investor report in fact anticipates that meat 
taxes will become part of the political landscape over the next decade (FAIRR 2017: 2; Carrington 
2017). Such taxes will have an impact upon farm animal welfare, and thus should be explored 
further. 
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We see further support for this brief change of focus from a welfare tax to an environmental tax 
when we consider the informational challenges facing psychological externality policies. For a 
government to determine the socially-optimal provision of psychological externalities, it must 
first calculate their size. Identifying people’s subjective valuations surely requires an unrealistic 
level of access to information about personal preferences and attitudes. For one, this method 
becomes prohibitively expensive and time-consuming when dealing with externalities that 
impact large numbers of people. In addition, maintaining an optimal supply would be resource 
intensive, as a government would have to constantly respond to changing market conditions 
and public attitudes (Lusk and Norwood 2011: 475; Lusk 2011: 572). 
Moreover, subjective valuations may not be a reliable source of information. There are some 
externalities to which people will simply be unable or unwilling to assign an accurate value 
(Perloff 1999: 688). Even in those cases where people are able to accurately calculate the value 
of a psychological externality, there is often reason to be sceptical of the truthfulness of their 
responses: those affected by negative psychological externalities have an incentive to exaggerate 
their dislike, as, by doing so, they induce governments to introduce higher taxes to further 
reduce these harms (Schotter 1997: 565). Unless governments can reliably access the 
information required to calculate the value of psychological externalities, it is unlikely that 
externality taxes will produce a socially-optimal outcome. This does not entail, however, that 
the policy should be rejected: externality taxes can still be used to limit the supply of goods that 
bear negative psychological externalities, although policymakers must accept that they cannot 
reliably know whether they have achieved a socially-optimal level of supply. 
In contrast, the technological externalities created by animal agriculture, namely illness and 
pollution, are less dependent on subjective valuations and so may be easier to calculate or 
model. For health externalities, survey data reveals the proportion of a population that engage 
in a given habit, medical research exposes the probabilistic connection between the habit and 
the risk of disease and health services can provide information about the costs of treating the 
disease. From this, we can estimate the national costs of treating the disease.58 Something 
similar can be done for environmental externalities. To calculate the size of an optimal 
emissions tax, we need to know the size of a given sector’s emissions and the social cost of 
carbon: see Ricke et al. 2018 or Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, 
United States Government 2016 for two estimates. With this information, we can calculate a 
 
58 This method was used by Springmann et al. (2018a; 2018b) to estimate the costs of red and processed meat-
related health issues, as discussed below. 
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product’s carbon footprint and thus determine the optimal emissions tax. Taxes may therefore 
be better suited to internalising technological externalities, which are less afflicted by 
informational difficulties than psychological externalities. 
These informational difficulties shed light on the policies that will be best suited to responding 
to psychological externalities. A tax is less effective at responding to psychological externalities 
because it is a centralised policy, meaning it flows from governments. For a centralised policy to 
achieve a socially-optimal outcome by internalising externality effects, governments must be 
able to determine the socially-optimal level of supply. While this is challenging when dealing 
with psychological externalities,59 the value of technological externalities can often be 
calculated with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  
Because taxes targeting animal agriculture’s technological externalities do not suffer the same 
informational and political issues that hinder psychological externality taxes, policymakers may 
wish to consider whether technological externality taxes can provide a vicarious response to 
animal welfare psychological externalities. Springmann et al. (2018a; 2018b) designed a 
consumer externality tax to internalise the UK’s healthcare costs associated with consumption 
of red and processed meat, although the authors predict numerous secondary benefits. An 
increase in price would likely lead to a reduction in the consumption of processed meat, which 
would lead to fewer processed meat-related deaths – the model predicts 6,100 fewer annual 
deaths, a 19.42% decrease. Reduced illness and mortality from processed meat translates into a 
reduction in healthcare expenditure of about 20% (£800 million). The tax is also expected to 
raise about £2bn towards healthcare costs. Reduced consumption would also feed into reduced 
production, meaning that the processed meat industry’s environmental impact would be 
diminished by a health tax.  
Springmann et al. (2016a; 2016b) use a similar methodology to propose an environment-
motivated externality tax on animal agriculture. They conclude that, in high income countries, 
consumption taxes of about 27% on beef, 13.4% on milk, 10.7% on poultry, 8.3% on pork and 
6.6% on eggs could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about 7.1% for beef, 2.1% for milk, 2.3% 
for poultry, 1.3% for pork and 1.3% for eggs. The taxes are also expected to raise over £61 billion 
 
59 Although a centralised response may not provide an optimal response to psychological externalities, other 
options, namely decentralised policies, where each individual is given the freedom to contribute towards their 
desired level of the externality, may yield more success. Such policies are generally market-based, and will be 
discussed later. 
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per year for 35 high-income countries (including the UK), and could prevent over 115,000 annual 
deaths through the associated health benefits of reduced red meat consumption. 
This does not guarantee that technological externality taxes will reduce the size of negative 
psychological externalities stemming from farm animal welfare, however. Environmental and 
health taxes will have the greatest impact upon those sectors that contribute the most to these 
negative externalities. A health-motivated tax will overwhelmingly impact the red and 
processed meat sectors due to the links between these products and cancer, stroke and diabetes. 
Such associations have not been found with white meat, although research in this area is 
limited: the WHO, who released the 2015 report detailing the associations between red and 
processed meat and chronic illness, has not conducted a similar study for white meat. Similarly, 
an environmental tax will have the biggest impact on the biggest polluters, namely the cattle 
industry. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization identifies cow’s milk and beef as 
producing higher levels of pollution, both per sector and per kilogram of protein, than pork, 
chicken meat and chicken eggs (Gerber et al. 2013: 15-17). This is a result of ruminants’ enteric 
fermentation, which is responsible for about 82% of agricultural methane emissions (DEFRA 
2011: 10). Nitrous oxide emissions, which are produced from waste management and the 
production of animal feed (Sonesson et al. 2009: 7), do not appear to have been analysed on a 
sector-by-sector basis. 
We can thus anticipate health- and environment-motivated externality taxes to primarily 
reduce the production and consumption of red meat. The impact on psychological externalities 
relating to farm animal welfare will therefore be greatest where there exists significant concern 
for ruminant welfare relative to other farm animals. In the UK, however, concern is greater for 
the welfare of chickens than of cattle and so these taxes will likely do little to internalise animal 
welfare psychological externalities (Clark et al. 2017: 122; Eurobarometer 2005: 105; IGD 2007: 
20-21; Brook Lyndhurst 2012: 24).60  
It is also likely that these taxes would have a limited effect upon animal suffering in the UK, due 
to the greater number of animals involved in poultry production relative to cattle production 
(Reese 2018: 60): in 2018, the UK produced 188 million poultry, in contrast to 9.9 million cattle 
(DEFRA 2019a: 4). Environment and health taxes may even exacerbate negative psychological 
 
60 The surveys and focus groups that support this claim were conducted in 2005 and 2007 respectively. 
Consequently, perceptions may have changed, especially in light of the EU’s 2012 ban on battery cages. Up-to-
date research on consumer concerns about farm animal welfare will give us a better idea of the impact that an 
environment- or health-motivated meat tax could have upon psychological externalities. 
4 | Externalities 
84 
 
welfare externalities and increase animal suffering if more expensive red meat leads to increased 
poultry consumption, as one elasticity analysis indicates is likely (Tiffin et al. 2011: 43). 
In addition to potentially exacerbating psychological externalities and animal suffering, an 
environment-motivated animal product tax could also discourage higher-welfare agriculture. 
The enclosed nature of caged and barn egg systems better enables manure-related ammonia 
and dust to be contained than in higher-welfare organic and free-range systems. Additionally, 
more extensive heating is required in cage-free systems due to their lower stocking densities. 
This requires a greater use of energy during periods of cold weather (Xin et al. 2011: 271-72; Singer 
and Mason 2006: 106); depending on how this energy is produced, this can contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions. Consequently, cage-free eggs could face higher environmental 
externality taxes than caged alternatives, meaning that these taxes may inadvertently encourage 
lower-welfare production. Although animal agriculture’s technological externalities are serious 
problems that warrant attention for their own sakes, taxes introduced to this end cannot be 
relied upon to either reduce animal suffering or internalise animal welfare psychological 
externalities. 
In short, there are limits to how externality taxes can be used to improve animal welfare. First, 
animal welfare must be understood as a negative psychological externality, rather than a 
positive one: a reduction in lower-welfare animal production must be viewed as desirable. 
Second, the value of psychological externalities is difficult to calculate, rendering it almost 
impossible to determine the optimal level of a welfare tax. Third, a welfare-motivated tax would 
likely need to be quite large to meaningfully affect consumer behaviour, which raises concerns 
about political viability. 
Although they may be more politically viable than a welfare tax, health and environment taxes 
are unlikely to address negative psychological externalities stemming from farm animal welfare. 
The greatest impact of these taxes would fall upon red meat sectors, while, in the UK at least, 
people report greater concern for poultry welfare; a health- or environment-motivated tax is 
more likely to exacerbate animal welfare psychological externalities by encouraging consumers 
to substitute poultry for red meat. This does not mean that there are no good reasons to 
implement a health- or environment-motivated animal product tax, only that animal welfare is 
rarely one of them. 
I also raised concerns about the societal impact of an animal welfare tax introduced in isolation: 
such a policy may exclude people on lower incomes from consuming animal products, and thus 
raises questions about food justice. This problem arises because an externality tax discourages 
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the purchase of lower-welfare, cheaper animal products, but does not encourage the 
consumption of other products. One way of resolving this issue may therefore be to pair an 
externality tax with a policy, such as an externality subsidy, that encourages the consumption 
of other types of animal product. 
 
6. Consumer Subsidies 
Subsidies increase demand for a good by lowering its consumer price or increasing its producer 
price.61 Because subsidies increase demand, they are most effective when used to target goods 
and production methods that create positive externalities. When applied to animal product 
markets, subsidies should therefore be used to encourage a greater supply of, or demand for, 
higher-welfare goods. Animal welfare subsidies can also be used to lower the costs of charitable 
donations. 
 
a. Product Subsidies 
Product subsidies can be granted to either producers or consumers. A producer subsidy 
ameliorates the costs of higher-welfare production by granting money to producers who meet 
certain welfare standards or products.62 Several countries already use subsidies in this way. The 
RAUS63 and BTS64 programmes in Switzerland grant subsidies to producers who provide their 
animals with outdoor access and high-quality housing (Voegler 2017: 32; Mann 2005a: 369; Mann 
2005b: 142), while the German state of Lower Saxony subsidises producers who refrain from 
noncurative operations such as tail docking and beak trimming (Voegler 2017: 32). Animal 
welfare subsidies may also feature in the UK’s post-Brexit agricultural policy. Currently, farming 
subsidies are largely determined by the EU Common Agricultural Payment (CAP) system of 
direct payments based on the amount of land farmed, but Brexit provides the opportunity for 
the UK to forge its own path. The proposed Agriculture Bill [HC] (Bill 266: 2017-19) seeks to 
make subsidies more dependent on producers’ contributions to a range of public goods, 
including ‘protecting or improving the health or welfare of livestock’. Despite calling animal 
welfare a public good, the bill treats farm animal welfare as an externality: encouraging and 
 
61 A graphical treatment of subsidies can be found in Appendix III. 
62 Consumer subsidies subsidise end products. 
63  Regelmäßiger Auslauf im Freien (roughly ‘regular outdoor exercise’) – a subsidy program for farms that 
provide their livestock with regular outdoor exercise, i.e. free-range production.  
64 Besonders Tierfreundliche Stallhaltungssysteme (roughly ‘particularly animal-friendly stable systems’) – a 
subsidy program for farms that provide their livestock with animal-friendly housing. 
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discouraging production and consumption is a hallmark of externality policies, while public 
good policies ensure the direct provision of goods. 
Subsidies may be more politically viable than taxes. Two factors cause people to react more 
negatively to taxes than to subsidies: an apparent intrinsic aversion to taxes (Olivola and 
Sussman 2015: 570, 573) and loss aversion, the attachment of greater significance to losses than 
to gains (Kahneman 2012: 282-86). As subsidies make a wider range of goods accessible to people 
on lower incomes, issues of food justice also seem less relevant. 
Nevertheless, the political viability of subsidies holds true only to an extent: if a subsidy has to 
be particularly large – and thus expensive – to be effective, the policy will not be politically 
viable, especially when funded by general tax revenue. John McInerney argues that consumers 
will be largely unresponsive to price changes in higher-welfare goods; consequently, subsidies 
must be large to be effective.65 To understand why, we need to look at the groups McInerney 
thinks will (and will not) be affected by a price decrease. He states that ethically-motivated 
consumers already avoid low-welfare goods and so cannot respond to price decreases by 
substituting higher-welfare animal products for lower-welfare ones. McInerney argues that 
consumers of lower-welfare goods will also be unresponsive to small price decreases because 
they do not attach great significance to animal welfare; if they cared about farm animal welfare, 
they would not buy lower-welfare goods. It is only when the price premium between higher- 
and lower-welfare goods is eliminated, McInerney claims, that price decreases will have a 
meaningful effect upon demand (McInerney 2004: 14). 
There are, however, several ways to contest McInerney’s argument. First, he focuses on 
substitution effects and affords little attention to income effects. In this example, substitution 
effects refer to the relative desirability of higher- and lower-welfare goods, and how this changes 
as the prices of these goods change. When higher-welfare goods become cheaper, people who 
 
65 At first glance, we might think that a subsidy must be large to be effective simply because demand for 
animal products is generally inelastic (Tiffin et al. 2011: 16-17). Elasticity, however, is not as salient for 
subsidies as for taxes, due to the two policies’ different aims. A tax seeks to discourage people from consuming 
lower-welfare goods, and does not seek to make higher-welfare goods more appealing. When assessing the 
effects of a tax, we consider own-price elasticity, how demand for a product changes as its price changes. A 
welfare subsidy, on the other hand, encourages shoppers to substitute higher-welfare goods for lower-welfare 
ones. To assess the impact of this policy, it is more appropriate to consider cross-price elasticity, how demand 
for a good responds to price changes in another good. Studies of pork consumption in Scotland have shown 
that when the price of animal-friendly pork increases, shoppers reduce their purchases and increase purchases 
of organic or conventionally-produced pork, indicating that higher- and lower-welfare pork are treated as 
substitutes (Akaichi and Revoredo-Giha 2016). Although perceptions of substitutability are not always 
symmetrical (milk may be viewed as a substitute for a milkshake, for instance, but milkshakes may not be 
viewed as a substitute for milk), I assume symmetrical substitution between higher- and lower-welfare goods. 
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value welfare attributes might find them more attractive relative to lower-welfare goods. Income 
effects will also occur, however. When higher-welfare goods are subsidised, existing consumers 
are made better-off – their income now allows them to buy more. With more money to spend, 
these consumers will buy more of the products they like, including higher-welfare goods. 
Welfare subsidies could therefore encourage ethically-motivated consumers to increase their 
purchases of higher-welfare goods. Income effects are likely to be small, however, due to the 
own-price inelasticity of animal products. 
Second, as McInerney himself recognises (2004: 39), some consumers may be willing to pay 
more for higher-welfare goods, but are unwilling to pay current prices; these people may refuse 
to participate in animal product markets. A subsidy might entice some of these ‘exiled 
compassionate omnivores’ back into animal product markets, even if it does not eliminate the 
price premium between higher- and lower-welfare goods. McInerney mistakenly assumes that 
there are no substitutes for higher-welfare goods. This is not the case: meat substitutes such as 
Quorn, as well as products such as tofu, pulses and more, can all be viewed, to a greater or lesser 
degree, as substitutes for animal products. A welfare subsidy could therefore encourage 
consumers of these goods to consume higher-welfare animal products. To calculate this effect, 
we need to know how many people abstain from participating in animal product markets for 
price reasons, and the cross-price elasticity between higher-welfare goods and non-animal 
product substitutes; such information was not accessible at the time of writing. Chapter 1’s 
discussion of the meat paradox (p.30) suggests that this effect will be small, however, because 
many consumers dissociate living animals from their produce or simply do not think about 
ethical issues in purchase environments. Instead of opting out of the market due to price 
concerns, consumers are perhaps more likely to overcome or ignore their qualms about eating 
lower-welfare produce. 
Third, McInerney’s argument assumes a model of the consumer in animal product markets that 
could be described as unrealistic. He states that consumers of lower-welfare products will not 
be affected by a decrease in the price of higher-welfare goods as it is improbable that they care 
about animal welfare. Even if a consumer of low-welfare goods does not directly care about 
animal welfare, however, McInerney’s conclusion does not necessarily follow. We saw in 
Chapter 1 (p.23) that many consumers hold self-interested preferences for higher animal welfare, 
due to perceived associations with nutrition, safety, quality and taste. These associations, 
whether justified or not, entail that a decrease in the price of higher-welfare goods can appeal 
to consumers of lower-welfare products, irrespective of direct concern for animal welfare. The 
size of this effect is dependent upon both the number of consumers who associate animal 
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welfare with other quality attributes and the cross-price elasticity of higher- and low-welfare 
goods, i.e. how far consumer perceive the two types of good to be substitutes. 
Fourth, McInerney’s account of ethically-motivated behaviours in this domain is also suspect. 
He appears to assume that consumers have well-developed and consistent ethical views that 
they are aware of and use to make ethically-informed purchases: people who care about animal 
welfare will not buy low-welfare goods, and people who do not care about animal welfare will. 
The reality seems less straightforward. As we saw in Chapter 1 (p.30), and will return to in greater 
detail in Chapter 7, consumers are often detached from their ethical views in animal product 
markets. Despite stating ethical concern for farm animal welfare, many consumers avoid 
thinking about the ultimate fate of a farm animal at points of purchase (Harper and Henson 
2001: 11). This detachment allows consumers who care about animal welfare to still buy low-
welfare goods. 
When consumers do think about farm animal welfare, the focus is primarily on positive 
elements of animal agriculture that contribute to the idea that animals have lived happy lives 
(IGD 2007: 16; Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 40); this suggests that higher-welfare purchases are 
frequently associated with positive psychological externalities.66 Consequently, some higher-
welfare purchases may be motivated by impure altruism, the personal pleasures associated with 
contributing to higher-welfare goods. When a subsidy reduces the price of higher-welfare 
goods, the price of achieving this feeling of warm glow also decreases, making higher-welfare 
purchases more attractive even when they are not price-equivalent with lower-welfare ones. 
This argument is effectively an extension of the previous one, treating the intrinsic satisfaction 
of a higher-welfare purchase as a product attribute akin to nutrition, safety and taste. It thus 
extends the reach of the previous argument to cover consumers with ethical preferences for 
farm animal welfare. 
For these reasons, subsidies could in fact be effective in encouraging consumers to substitute 
higher-welfare goods for lower-welfare ones, even when they fail to make higher-welfare goods 
price-competitive. They do not have to be large in order to have a meaningful effect and may 
therefore be a viable method of increasing the supply of higher-welfare goods. 
Even if subsidies did need to be large to be effective, they can be combined with other policies 
to mitigate their impact on government spending. As noted above, an externality tax might be 
 
66 As argued in Chapter 1 (p.30), detachment from welfare issues renders it is entirely conceivable that a 
consumer can fail to consider animal welfare when purchasing lower-welfare goods, but still derive satisfaction 
from their contribution to animal welfare when buying higher-welfare ones. 
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combined with an externality subsidy. A tax on low-welfare production would raise revenue that 
could contribute to the costs of a welfare subsidy. This can address concerns about food justice 
by reducing disruption to consumption patterns and better-enabling people of all levels of 
income to freely choose their food styles. 
As with externality taxes, however, several factors can limit the effectiveness of an externality 
subsidy. First, a badly designed subsidy may not achieve its objectives. Although McInerney 
(2004: 53) argues that subsidies granted to producers will be as effective as end-product 
(consumer) subsidies, David Harvey and Carmen Hubbard (2013: 113) suggest that, as the 
structure of a market can encourage producers to hold onto the subsidy and fail to pass any of 
it on to consumers, producer subsidies could be less effective, and might in fact hinder the 
further development of higher-welfare products. Consequently, policymakers might want to 
focus more on consumer subsidies and move away from the current system of direct payments 
to producers. 
Second, a subsidy that is applied inconsistently may not achieve its objectives. If, say, an EU 
government wanted to move egg producers away from battery cage production in the run-up to 
the 2012 legislative ban, they might have introduced a subsidy for enriched cage production. 
Such a subsidy would be of overall detriment to hen welfare if it was large enough to encourage 
barn, free-range and organic producers to switch to lower-welfare enriched cage systems. An 
effective subsidy must therefore be applied to all relevant forms of production. 
Third, participation is voluntary: subsidies cannot force producers to provide their animals with 
higher welfare if they do not want to. While, in many respects, the voluntariness of this policy 
can be perceived as an advantage, it may also hinder its effectiveness. To this end, subsidy 
payments must be large enough to provide a genuine incentive for producers to consider higher-
welfare production methods. In some sectors, this may not be a serious concern; agricultural 
subsidies around the world keep food prices at an artificially low level, and often leave farmers 
dependent upon them in order to remain competitive (Pollan 2011: 52-55). In the UK, subsidies 
make up a significant proportion of farm income, and, excepting horticulture, specialist pig 
farms and poultry farms, provided the largest stream of farm revenue in 2016/17 (DEFRA 2017a). 
In the livestock and dairy industries, where subsidies made up 88% and 51% of business income 
respectively, changing the terms of these subsidies – as proposed in the Agriculture Bill [HC] 
(Bill 266: 2017-19) – would effectively force producers to comply: those who do not are unlikely 
to remain competitive and will be forced out of the market. This may not, however, be so 
effective in the pig and poultry industries, where producers are less dependent on subsidies: 
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they comprised 19% and 14% of business income respectively in 2016/17. In addition, Agriculture 
and Horticulture Development Board research (2017: 22-23) anticipates that pig farmers’ 
incomes will increase after Brexit, meaning that subsidies are unlikely to become a more 
important revenue stream in the near future.67 
Fourth, as with other centralised policies, informational issues can limit a subsidy’s success in 
achieving socially-optimal levels of supply when dealing with psychological externalities. 
Externality subsidies can still be used, however, to encourage a given level of supply, but 
policymakers must accept that they cannot know whether this supply is socially-optimal. 
 
b. Charity Subsidies 
In addition to using subsidies to encourage higher-welfare production, subsidies can be used to 
target charitable donations. Governments in many countries (including the UK) offer tax relief 
on charitable donations (Nechyba 2017: 1050-51). Tax relief reduces the costs of donations, which 
encourages more people to donate more money (Roberts 1987: 420). Tax relief could therefore 
encourage donations to charities that support farm animal welfare. Charities support farm 
animal welfare in a myriad of ways, including lobbying for new legislation (World Animal 
Protection), investigating and prosecuting those who break animal welfare laws (RSPCA), 
raising awareness of welfare issues (CIWF), operating high-welfare labelling schemes (Soil 
Association), producing research and policy assessments (UFAW), providing training in high-
welfare methods for those working with animals (HSA), encouraging public education on 
welfare issues (BHWT) and rehabilitating animals (Thornberry Animal Sanctuary).68 
Because charities perform so many different functions relating to farm animal welfare, tax relief 
enables consumers to contribute to the issues that matter most to them. Every year, the British 
Hen Welfare Trust (BHWT) finds homes for about 60,000 hens, which, at two years of age, are 
at the end of their commercial laying lives and would otherwise be sent to slaughter (BHWT 
2019). The BHWT’s work does not, however, directly alleviate the animal suffering and 
associated psychological externalities created by egg production, but rather provides life to 
some of the sector’s ‘waste’ products. Consequently, a person’s attitudes towards farm animal 
welfare will determine whether they support the BHWT. If Michael is more responsive to animal 
 
67 The impact on poultry farmers’ income is not discussed in the report, so it is possible that this sector will 
become more dependent on subsidies post-Brexit. 
68 Many of these charities improve farm animal welfare in multiple ways: the RSPCA, for instance, performs all 
of the above functions. 
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suffering than animal happiness, for instance, he is unlikely to support the BHWT’s efforts 
because it does little to relieve suffering in production systems. The BHWT’s work will primarily 
be regarded as effective by those who are concerned about whether farm animals are given good 
lives. Yet even for these people, the BHWT’s work may leave concerns unaddressed as it does 
not improve animal welfare within production. There are, however, a plethora of other animal 
welfare charities that work on production-side welfare issues and can therefore address animal 
agriculture’s negative psychological externalities. 
Subsidising charitable donations thus represents a highly equitable approach, as it enables 
people to directly address the elements of animal agriculture from which their psychological 
externalities spring. The policy also facilitates the expression of a range of ethical attitudes: 
abolitionists with views similar to Gary Francione can express their ethics by contributing to 
charities that promote vegan lifestyles, while those concerned about animal welfare can donate 
to charities that pursue this cause both on the farm and in the corridors of power.69 
Consumer subsidies are limited, however, by the fact that they cannot entirely eliminate free 
rider incentives. The existence of good farm animal welfare in society can be of satisfaction even 
to people who do little to support higher welfare. Consumers can thus reap the psychological 
benefits of higher welfare without contributing to the associated costs. Even though tax relief 
for charitable donations reduces the costs of charitable actions, it cannot eliminate the 
consumer incentive to enjoy the benefits of better welfare without contributing – this is known 
as free riding. As tax relief does not remove the opportunity to free-ride, it can only ever be a 
partial response to psychological externalities and is best-used in conjunction with other 
policies. 
Further problems are raised by informational issues. Different elements of animal welfare may 
require different levels of subsidy to reach an optimal level of provision. This adds to the 
complexity of providing an optimal supply of animal welfare, and, more importantly, may not 
be a politically viable option: governments that adopt a policy of variable tax breaks may be 
accused of playing favourites with different causes. Fortunately, this political dilemma is 
avoided by the same informational difficulties that prevent other centralised policies from 
achieving a socially-optimal level of supply. As with welfare-motivated externality taxes and 
product subsidies, a more realistic use of this policy is to encourage an increase or decrease in 
 
69 Indeed, charitable donations appear to be an effective way for people who do not participate in animal 
product markets to express concern for farm animal welfare: one study in Belgium found that vegetarians 
donate more to animal charities than meat eaters and flexitarians, with no significant difference between each 
group for donations to human charities (De Backer and Hudders 2015). 
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supply, rather than provide an optimal level. For this, equally subsidising charitable donations 
irrespective of their cause may be an appropriate policy. 
 
7. Cap and Trade 
Cap and trade, commonly used to address pollution, offers another externality policy response. 
When used to tackle pollution, a government must first determine the maximum level of 
pollution that it deems acceptable (the cap). It then distributes or sells permits to firms which 
entitle them to emit a certain amount of pollution, totalling the government’s desired level 
(Parkin 2000: 437). Permits may be sold to competitors if a producer has more than it needs. 
Heavy polluters find themselves having to buy permits, which increases their production costs, 
while less-polluting firms can sell their permits to subsidise theirs. This gives producers an 
incentive to adopt low-pollution technology, as doing so reduces the need to purchase pollution 
permits, and the selling of permits opens up a new revenue stream. 
Cap and trade is intended to reduce negative externalities and so will be most effective when 
used to limit the production of lower-welfare animal products, rather than increasing the supply 
of positive externalities. This is not to say that a cap and trade policy cannot increase the supply 
of higher-welfare goods, only that this is achieved by making lower-welfare goods less appealing. 
An animal welfare cap and trade could work by either allocating or selling permits which allow 
producers to use a given low-welfare practice, such as a higher stocking density, upon a certain 
number of animals, with a centralised body determining the level at which the practice ought 
to be capped. Producers who do not use their full allocation could sell to those who face a 
shortage. Additionally, animal welfare charities could purchase permits and withdraw them 
from circulation, limiting the extent of the production practice. Cap and trade discourages the 
use of a lower-welfare practice by making it more expensive relative to other methods of 
production: it can subsidise higher-welfare producers by granting them the opportunity to sell 
excess permits, and also serves as another cost for those producers who must buy permits. 
There are, however, several concerns regarding the use of cap and trade policies as a means of 
addressing animal welfare psychological externalities. First, cap and trade faces the same 
informational problems that plague externality taxes and subsidies. Given that cap and trade 
creates a market in permits, one could be forgiven for assuming that it is a decentralised 
response. This assumption is incorrect, however, as, although market mechanisms will 
efficiently distribute a fixed level of supply, a centralised body must first set this level of supply. 
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Governments are unlikely to possess full information when calculating the value of 
psychological externalities, which entails that using a cap and trade in this context will not lead 
to an optimal outcome (Nechyba 2017: 750-51). This is not to say that there is no place for cap 
and trade in responding to psychological externalities: as with welfare-motivated externality 
taxes and subsidies, the policy is still an effective tool for reaching a desired level of supply, but 
cannot guarantee a socially-optimal supply.  
As with externality taxes, cap and trade is likely better-suited to dealing with the technological 
externalities produced by animal product industries, namely pollution. Many countries, such as 
New Zealand, already run pollution cap and trade programs which are able to incorporate 
animal industries (Bailey et al. 2014: 8). New Zealand’s incorporation of livestock emissions in 
its cap and trade scheme can only be regarded as partial, however, as the country requires the 
reporting of agricultural emissions but not trading, meaning that there is significant scope for 
policy development in this area. 
There are numerous technical concerns about how the design of emissions trading systems can 
affect their efficacy in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and whether it is appropriate to use 
this policy in agricultural industries. A discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but can be found in Ritter 2017, Thomassin 2003, Bullock 2012 and Ancev 2011. My interest 
lies with how the policy can influence animal welfare psychological externalities, and in this 
regard it appears that cap and trade faces the same concerns as environment- and health-
motivated externality taxes. As with a pollution tax, a pollution cap and trade should have the 
greatest impact on the biggest polluters, i.e. red meat sectors. Consequently, the policy will 
likely encourage consumers to substitute white meat for red meat, and so will only address 
animal welfare psychological externalities in societies where there is significant concern for 
livestock welfare and relatively little concern for poultry welfare. In the UK, evidence suggests 
that consumers are most concerned about welfare in poultry sectors (Clark et al. 2017: 122; 
Eurobarometer 2005: 105; IGD 2007: 20-21; Brook Lyndhurst 2012: 24), meaning that a cap and 
trade is in fact likely to exacerbate negative psychological externalities if it causes consumers to 
substitute white meat for red meat. As with environment- and health-motivated taxes, this is 
not to say that there are no good reasons to use an emissions cap and trade in animal agriculture, 
only that this tool may not be an effective way of addressing animal welfare externalities. 
While there are clear difficulties associated with using cap and trade to internalise psychological 
externalities, the policy may be useful in phasing out extremely low-welfare practices. Naturally, 
it would be inappropriate to use a cap and trade policy in a manner that maintained any use of 
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extremely low-welfare practice in the long term. The long-term solution to any such practice 
must be prohibition, but cap and trade could be used as a tool to facilitate a transition away 
from extremely low-welfare practice. This may be appropriate in cases where introducing an 
immediate ban would impose large costs upon producers and so could face significant political 
obstacles. Because governments control the level at which a cap is set, they can gradually reduce 
the supply of permits over time, which would cause them to become more expensive. Increasing 
permit prices will raise costs for those producers who remain reliant upon extremely low-welfare 
practices, and thus provides an increasingly strong incentive to adopt other production 
methods. 
Such a use of cap and trade might have been able to increase compliance with the EU’s 2012 ban 
on battery cages, which could not be described as an immediate success. Despite there being 
more than twelve years between the legislation being passed and the ban coming into effect, an 
estimated 14% of EU hens were still in battery cages at the start of 2012 (Blandford and Harvey 
2014: 37-38; BBC Newsround 2012; BBC 2012). If a cap and trade had been introduced upon the 
passage of the EU’s Council Directive 1999/74/EC of July 1999, the costs associated with battery 
production could have been slowly raised over the following twelve years, providing an 
additional incentive for producers to adopt other methods of production and be ready for the 
ban’s implementation in 2012. 
In short, cap and trade represents another limited way of addressing animal welfare 
externalities. Informational issues limit the policy’s use in addressing psychological 
externalities, and, when used to address animal agriculture’s technological externalities, might 
even exacerbate concern for welfare. Despite these concerns, cap and trade could be an effective 
way of transitioning away from extremely low-welfare practices before bans come into effect. 
 
8. Market Creation 
A fourth externality policy involves creating new markets by better-defining property rights. 
This idea was first proposed by Ronald H. Coase in his 1960 paper ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. 
Coase recognised that, where property rights for a production input remain undefined, firms 
have little incentive to treat the input as a cost in the production process; this tends to lead to 
its overuse. Not having to pay for emitting air pollution, for instance, effectively turns clean air 
into a free input in the production process. Firms will emit more air pollution than they would 
if clean air was owned by someone, and thus needed to be paid for. If property rights are 
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defined,70 and if those affected by the externality can engage in costless negotiations, an efficient 
solution can be arrived at. To illustrate, suppose that there are two firms operating on a river: a 
cattle farm and a water treatment facility. The cattle farm releases pollution into the river, and 
an increase in its production therefore increases the costs of treating the water, which the farm 
does not cover; the farm thus imposes a negative externality upon the water treatment facility. 
Assume that the cattle farm considers reducing production by 5000kg (about five cows) and 
calculates that doing so would cost £16,000 in lost revenue (AHDB 2019a). The cattle farm’s 
actions would also reduce the water treatment plant’s costs by £20,000, which makes a 
reduction in beef production a Kaldor-Hicks efficient action; the losses of the farm are 
outweighed by the gains of the water treatment plant (Schotter 1997: 578). There are currently 
no clearly-defined property rights in this example, however: without knowing whether the cattle 
farm has the right to pollute the river or whether the water treatment plant has a right to 
pollution-free water, the two parties will not negotiate (Perloff 1999: 673). The cattle farm will 
continue producing at a profit-maximising level, which imposes a substantial negative 
externality upon the water treatment facility and leads to a suboptimal outcome. If a 
government defines property rights, however, the firms have an incentive to negotiate and 
arrive at an optimal solution. Notably, it does not matter who gets the property rights; as long 
as they are defined, and costless negotiation is possible, a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency improvement 
can be achieved. 
Assume that the cattle farm is given the right to pollute the river. This creates a market in the 
emission of pollution into the river. We have seen that if the farm reduces production by 
5,000kg, which leads to a £16,000 reduction in its revenue, the water treatment plant stands to 
save £20,000. The water treatment facility can therefore maximise its profits by offering the 
cattle farm between £16,000 and £20,000 to reduce production. Doing so leaves both firms better 
off, or at least no worse off than they would have been had a solution not been agreed upon 
(Mansfield 1985: 501). Alternatively, assume that the water treatment plant is given the right to 
use the water as it chooses. In this case, there is still scope for the cattle farm to emit pollution 
into the river. The water treatment plant will accept payment for each unit of pollution emitted 
up to the point that the cost of treating the water exceeds the price of another unit of pollution, 
i.e. where the marginal revenue gained by allowing another unit of pollution to be emitted 
exceeds the marginal cost of treating another unit of water. Similarly, the farm will treat the 
emission of pollution into the river as another production input, and will produce beef up to 
 
70 The distribution of property rights can be a result of firms’ negotiations or government intervention. 
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the point where the cost of producing another unit equals the revenue it brings in. Regardless 
of who owns the property rights, a Kaldor-Hicks improvement will be achieved if the parties can 
negotiate without cost (Schotter 1997: 578).71 
Defining property rights provides a solution to some externality problems because it recognises 
that these externalities are connected to a ‘missing market’ elsewhere (Nechyba 2017: 756). The 
creation of new markets through the definition of property rights forces firms and individuals 
to consider externalities as costly inputs, and can thus internalise them (Salvatore 2003: 609). 
Market creation can also internalise positive externalities. Earlier in this chapter, we saw that 
positive externalities exist between beekeepers and orchard owners. The bees pollinate the 
orchard, while the orchard provides nectar for the bees (Meade 1952: 56). The orchard owner 
could – at least in theory – seek to charge the beekeeper for using it as an input in her production 
of honey. This new income stream may encourage him to expand his orchard to the point where 
marginal social benefits equal marginal costs. Similarly, the beekeeper could charge for the 
pollination services her bees provide. This new income stream could encourage her to expand 
her beehives, again to the point that the marginal social benefits are equal to the marginal costs. 
When applied to issues of farm animal welfare, we see that creating markets for animal welfare 
overcomes the informational difficulties that centralised policies face, as doing so enables 
people to contribute to a personally optimal level of animal welfare. For this reason, market 
creation is a decentralised action and could be an effective means of addressing the 
psychological externalities, both positive and negative, created by animal agriculture.  
To create a new market in this way, someone, or some group, must either be granted, or assume 
ownership of animal welfare. There appear to be three main ways of doing this. First, the 
producers of animal products could assume ownership of animal welfare and charge consumers 
to deliver higher welfare (Lusk 2011). J.L. Lusk suggests that firms are often discouraged from 
providing higher levels of animal welfare because they cannot directly extract payment from 
consumers for doing so, and therefore interprets animal welfare as a positive externality. Lusk 
proposes the creation of ‘animal well-being units’ (AWBUs), which are distributed to producers 
in proportion to the number of animals raised and the quality of their living conditions. 
Producers would be able to sell these AWBUs in a market that existed independent of markets 
 
71 While the party that possesses the property rights appears to have an advantage in negotiations and is thus 
likely to secure a better deal for itself, this is a problem with distribution rather than efficiency (Nicholson and 
Snyder 2010: 525). 
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for animal products (Lusk 2011: 565).72 Lusk assumes that people and groups that are concerned 
about animal welfare but unwilling to buy animal products would then buy these credits, and 
market mechanisms would promote the efficient pricing and supply of AWBUs, and thus animal 
welfare (Lusk 2011: 564). The AWBU may also promote innovations in animal welfare by 
encouraging producers to look for ways to provide better animal welfare at lower costs (Lusk 
2011: 571). 
Lusk does not explicitly explore how an AWBU market may influence markets for animal 
products, but it is plausible to suggest that, if it functions as he intends, the decoupling of 
welfare from product would contribute to a short-run reduction in the consumer price of 
higher-welfare products. A large part of what makes higher-welfare goods more expensive than 
conventional ones is the higher costs of providing more welfare, and so the creation of a separate 
revenue stream for higher-welfare could subsidise animal products and allow producers to 
charge less for them without harming profit margins. This could encourage consumers to 
substitute higher-welfare goods for lower-welfare ones, if not for welfare-related reasons then 
for these goods’ perceived superior quality and safety attributes. Access to a higher-welfare 
revenue stream, coupled with an increase in demand for higher-welfare goods, could also 
encourage producers to move away from low-welfare practices and towards higher-welfare ones. 
There are, however, two issues that undermine the AWBU market’s effectiveness as a response 
to animal welfare psychological externalities. First, as Lusk himself recognises, it fails to fully 
internalise externality effects. To explore this point, we need to consider who is expected to 
participate in the AWBU market. For obvious reasons, people who do not care about farm 
animal welfare will not participate. Consumers of animal products are also unlikely to 
participate; although these people may have preferences for animal welfare, they are likely to 
primarily express these preferences in animal product markets (Harper and Henson 2001: 11). 
Lusk instead suggests (2011: 566) that the viability of the AWBU market relies upon those who 
care about animal welfare but refrain from the consumption of animal products; the intention 
of the AWBU market is to provide this group with the opportunity to express their preferences 
in a market setting, and thus internalise their psychological externalities. 
Within the group of people who care about animal welfare but abstain from consuming animal 
products, however, there will be plenty who will also abstain from the AWBU market. For 
 
72 Although the market for AWBUs may be able to function without government involvement, there may still 
be a role for policymakers to play in the definition of AWBUs, as well as in supporting efforts to ensure 
transparency and accountability through monitoring and enforcement. 
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abolitionists like Gary Francione and Anna Charlton (2015), who oppose all forms of animal 
ownership, or rights-based theorists such as Tom Regan (2004), who believe that that farm 
animals have a right not to be used merely for human ends, participation in the AWBU market 
is to implicitly endorse the continued treatment of animals as property and human resources, 
which they are likely to find an unpalatable proposition; as Lusk admits (2011: 566), we expect 
them to abstain. Lusk’s proposal will therefore not fully internalise animal welfare externalities 
because many people who care about animal welfare will continue to lack an appropriate way 
of expressing their concern. 
Although the primary purpose of the new market is to internalise externalities, rather than to 
improve animal welfare, it is still worth considering how the AWBU market might impact the 
lives of farm animals. It seems likely that, because we cannot expect many people to participate 
in Lusk’s AWBU market, it will have little meaningful impact upon farm animal welfare. 
Expected participants are likely to identify as vegetarians or vegans, a group which, according 
to a recent report by the supermarket Waitrose, makes up 12.5% of the UK’s population 
(Waitrose and Partners 2018: 6-7). Within this group, participants must have some sort of 
concern for animal welfare – 55% state that animal welfare was one of the motivating factors in 
their turning vegetarian or vegan, a finding which corresponds with other surveys (e.g. Mintel 
2017e).73 At this point, just under 7% of the population are possible participants in the AWBU 
market, which seems promising. However, 49% of those identifying as vegetarian or vegan in 
the Waitrose report admitted to eating meat occasionally, at weekends, or on special occasions. 
These people are unlikely to participate in the AWBU market, as they can express preferences 
for greater animal welfare in animal product markets, where their purchases will carry greater 
private benefits. Ruling this group out leaves a potential participant pool of about 3.4% of the 
population. Some of this group will likely oppose animal ownership and the use of animals as 
merely human means, however, or will view participation in the AWBU market as a way of 
subsidising the consumption habits of others. Numbers for these groups are not available, 
meaning it is not clear what proportion of the population are likely participants in the AWBU 
market, although it is likely to be small.74 Participation is also likely to be negatively impacted 
by the opportunity to free ride on others’ contributions to the AWBU market, due to the 
excludability and non-rivalry of psychological externalities. 
 
73 Respondents could provide multiple responses to this question, and so were not prevented from expressing 
concern for farm animal welfare as a secondary motivator.  
74 Lusk suggests (2011: 573) that animal welfare charities may also be buyers of AWBUs. However, this is 
unlikely to increase the number of participants in the AWBU market: charities committed to buying AWBUs are 
most likely to receive donations for this purpose from people who also support the AWBU market. 
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When low levels of market participation are combined with high numbers of farm animals, it 
seems unlikely that the AWBU market can meaningfully improve animal lives. In 2016 alone, 
approximately 2.8 million cattle, 14.6 million sheep, 11 million pigs and 1 billion poultry75 were 
slaughtered in the UK (DEFRA 2016a-u, 2017b-c). When dealing with such large numbers, the 
contributions of the subsection of vegetarians and vegans willing to participate in the AWBU 
market will surely have little effect upon farm animals’ lives. 
The failure of Lusk’s AWBU market to internalise psychological externalities or lead to 
meaningful improvements in farm animal welfare does not mean that the possibilities of market 
creation have been exhausted. Lusk’s AWBU market relies upon the producers of animal 
products assuming ownership of animal welfare, but ownership could be given to or assumed 
by other parties. One alternative is for a government to grant ownership of animal welfare to 
the general public. Such a distribution forces producers to treat low animal welfare as a 
production input, the use of which requires compensation to be paid to the public. This 
effectively amounts to an externality tax on the use of low welfare as a production input, 
increasing the costs of low-welfare production and reducing the supply of low-welfare goods. 
Consequently, the informational difficulties that hinder the efficiency of externality taxes are 
again relevant. It is also unlikely that public ownership of animal welfare can internalise all 
animal welfare externalities. This policy is unlikely to be palatable to many abolitionists and 
supporters of animal rights as it implicitly condones the use of animals for human ends; even if 
the market contributes to reductions in animal harm, it may create new psychological 
externalities if people are dissatisfied by it. It is also probable that the pricing of animal welfare 
will not be agreeable to all members of society, and so their psychological externalities will not 
be fully internalised. Consequently, this distribution of property rights cannot be relied upon to 
fully-internalise psychological externalities. 
A final way that animal welfare property rights might be distributed is to grant them to the farm 
animals themselves. By doing this, policymakers would be effectively adopting a weak version 
of the animal rights position by denying producers and consumers the opportunity to treat farm 
animals merely as means to human ends. The implications are potentially radical: animal 
interests would need to be considered by producers for the sakes of the animals themselves, 
rather than for economic reasons. This means that certain common practices, such as the egg 
industry’s culling of male chicks, typically by gassing them (Saul 2015), or the dairy industry’s 
 
75 The poultry figures cover birds bred for their meat as well as 51.4 million ‘boiling fowl’, a category that 
includes spent laying hens and spent breeders. 
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removal of male calves from their mothers shortly after birth and sending them to slaughter 
(Levitt 2018a), would likely be prohibited. In short, giving farm animals ownership their own 
welfare would prohibit producers from inflicting harms upon them solely for commercial gain, 
meaning that animal agriculture could only exist where it was also clearly in the animal’s 
interests. 
Such a distribution of rights would not create a market in the way that Lusk’s AWBU or public 
ownership of farm animal welfare does; we are not buying or selling animal welfare. In fact, 
consumers do not feature at all in this market. Instead, this distribution essentially creates a 
two-good barter economy, where producers supply animal welfare and animals supply their 
produce. Producers seek profit and farm animals seek a life worth living. Granting animals 
ownership of their welfare thus does not have to entail the end of animal farming. If an animal’s 
existence can be said to be of good quality, then it may be in the animals’ interests to live and 
there may be scope for farm animals to bargain with producers in order to secure a certain 
standard of welfare.76  
Ultimately, this bargaining would likely lead farm animals to sacrifice elements of welfare in 
order to be given, as a bare minimum, a life worth living. This minimum goal corresponds with 
the recommendations of the Farm Animal Welfare Committee (FAWC), which defines a life 
worth living as one where ‘the balance of an animal’s experience [is] positive over its lifetime’, 
any suffering is ‘necessary, proportionate and minimal’ and where animals’ needs and some of 
their wants are provided for (FAWC 2009: 14).77  This is not the same as a good life, which 
requires a much higher standard of living (FAWC 2009: 16) – a life worth living is likely 
compatible with various low-welfare practices. A life worth living is just a baseline, however: 
negotiations between stakeholders may lead to higher levels of welfare, up to a maximum point 
where further welfare improvements are not economically viable. The effectiveness of this 
 
76 This bargaining is clearly hypothetical; if such a market existed then the interests of farm animals would 
need to be represented by humans, perhaps by animal welfare experts with no ties to animal agriculture, who 
would ensure that elements of welfare are only sacrificed when it is in the animals’ best interests. Such a 
possibility is not so farfetched: the Nonhuman Rights Project already pushes for the recognition of legal 
personhood for animals, which, when their rights are violated, would allow nonhumans to seek legal redress 
with the help of human representation (Reese 2018: 11-12). 
77 There are numerous practical difficulties associated with the concept of a life worth living. First, it is not 
apparent that quality of life can be treated as what John Webster calls an ‘algebraic sum of positive and 
negative experiences’. Even if it can be, our ability to assess trade-offs between constituents of welfare in 
other species must surely be limited. Moreover, our judgements regarding whether an animal possesses a life 
worth living are made without the contribution of the animal itself; our assessments instead rely upon how 
we, or their human representatives, think the animal thinks and feels in a given environment (Webster 2016: 
35; Yeates 2017: 25). Perhaps the most appropriate response to these issues is to err on the side of caution 
and aim to provide animals with lives significantly above the quality we believe necessary for a life worth 
living. Any mistakes about quality of life would subsequently be unlikely to deny animals a life worth living. 
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distribution of rights as a way of improving animal welfare will therefore be largely dependent 
on the outcome of negotiations: if current standards do not provide farm animals with lives 
worth living, animal ownership of welfare will improve standards and reduce the size of negative 
psychological externalities, but, if animals are already provided with lives worth living, the 
impact on psychological externalities (and animal welfare) will be uncertain. 
Although this designation of property rights may preserve the existence of animal product 
markets, it may nevertheless reduce the dissatisfaction felt by supporters of animal rights. Some 
supporters, including those inspired by Tom Regan, believe that animals have a right not to be 
used merely as means to human ends. These people may be appeased when animal interests are 
put at the heart of animal agriculture, when animals are only raised when they can be given lives 
worth living; the granting of welfare rights to farm animals ensures that they are no longer 
treated solely as a means to human ends. Similarly, abolitionists such as Gary Francione and 
Anna Charlton maintain that animals have a right not to be treated exclusively as human 
resources. The key term here is exclusively, a term the two authors use repeatedly (Francione 
and Charlton 2015: 9, 23, 87, 97, 108, 129). When animal needs and interests are placed at the 
heart of animal agriculture to the detriment of economic concerns, farm animals are no longer 
being treated exclusively as human resources; in fact, farm animals could be said to possess a 
degree of self-ownership. Some abolitionists might therefore find that this designation of 
property rights goes some way towards addressing their concerns. 
On the other hand, it would be naïve to assume that this policy overcomes all psychological 
externalities. Francione and Charlton (2015) would be unlikely to view this as an acceptable 
solution; ultimately, farm animals would still be treated as property, would likely still endure 
significant institutional suffering, and would continue to live lives of dependency, unable to 
survive by themselves in the human world or the nonhuman world. Others may hold that the 
killing of an animal for consumption can never be in its interests. Additionally, 
consequentialists who share Richard Ryder’s ‘painience’ position (2000: 213) – which focuses on 
pains caused to animals but not pleasures – may be unhappy with outcomes that lean towards 
lives worth living, as harms to animals and low-welfare practices will continue to cause them 
dissatisfaction.  
Consequently, granting ownership of welfare to farm animals will fail to internalise all 
psychological externalities. Nevertheless, the policy aligns with FAWC welfare objectives and 
would guarantee a baseline for animal welfare by ensuring that no farm animal is given a life 
not worth living. 
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There are, however, three further issues which may limit the effectiveness of any market 
creation policy. First, outcomes will only be socially-optimal if the costs of negotiation are 
sufficiently low. While the costs of negotiating may be low when only a small number of parties 
are involved, bringing large numbers of stakeholders to the negotiating table may create 
prohibitively large costs (Mansfield 1985: 503). This issue is particularly salient to environmental 
issues, where the cost of negotiation tends to be high due to the number of stakeholders 
involved (Nicholson 2010: 523). There will likely be many stakeholders in issues of animal 
welfare: producers, consumers, vegetarians and vegans, and perhaps the farm animals 
themselves. Second, even if negotiations are costless, an optimal outcome may not be achieved 
should any party lack complete information about the costs and benefits involved. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, informational asymmetries abound in animal product markets, making 
it harder to achieve an optimal outcome. Third, firms might engage in strategic bargaining, 
which militates against an agreement being reached (Perloff 1999: 675). 
In short, none of the three proposed forms of market creation fully-internalise psychological 
externalities, although they could still bring about radical changes in animal product markets. 
Ownership of animal welfare could be given to or assumed by producers, who would then sell 
credits connected to this welfare to concerned individuals who do not consume animal 
products. I challenged the effectiveness of this solution on two fronts: first, supporters of animal 
rights would likely find such a solution unpalatable and would abstain from the AWBU market; 
consequently, some psychological externality effects will not be internalised by Lusk’s market. 
Second, given their limited number, it is not apparent that the participants in Lusk’s market 
would bring about meaningful improvements to farm animal welfare. 
Alternatively, ownership of animal welfare could be granted to the public, in what essentially 
amounts to another way of framing an externality tax on low welfare. Perhaps most radically, 
ownership of animal welfare could be granted to the animals themselves. Doing this would not 
necessitate the end of animal product industries, provided it could be shown that it is in an 
animal’s interests to sacrifice certain elements of welfare in order to be brought into existence. 
At a minimum, farm animals would be provided with lives worth living, although, depending 
on negotiations, they could achieve higher levels of welfare.  
 
9. Summary 
In this chapter, I have proposed that animal agriculture produces both positive and negative 
psychological externalities stemming from concern for farm animal welfare. I have considered 
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four policy responses to externalities. When governments can calculate the socially-optimal 
level of supply of an externality-producing good, taxes, subsidies and cap and trade policies can 
push markets towards these levels. When dealing with psychological externalities such as the 
feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction produced by farm animal welfare, however, it is nearly 
impossible for governments to calculate the socially-optimal level of supply. In such instances, 
centralised policies are best used to promote a given level of supply, although policymakers 
must recognise that they do not know whether this will be a socially-optimal one. 
I also explored the possibility of using taxes, product subsidies and cap and trade to indirectly 
improve farm animal welfare by addressing the health and environmental technological 
externalities created by animal agriculture.  These policies could in fact penalise higher-welfare 
production, and would exacerbate negative psychological externalities when they facilitate a 
transition from red meat consumption to white meat consumption in societies such as the UK, 
where welfare concerns are greatest for poultry. 
Creating markets in animal welfare could be a novel way of internalising some psychological 
externalities. Regardless of whether ownership of animal welfare is given to producers, the 
public or the animals themselves, this policy is also unlikely to fully internalise psychological 
externalities, as people opposed to animal ownership may not be receptive to any policy that 
promotes the commodification of animals. Irrespective of its effectiveness as an externality 
policy, market creation, in particular when ownership of animal welfare is given to the animals 
themselves, has the potential to radically reform our relationships with farm animals and animal 
agriculture.  
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Chapter 5 
Public Goods 
 
In this Chapter 
• An introduction to the concept of public goods. 
• A defence of the claim that farm animal welfare does not meet the technical criteria for a 
public good but should, in certain circumstances, nevertheless be treated as one for policy 
reasons. 
• A discussion of public good policies and how they can be used to provide and protect farm 
animal welfare. 
 
1. Introduction 
The American sociologist K.A. Davis (1949: 157-62) once noted that conflict ‘is an ever-present 
in human relations’ and, for many people, this conflict starts at home. Chores can be a major 
source of domestic conflict: who will sweep the floors, empty the bins, do the washing up? These 
chores are frequently not finished, leading to tension as the home becomes dirty, messy and 
cluttered. Paradoxically, each member of the household professes a keen desire for cleanliness. 
How can it be that everyone wants to live in a clean and tidy house, yet the reality is rather 
different? 
The word economics stems from the Ancient Greek word for household management, 
οἰκονόμος, and the discipline can shed some light on this domestic paradox. A clean and tidy 
house possesses elements of a public good, something that all housemates will benefit from 
irrespective of who does the cleaning. When you can reap the benefits of a clean house without 
putting in any effort, the motivation for hoovering the stairs quickly ebbs away – after all, 
someone else will surely get around to doing it eventually. But when everyone holds this 
attitude, grime and dirt start to build up and the house becomes squalid. 
The concept of public goods does more than explain why household chores are so frequently 
left unattended to. It can explain why markets for goods with certain characteristics are often 
inefficient. In this chapter, I introduce the technical concept of a public good and consider how 
far farm animal welfare can be understood as one. I contend that farm animal welfare does not 
satisfy the technical conditions of a public good and is better understood as a psychological 
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externality. Nevertheless, I propose that, from a policy perspective, treating farm animal welfare 
as a public good may be useful in certain circumstances. I then assess how legislation and public 
good taxes can be used to provide and protect farm animal welfare. 
 
2. Public Goods 
a. Excludability and Rivalry 
The two unique characteristics of a public good are best understood in relation to its 
counterpart of a private good. Many commodities encountered in our day-to-day lives are 
private goods: a chocolate bar is a prime example. There are two characteristics that make a 
chocolate bar a private good. First, it is excludable: it can be denied to those who do not pay for 
it (Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 628). Second, a chocolate bar is rival in consumption: when eaten, 
nobody else can consume that particular chocolate bar (Salvatore 2003: 611). 
Not all goods are excludable. Tourists can access foreign public radio without contributing to 
it. Because those who have not paid for it cannot be prevented from enjoying its benefits, it is 
nonexcludable (Mansfield 1985: 491). Other goods are not rivals in consumption. When you 
watch a television program, you do not diminish the enjoyment experienced by other people 
watching that same program. Such goods are non-rivalrous: each subsequent person who makes 
use of the good imposes no additional cost upon the producer (Nicholson and Snyder 2010: 534). 
Most goods are neither fully rivalrous nor fully non-rivalrous, but exist on a dynamic scale 
between the two. For instance, local goods are often non-rivalrous only to an extent – they might 
have a fixed capacity, so heavy use comes at a cost to other users (Nechyba 2017: 1040-41). The 
arrival of a couple of extra people at a public swimming pool may do little to diminish someone’s 
enjoyment when swimming alone, but eventually the pool becomes so packed that each 
additional swimmer detracts from the enjoyment of others.  
There is disagreement in the literature about what constitutes a public good. Some maintain 
that public goods are both nonexcludable and non-rivalrous (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2013: 690; 
Schotter 1997: 588; Begg et al. 2000: 281; Nicholson 2010: 531; Reiss 2013: 235).78 Others maintain 
that non-rivalry is sufficient, although recognise that public goods will often be nonexcludable 
too (Salvatore 2003: 611; Nechyba 2017: 1040; Mansfield 1985: 490; Perloff 1999: 682). Given that 
 
78 The continuous nature of rivalry raises questions regarding how much non-rivalry is required for a good to 
count as a public good. 
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many classic examples of public goods, such as national defence, clean air and streetlighting, 
are both nonexcludable and non-rivalrous, both criteria will be assumed necessary here. 
Because public goods are nonexcludable and non-rival in consumption, their costs do not reflect 
their full social value; as such, they can be understood as a special kind of externality. 
Consequently, markets for public goods, where they exist at all, are likely to undersupply public 
goods. The market’s inability to provide a socially-optimal supply of public goods is largely a 
consequence of the free rider effect (Kaul 2012: 729). 
 
b. The Free-Rider Problem 
The excludability and rivalry of private goods means that the amount you are able to consume 
is determined by what you are willing to pay: if you are not willing to pay for a chocolate bar, 
you will not be able to consume it; if you are willing to pay for just one chocolate bar, you will 
be able to consume only one. Because, on the other hand, public goods are nonexcludable and 
non-rivalrous, the quantity that a person is able to consume is instead determined by total 
supply (Parkin 2000: 394; Mansfield 1985: 492; Begg et al. 2000: 281). When people can enjoy 
public goods without paying for them and their enjoyment is unlikely to lead to these goods 
becoming exhausted, they have little incentive to contribute to the good’s supply. The problem 
of people using public goods without paying for them, known as free-riding, is thus especially 
salient in large societies, where consumers may believe a public good will be provided 
irrespective of their contributions (Salvatore 2003: 614). One person withdrawing support for a 
public good will barely affect its supply, allowing a free-rider to enjoy its benefits without 
contributing to its provision. When many people behave in this way, however, the supply of a 
public good can be severely reduced. 
This does not mean that markets cannot exist in public goods: there are several reasons why 
people might choose to pay for them, the most obvious being that they have preferences for 
public goods. This motivation is captured by models of pure altruism, which assume that people 
have preferences only for private consumption and the total supply of a public good (Andreoni 
1990: 464; 1988a: 57). Models of pure altruism are pessimistic about private contributions to 
public goods, however: they anticipate that, even when overall demand for public goods is high, 
few people will contribute because of the free-rider effect.  
The pure altruism model is evidently incomplete, as many people voluntarily contribute to 
public goods. This is frequently seen in the literature, typically in public good games. In games 
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of this type, players are given an endowment, and must choose how much to put in a public 
good pot. At the end of the game, each player receives a payoff that is a function of whatever 
they withheld from the pot in addition to a percentage (often 40%) of what all players have 
placed in the pot. Assume there are four players, each with an endowment of £10. If everyone 
placed their entire endowment in the shared pot, each player would receive £16. Should, 
however, one player decide to free-ride and contribute nothing, that person will receive £22, 
while the others receive £12. If two players free-ride, they each receive £18, while the other two 
receive £8. If three free-ride, they receive £14 and the one public good contributor receives £4. 
If everyone free-rides, they leave with their initial endowment of £10. Clearly then, the best 
outcome for the group as a whole is for everyone to contribute to the shared pot. However, each 
player can make themselves better-off by free-riding, leading to a Nash equilibrium (an 
equilibrium where nobody can make themselves better off by changing their strategy) that is 
not Pareto-optimal (Andreoni 1988b: 293; Keser and van Winden 2000: 25-26). 
Despite free-riding being the ‘optimal’ strategy in public good games, the behaviour of 
participants in experiments indicates many people have reasons for contributing to public 
goods. The hypothesis of strong free-riding, where just about everyone avoids contributing to 
public goods, can be rejected, as most people in public good games contribute to the public 
good pot. There is, however still a clear weak free-rider effect: participants in single-shot public 
good experiments tend to contribute between 40 and 60% of their endowments to the public 
good, a far cry from full free-riding, but also significantly below the optimal level of contribution 
(Marwell and Ames 1981; Thaler 2016: 145; Ledyard 1995: 113; Dawes and Thaler 1988: 189). 
Outside of the laboratory, there are also many examples of people contributing to public goods. 
People donate to political parties, pick up litter and pay for fireworks displays they could watch 
from external vantage points for free (Thaler 2016: 144; Bergstrom et al. 1986: 25). In 2017, people 
in the UK self-reported as giving £10.3 billion to charity, with about 60% of people claiming to 
be donors. Among donors, the median monthly donation was £20 (CAF 2018). Given the extent 
of public engagement with public goods, it is thus clear that models of pure altruism do not 
capture all the reasons why people choose to contribute. 
The unrealistic predictions of pure altruism models led James Andreoni (1989) to develop the 
theory of impure altruism, which, as we saw in Chapter 1 (p.32), recognises that acting 
altruistically – for instance by contributing to public goods – can produce a feeling called 
variously a warm glow, a satisfaction of conscience, an intrinsic satisfaction and a private 
benefit. This feeling can constitute a motivating force for pro-public good behaviours (Dawes 
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and Thaler 1988: 192; Clark et al. 2003: 239; Deci 1971: 105). Feelings of intrinsic satisfaction are 
excludable in nature – free-riders cannot enjoy the satisfaction that can accompany pro-public 
good behaviours – and so can offer an explanation for why people contribute to public goods. 
Other writers have claimed that social norms may provide another motivation for voluntarily 
contributing to public goods (Holländer 1990; Cartwright and Patel 2010; Rege 2004). The desire 
to follow social norms, in turn motivated by the desire to receive social approval and avoid social 
disapproval, attaches further private benefits to public good contributions and costs to free-
riding. As will be discussed in Chapter 7 (p.178), social norms could be a useful policy instrument 
for promoting pro-farm animal welfare behaviours. 
 
c. Optimal Supply 
Despite there being a range of reasons why people might want to contribute to public goods, 
the free-rider effect will still cause markets to undersupply these goods. Consequently, the 
provision of public goods is largely regarded as a government responsibility. For governments 
to provide public goods effectively, they need, at least in the theoretical domain, to be able to 
calculate public demand for these goods. The aggregate demand for a private good is calculated 
by summing the quantities demanded at various price points. For instance, when the price 
(represented in Figure 4 as marginal willingness to pay) of a bag of apples is £3, Nellie demands 
three and Oliver two: aggregate demand is therefore five bags. For public goods, we must instead 
consider people’s willingness to pay for a given quantity. If Nellie is willing to pay £3 for a third 
public park and Oliver £1, total willingness to pay for the third park is £4. The contrast between 
the two processes is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. 
The different methods stem from the non-rivalry of public goods: one person’s consumption of 
a public good does not preclude another’s. If two people each demand five units of a public 
good, only five units need to be supplied, whereas ten units of a private good would be required. 
Summing individual demand would overestimate the optimal supply of public goods; 
willingness to pay for different levels of supply is instead the appropriate measure.  
In sum, public goods are nonexcludable and non-rivalrous in nature, meaning that people can 
enjoy a good’s benefits without paying for it, and one person’s use of public goods does not limit 
another’s. Because they can free-ride on others’ contributions, consumers have little incentive 
to pay for public goods; despite this, we see a degree of private support for public goods, which 
implies that there are private benefits attached to pro-public good behaviours. Because 
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Figure 4 – Aggregating Demand for Private Goods                                                                                                                                                                         
(Adapted from Kolstad 2011: 97) 
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Figure 5 – Aggregating Demand for Public Goods                                                                                                                             
(Adapted from Begg et al. 2000: 268) 
                                                            
(Adapted from Begg et al. 2000: 268) 
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voluntary support for public goods is likely to be limited, markets in public goods are liable to 
failure and the burden of supply largely rests on the government, which can calculate the 
optimal level of provision by summing willingness to pay for a given level of supply. 
 
3. Farm Animal Welfare as a Public Good 
Many economists, organisations and policymakers (see Norwood and Lusk 2011, McMullen 
2016a, FAWC 2011, UK Parliament 2018, and RSPCA 2018, for example) identify farm animal 
welfare as a public good. J.L. Lusk and F.B. Norwood (2011: 474), for instance, state that farm 
animal welfare is ‘non-rival (the happiness I receive from knowing a hen benefits from my 
consumption of cage-free eggs does not prohibit you from also being happy at the hen’s better 
life) and non-excludable (I cannot keep you from enjoying the fact that I eat cage-free eggs)’.79 
They therefore contend that farm animal welfare is likely to be underprovided in the market 
because of the free-rider problem. While some people may be satisfied in the knowledge that 
farm animals enjoy a particular level of welfare, they can enjoy a similar degree of satisfaction 
even when they do not contribute to its provision (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 315). For instance, 
you may derive pleasure from the existence of the growing organic industry because you believe 
it provides animals with higher welfare than conventional animal agriculture, yet continue to 
buy conventionally-produced goods because they are cheaper. Due to consumer dissociation 
from the suffering and death produced in animal agriculture, as discussed in Chapter 1 (p.32), 
people can have an asymmetric relationship with farm animal welfare, where they derive 
pleasure from higher welfare but overlook the low welfare aspects of animal agriculture that 
would otherwise cause them discomfort. 
Although often desirable, some public goods can be undesirable: such things are known as 
public bads. Elements of public bads pertain to farm animal welfare (Harvey and Hubbard 2013: 
108): they are both non-rival (the distress you might feel at the level of animal suffering in a 
society can also be felt by others) and non-excludable (people cannot be prevented from feeling 
distressed by animal suffering) (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 311). 
One plausible candidate for a public bad in this context is animal cruelty, which, in this thesis, 
will be defined in terms of public attitudes. Because there likely exists significant public concern 
for farm animal welfare, there may exist a level of welfare or set of practices that are deemed so 
 
79 As noted in the previous chapter (p.72), we can understand this in terms of preference satisfaction: people 
have preferences for farm animals to consume certain goods, and derive happiness from the satisfaction of 
these preferences. 
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detrimental to farm animals that almost everyone opposes them and would be willing to pay to 
eradicate them. I will refer to these practices and these levels of welfare as ‘cruelty’ or ‘cruel 
practice’. 
Because farm animal welfare bears similarity to public goods, markets are unlikely to supply an 
optimal level of it, despite there being significant public concern for farm animal welfare and 
willingness to pay to improve it. Consequently, some degree of provision and protection of 
animal welfare is likely to be in society’s interests, and there may be scope for government 
intervention in animal product markets to achieve this. 
 
4. Farm Animal Welfare as a Public Good? 
Although many academics and policymakers treat farm animal welfare as a public good, some 
thinkers have suggested that it does not in fact fulfil the necessary criteria of nonexcludability 
and non-rivalry. David Harvey and Carmen Hubbard (2013: 109), for instance, recognise that 
welfare is intrinsically tied to the production and sale of animal products. Without markets for 
animal products, there would be no need for farm animals, and thus there would be no farm 
animal welfare. The provision of farm animal welfare is therefore dependent upon the demand 
for animal products, which are private goods. Rather than being a public good, animal welfare 
could instead be characterised as a mere attribute of private goods. 
Stefan Mann is also sceptical of whether farm animal welfare is best categorised as a public good, 
although for different reasons. Mann understands farm animal welfare as relating to an animal’s 
quality of life, which in turn depends upon the living conditions and husbandry practices its 
owner provides.80 This relationship between farm animals and their owners is a private 
interaction good; it cannot be a public good because it is excludable; Mann recognises that the 
way one animal is treated has little bearing upon the treatment of another when he writes that 
‘a farmer may pamper one cow and torture another’ (2005a: 370-71). 
If animal welfare relates to the relationship between owner and animal, welfare improvements 
are rival and excludable, and thus private, goods. Although many welfare improvements may 
not be fully-rivalrous, they are certainly closer to the rival end of the spectrum. For instance, 
although one hen’s use of a dust bath may not preclude another from using it, there are only so 
many hens that can use it simultaneously. In addition, individual animals can be excluded from 
 
80 In this thesis, I have noted that farm animal welfare is likely to be affected by factors including production 
inputs (p.14). Mann’s account appears to cohere with this definition, and perhaps develops it further in its 
recognition that many of the constituents of farm animal welfare are provided by an animal’s owner. 
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making use of welfare improvements (Mann 2005b: 135-36). In short, Mann argues that 
improvements in farm animal welfare are both rival and excludable, and so are in fact private 
goods. 
This raises the question of why so many have claimed that farm animal welfare is a public good. 
As noted earlier, J.L. Lusk and F.B. Norwood claim (2011: 474) that animal welfare is a public 
good because it is ‘non-rival (the happiness I receive from knowing a hen benefits from my 
consumption of cage-free eggs does not prohibit you from also being happy at the hen’s better 
life) and non-excludable (I cannot keep you from enjoying the fact that I eat cage-free eggs)’. At 
first glance, the claims they make seem fairly incontestable. When we consider the human 
benefits these writers ascribe to farm animal welfare, however, we see the flaw in their 
argument. Lusk and Norwood, along with others in the literature (see McInerney 2004: 4 for 
instance), do not see farm animal welfare as a public good in terms of how it benefits farm 
animals; as we have already seen, such a strategy would be doomed to failure because the 
benefits to farm animals are rivalrous and excludable. Similarly, they do not see farm animal 
welfare as a public good because of the benefits accrued by animal owners: these too are 
rivalrous and excludable. 
Instead, Lusk and Norwood see farm animal welfare as a public good in terms of the happiness 
and sadness that humans draw from its existence. Contrast this with a classic public good such 
as a public radio station. Public radio is non-rival in the sense that one person listening to it 
does diminish the enjoyment of anyone else listening to it, and nonexcludable because those 
who do not pay for it cannot be prevented from tuning in. The nonrivalry and nonexcludability 
conditions relate to the benefits people draw from the consumption of the radio station, in this 
case by listening to its programming, rather than from pleasure taken from its mere existence. 
Through analogy, however, we see that the public is not a consumer of farm animal welfare. 
First, we might better understand our relationship with current levels of farm animal welfare in 
society, by considering Poppy, who buys a classic car that is in desperate need of refurbishment. 
The paint is scratched and faded, the lights do not work, and the car is beginning to rust. Poppy 
diligently repairs and refurbishes the car, to the point that it looks as good as new. She takes it 
out for a ride on a Sunday morning and the car catches the eye of numerous admiring passers-
by. 
By Lusk and Norwood’s reasoning, Poppy’s car would be a public good: the pleasure that one 
person draws from seeing the classic car in all its glory does not preclude another from feeling 
the same way, and people cannot be prevented from being delighted by the sight of the car. For 
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Poppy’s car to be a public good, we must say that passers-by are consumers of the car in some 
way. It seems more plausible to contend that, as the sole owner of the car, Poppy is also its sole 
consumer. When the car’s condition is improved, the benefits accrue to its consumer. The 
enjoyment experienced by passers-by is unrelated to the consumption of the car, but rather is a 
psychological externality stemming from Poppy’s purchase of the car and the time and money 
she has put into refurbishing it.81 
Poppy is also a chicken farmer. She used to raise her chickens in a barn, but has recently shifted 
to free-range production. People walking past Poppy’s farm take pleasure in seeing chickens 
roaming the fields and living what are perceived to be good lives. This pleasure fits Lusk and 
Norwood’s definition of a public good: one person’s pleasure does not preclude another’s, and 
people cannot be prevented from taking pleasure from the sight of Poppy’s poultry roaming the 
fields. In fact, the mere knowledge that Poppy’s chickens are living good lives may be enough 
to spark pleasure. Just as with her classic car, however, Poppy is the sole owner of her chickens, 
and is thus the sole consumer. When Poppy shifts production from barn to free-range, many 
would say that the chickens’ welfare improves. Any benefits of this improvement accrue solely 
to Poppy, who might now own healthier and possibly happier chickens, and the chickens 
themselves. The enjoyment experienced by passers-by is once more unrelated to the 
consumption of the chickens, but is a psychological externality created by Poppy’s investment 
in free-range production. 
To labour the point, because farm animal welfare concerns the relationship between an owner 
and an animal, welfare improvements can only be consumed by the owner and the animal; 
consequently, the benefits of improved farm animal welfare are ‘consumed’ by the animal’s 
owner, and perhaps the animal itself. Where other people derive enjoyment from the presence 
of higher welfare, this is not as consumers, but as mere passers-by. Their benefits are thus best 
understood as psychological externalities. 
But what of our relationship with farm animal welfare that our purchases have contributed to? 
If passers-by stop off at Poppy’s farm to buy her produce and financially contribute to her 
provision of higher welfare, are they not in some sense consumers of this welfare too? Another 
analogy sheds light on this matter. In Christmas 2019, Oxfam launched a series of ‘life-changing 
 
81 Some have recognised that the consumption of some goods appears to be visual in nature (Urry 2000: 148-9; 
Zuev 2015: 79). It seems implausible to suggest that passers-by are visually consuming Poppy’s car, however: 
as J.E. Schroeder notes (2004: 230), ‘visual consumption begins with images’, such as adverts, photographs and 
paintings. Perhaps passers-by are consuming the image of Poppy’s car, but it remains implausible to claim that 
they are consuming the car itself. 
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gift cards’. For £25, you could buy a Christmas card for a friend or relative, while also providing 
a pig to a women-led co-operative farm in northern Rwanda. The pigs provide manure and 
piglets, which can be sold to fund essentials such as food and education, and empower these 
women to become more self-sufficient (Oxfam 2020). 
When Qasir buys an Oxfam poverty-busting pig gift card, however, we want to say that he 
becomes a consumer of the gift card itself, not the pig. The pig is owned and consumed by the 
owners of the co-operative farm in northern Rwanda. Qasir may derive a feeling of warm glow 
from his purchase, and so may experience benefits beyond those immediately provided by the 
gift card, but he is clearly not a consumer of the pig. 
It is useful at this point to introduce a distinction used in the marketing literature. Economics 
tends to bundle consumers, buyers and shoppers together as consumers, but, in this instance, 
recognising the distinction between the three is enlightening. Consumers are a product’s end 
users. If you eat a steak, you are the consumer of that steak. When you have your hair cut, you 
are the consumer of that service. When you visit an art exhibition, you are a consumer of the 
exhibition. Buyers, on the other hand, are those who front up the money for a purchase. 
Shoppers are those people directly involved in the purchase decision, who choose which goods 
to buy, irrespective of whether they are buying these goods with their own money or whether 
they are the end users of them (Shankar et al. 2011: S29). 
When buying a poverty-busting pig gift card, Qasir is the shopper, buyer and consumer of the 
card. If he gifts it to a friend, the friend is the consumer of the gift card, while Qasir remains the 
shopper and the buyer. Neither Qasir nor his friend are consumers of the pig itself, however. 
Qasir buys the pig, an Oxfam agent presumably shops for the pig, and it is consumed by the co-
operative farmers of northern Rwanda. 
So it is the case for purchases of higher-welfare products. If Qasir pays a premium for free-range 
chicken, he plays the role of consumer, buyer and shopper for the chicken meat. For access to 
free range, Qasir is merely the buyer: Poppy shops for the land upon which the chickens roam, 
and either Poppy or Poppy and her poultry are consumers of this land and any associated welfare 
benefits. Qasir does not roam the fields that his purchase has contributed to, so he is clearly not 
a consumer of the access to free range that his money has bought: the access to free range can 
thus be understood as non-commodity output of agriculture that is not consumed by Qasir 
(Ryland 2014: 854). Any pleasure that Qasir feels as the result of his purchase is either related to 
his consumption of the chicken, or psychological externalities relating to his (charitable) 
contribution to the birds’ welfare. 
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We are not done yet, though. Like many people, Qasir associates farm animal welfare with 
quality attributes including safety, healthfulness and taste (Brook Lyndhurst 2012: 21; Matthews 
1996: 41-42; Jago et al. 2000: 163-64; Harper and Henson 2001: 21-22; Verbeke et al. 2010: 285; 
Heng et al. 2013: 425; RSPCA 2006: 23). When he buys free-range chicken, does he not gain in 
some way from the higher-welfare aspects of his purchase? If so, could we say that he directly 
benefits from the provision of higher welfare, and could be said to be a consumer of this welfare? 
The answer is no. We have seen that animal welfare relates to the relationship between the 
animal owner and the animal. When the animal has been slaughtered, processed and packaged, 
this relationship is severed and there is no welfare to speak of in the final product. The perceived 
benefits (taste etc.) associated with an animal’s welfare when it was alive are product attributes, 
and are directly enjoyed by the consumer, but there is no welfare to speak of, to consume, or to 
directly benefit from. Higher welfare benefits the consumer indirectly, by supporting those 
immediate quality attributes such as safety, healthfulness and taste that consumers directly 
benefit from. 
In sum, farm animal welfare is not a public good because the public does not consume farm 
animal welfare. Farm animal welfare concerns the relationship between farm animals and their 
owners, and thus is rival and excludable in nature. Any pleasure (or pain) that people feel as a 
result of the prevailing level of farm animal welfare in society is better understood as a 
psychological externality stemming from the level of welfare that an owner provides their 
animal. Even when people pay for higher-welfare products, they are not consumers of this 
higher welfare: the premiums they pay for higher-welfare goods are more plausibly viewed as 
charitable donations, to the benefit of farm animals and their owners. And even when people 
derive private benefits from higher-welfare goods, we do not want to say that they are 
consumers of higher welfare. If welfare concerns the relationship between an owner and their 
animal, this relationship is dissolved when the animal is slaughtered, and thus there is no 
welfare directly contained in the animal product. End users might benefit from attributes 
provided by the welfare that an animal enjoyed in life, but they are not consumers of the welfare 
itself. If the public is not a consumer of farm animal welfare, we cannot understand it as a public 
good. 
Despite farm animal welfare not being best-understood as a public good in a technical sense, it 
may still be prudent to continuing treating it as if it were one, at least from a policy perspective. 
Many of those in the policy debate, including former DEFRA secretary Michael Gove, identify 
farm animal welfare as a public good (McInerney 2004: 3; FAWC 2008: 2; FAWC 2009: 44; 
RSPCA 2018: 2; Tasker 2018). If this thesis is to resonate with the policy debate, it must surely 
5 | Public Goods 
117 
 
engage with the issue on the same terms. Additionally, the need for government intervention 
in public good issues is widely accepted and so treating animal welfare as a public good might 
make it easier to justify government action in an area that has significant public support. Last, 
due to the similarities between public goods and psychological externalities, some public good 
policies could also be effective tools for responding to psychological externalities.  
Even if it is deemed inappropriate to use public good policies to directly provide farm animal 
welfare, these policies could still be used to indirectly support animal welfare. First, there may 
be public goods which contribute to farm animal welfare. One example that warrants further 
investigation is education. At this point, there have been few studies concerning the link 
between education and purchases of higher-welfare goods, so firm conclusions cannot be 
drawn. If a causal connection between education and support for animal welfare can be 
established, however, education policy may be an indirect means of satisfying public preferences 
for farm animal welfare. There may exist other public goods whose support will benefit farm 
animal welfare.82 Further research into the demographics of those buying higher-welfare animal 
products may indicate what these public goods are. 
Second, supporting farm animal welfare may benefit the supply of other public goods. Animal 
cruelty is incompatible with a society’s values, and these values may be a public good in their 
own right. The benefits of living in a society that generally endorses ethical behaviours are 
numerous: physical, emotional and financial support for those who need it, protection of rights, 
action against cruelty, fair treatment for all, etc. These benefits can be seen as both non-
excludable and non-rivalrous, thus constituting a public good. Applying these ethical codes 
consistently throughout society may also require the protection of farm animal welfare. 
Third, there may be public goods directly related to farm animal welfare that can be supported 
with public good policies. Harvey and Hubbard (2013: 113) argue that, rather than animal welfare 
itself, it is the regulation of animal welfare that constitutes a public good. One person’s 
‘consumption’ of animal welfare regulations does not limit another’s, and people cannot be 
excluded from consuming animal welfare regulation, which applies to a whole society and not 
a select group. Consequently, there is scope for legislation to play a role in any public good 
response to farm animal welfare. 
 
82 There may also exist public goods whose support would be detrimental to farm animal welfare. As discussed 
in the previous chapter (p.80), support for environmental public goods such as clean air could ultimately harm 
farm animal welfare. 
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In sum, although many writers consider farm animal welfare to be a public good, the human 
pleasures and pains associated with it are derived from the existence of welfare rather than its 
consumption and so are more accurately categorised as psychological externalities. 
Nevertheless, the concept of public goods remains useful when discussing policy responses in 
this area: policymakers continue to treat farm animal welfare as a public good; public good 
policies may be appropriate tools for responding to psychological externalities; there may be 
public goods that benefit farm animal welfare, and supporting animal welfare can help develop 
other public goods; and aspects of farm animal welfare are public goods. For these reasons, I 
will spend the remainder of this chapter examining how public good policies can influence the 
provision of farm animal welfare: doing so coheres with the current policy conversation and can 
produce proposals that will have a meaningful impact on farm animal welfare. Additionally, if 
it is agreed that animal welfare is not a public good, this chapter’s analysis can be adapted to 
target public goods that indirectly benefit animal welfare. I begin with legislative interventions. 
 
5. Legislation 
An unfunded mandate is a type of legislation that requires producers to provide public goods at 
their own expense. Given that unfunded mandates require everyone in a society to obey the new 
legislation, they are appropriate public good policies because they guarantee a good’s provision. 
Unfunded mandates can be used to both require the use of certain practices and prohibit others, 
and so are appropriate for dealing with both public goods and public bads. The policy is limited, 
however, by the extent to which producers can extract payment from their customers. For this 
reason, unfunded mandates may be most effective when applied to public goods that are 
bundled with private goods; the policy has been used to target air pollution, for instance, by 
requiring producers to install pollution-limiting devices on vehicles. The policy may thus be 
appropriate for addressing issues in farm animal welfare, as animal welfare, which we are 
treating as a public good, is bundled with animal products, which are private goods. 
One way that unfunded mandates can address public good problems caused by farm animal 
welfare is by imposing minimum welfare standards that prohibit cruel practice (Doonan et al. 
2009: 233). There are several examples of unfunded mandates being used to protect animal 
welfare, particularly relating to the use of caged egg systems. Switzerland’s 1981 Animal Welfare 
Act effectively banned cage systems (Häne 2000: 22), while the European Union’s Council 
Directive 1999/74/EC of July 1999 introduced a ban on the use of conventional cages in egg 
production that came into effect in 2012 (Druce and Lymbery 2006: 130). Both Austria and 
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Germany have incoming unfunded mandates banning the use of enriched cages in egg 
production, to be enacted in 2020 and 2025-28 respectively (Stevenson 2018: 18), and, as we saw 
earlier, California eliminated the use of battery cages in egg production with the passage of 
Proposition 2 by popular vote in 2008. Beyond egg production, sow stalls were banned in the 
UK through an unfunded mandate in 1999 (Levitt 2018b), and other unfunded mandates were 
established in The Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007. 
Any legislation that limits consumer choice or leads to consumer price increases is likely to face 
at least some opposition, but consumer research suggests that anti-cruelty legislation may 
attract broad support. Focus groups indicate that the existence of animal welfare legislation 
helps many consumers to feel comfortable about not considering welfare issues when buying 
animal products; they instead adopt an attitude of ‘if it’s on the shelf it must be fine’ (Brook 
Lyndhurst 2010: 33; Harper and Henson 2001: 21). It thus appears that many consumers believe 
that responsibility for eradicating cruel practice at least partially rests with the government, and 
so some degree of legislation may be appropriate. Legislation can even be a popular response: 
62% of British respondents to the 2005 Eurobarometer survey (2005: 64) claimed that animal 
welfare was not treated with enough importance in food and agricultural policy, indicating that 
there exists appetite for further government action. 
Although political viability may not present a major threat to unfunded mandates, several 
factors could undermine the policy’s effectiveness. First, legislation must be carefully worded, 
otherwise the intended welfare improvements may not follow. This was seen in California, 
where the wording of Proposition 2, which was intended to eliminate the use of cages in egg 
production, was suspect: it stated that farm animals should not be confined in a manner that 
prevents them from lying down, standing up, fully extending their limbs and turning around 
freely. This prompted at least one producer to install larger cages (Lusk 2011: 563), while others 
simply removed the connecting walls between cages, giving hens more space but maintaining 
existing stocking densities (Reese 2018: 17- 18). 
Second, there must be robust penalties for breaches of unfunded mandates, otherwise firms will 
have little incentive to conform. This factor may be behind the initially limited effectiveness of 
the EU battery cage ban in 2012, as the size of penalties and the enforcement of the directive 
was left to member states (Council Directive 1999/74/EC art. 13). Fifteen states (including the 
United Kingdom) were not rigorous in enforcing the law when it first came into effect: 
consequently, an estimated 14% of EU hens were held in non-compliant cages at the start of 
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2012, despite producers having had over twelve years to prepare for the ban’s implementation 
(Blandford and Harvey 2014: 37-38; BBC Newsround 2012; BBC 2012). 
Third, unfunded mandates will, in many cases, be ineffective if firms are unable to extract 
payment, either directly or indirectly, for their efforts in increasing the provision of public 
goods. Unfunded mandates can be expected to increase producers’ costs – if they reduced costs 
then market forces would likely have already pushed producers towards the desired production 
methods and there would be no need for legislation. If producers cannot collect remuneration 
for these higher costs, it may become untenable for them to remain in the market.83 In many 
cases, producers can simply raise prices to accommodate the greater costs of higher-welfare 
production. This may be difficult, however, if governments do not apply unfunded mandates to 
imports. 
When unfunded mandates are not applied to imports, they force domestic producers to adopt 
more costly production practices but do not remove lower-welfare imports from the market. 
These cheaper, lower-welfare imports can undercut domestic producers. Consequently, this use 
of unfunded mandates can be expected to do little to improve animal welfare, but will instead 
drive socially-unacceptable production practices abroad while undermining the 
competitiveness of the domestic industry (Sumner et al 2011: 248; Mann 2005b: 143; Doonan et 
al. 2009: 233). This was an effect of the UK’s 1999 ban on the use of gestation crates in pig 
farming, which could not be applied to EU imports due to EU competition law and the nature 
of the customs union. Despite surveys indicating that consumers would support the new, higher 
domestic welfare standards, the market was flooded with cheaper meat from European 
countries with lower standards: imports of Danish pig meat increased 50% between 1997 and 
2007 and German imports increased 400% in the same period. The impact on the domestic 
industry was catastrophic: the number of British pig farmers nearly halved, from 10,000 in 1999 
to 6,000 by 2009, and the country’s self-sufficiency in pig meat fell from over 80% at the end of 
the decade to under 50% in 2018 (AHDB 2018). A similar story played out in the Swedish pig 
industry, where a ban on gestation crates was introduced in 1994 to complement bans on 
farrowing cages and tail docking. The country joined the EU in 1995 and experienced a surge in 
 
83 This is of particular concern for firms competing in export markets. If international markets have little 
appetite for higher welfare standards, the price increases associated with an unfunded mandate might harm a 
firm’s international competitiveness (Blandford and Fulponi 1999: 421). 
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cheap imports from Denmark and Germany. Whereas Sweden had once been almost entirely 
self-sufficient in pig meat, by 2014 it was only 68% self-sufficient (Levitt 2018b; O’Dwyer 2014).84  
Policymakers have at least three ways of responding to the threat of lower-welfare imports. First, 
they could extend an unfunded mandate to apply to imports. This path was taken by the 
Californian state government, which passed bill AB 1437 to require imported animal products 
to meet the standards demanded by Proposition 2 (Mullally and Lusk 2018: 652). One issue with 
this policy is that exporting producers will need to be monitored and certified by trustworthy 
organisations to ensure that standards are being met. This could impose significant costs upon 
these producers, making trade less profitable and thus less desirable. An exception may exist 
where there is unmet demand for higher-welfare goods in the exporter’s domestic market, in 
which case welfare certification may provide additional benefits by allowing producers to 
specialise within their own domestic market. 
Another issue with this response is that it may not be compatible with World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) regulations. The WTO does not permit technical barriers to trade, i.e. 
standards and regulations that are deemed discriminatory against other countries or that give 
domestic producers an unfair advantage (WTO 2014: 5). The US-Mexico Tuna-dolphin I dispute 
of 1991 suggests that an import ban on lower-welfare production could be regarded as a form of 
trade discrimination: the WTO ruled that import bans are not permitted on methods of 
production, but must instead be applied to broad categories of goods. This means that an import 
ban on eggs may be permissible, but a ban on caged eggs would not be (Bowles et al. 2017: 1; 
Stevenson 2015; Blandford and Fulponi 1999: 419). On the other hand, the organisation’s General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) delineates circumstances under which violations of 
WTO measures are exempted. One such circumstance allows measures to be taken to ‘protect 
public morals’ (WTO 1986: 37). Although this argument has not yet been presented to the WTO, 
it could be claimed that the protection of farm animal welfare is a matter of public morals, and 
so a ban on lower-welfare imports would be justified. Peter Stevenson attempts to make this 
argument, pointing out that the 2013-14 EU ban on seal imports was upheld by the WTO, in a 
 
84 Interestingly, the limited empirical evidence available in this area does not unanimously point towards 
welfare improvements being deleterious to domestic production. Switzerland’s Animal Welfare Act phased out 
the use of caged systems of egg production between 1981 and 1992, but did not change its import policy 
(Häne et al. 2000: 21-22). One might have expected cheap caged eggs to flow into the country and crowd out 
domestic producers, who were now required to use more costly production methods. However, the reverse 
happened, and the domestic market share increased from 62% in 1992 to 74% in 2006. Mann (2005b: 143) 
attributes this to the psychological effects of the ban, which indicated to consumers that eggs produced using 
caged systems were ethically unacceptable. These psychological effects were surely assisted by a mandatory 
labelling scheme that required imported caged eggs to carry the label ‘Produced in battery cages, which are 
not permitted in Switzerland’ (FAWC 2006: 10). 
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case that established animal welfare as an issue relevant to public morals (Stevenson 2018: 11). 
Whether this case sets a precedent that would justify a ban on animal products produced using 
lower-welfare methods remains to be seen; for now, though, policymakers should not rely upon 
an import ban as a means of protecting domestic production and farm animal welfare from 
lower-welfare imports. 
A second response is to impose tariffs upon lower-welfare imports in order to safeguard the 
competitiveness of the domestic industry (Stevenson 2018: 4). This increases the costs of lower-
welfare production to the point that domestic producers cannot be priced out of the market by 
cheap lower-welfare imports. This will not be possible, however, if imports are protected under 
the terms of a free-trade agreement, highlighting the need for governments to defend domestic 
standards in trade negotiations. 
Additionally, this use of tariffs risks falling afoul of WTO regulations. The WTO operates a ‘most 
favoured nation’ principle to prevent trade discrimination. This requires tariffs on goods to be 
applied equally to all countries, in the absence of a free trade agreement or customs union 
(WTO 2019). We have already seen that the WTO does not permit discrimination of goods based 
on production method, meaning that a low welfare tariff would likely be interpreted as 
discriminatory. 
A third way of protecting domestic producers from cheaper, lower-welfare imports may be to 
introduce clearer product labelling to inform consumers which goods have been produced using 
lower-welfare practices. This policy may have helped preserve the domestic Swiss egg industry 
after battery cage production in the country was prohibited in 1992 (FAWC 2006: 10). As I 
discuss further in Chapter 6, consumers are given relatively little information about animal 
welfare at points of purchase, making it difficult to discriminate between products according to 
welfare attributes. Consumers would be able to avoid lower-welfare imports if they could 
identify these goods at points of purchase. This in turn could encourage international producers 
to improve welfare standards in order to remain competitive in the British market.  
Once more, however, WTO regulations may scupper this policy. Article 2.2 of the WTO’s 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade permits the introduction of technical regulations 
such as labelling schemes in pursuit of a ‘legitimate objective’. Although animal health is 
considered to be a legitimate objective, the WTO has not ruled that animal welfare is one (WTO 
1995: 118; FAWC 2006: 7; McInerney 2004: 62). Until the WTO definitively rules on this issue, it 
is not clear that there is scope to enact animal welfare policies that discriminate between 
products on the basis of production method. 
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At this point, it appears that the UK’s relatively stringent animal welfare legislation threatens to 
undermine the competitiveness of its domestic animal product industries, especially in the 
context of Brexit. If it is not possible to protect domestic producers from lower-welfare imports, 
British producers would likely need to lower their own welfare standards to remain competitive, 
which would require the relaxing of the country’s animal welfare legislation (CIWF 2016: 3; UK 
Parliament. House of Lords European Union Committee 2017: 15). The stringency of WTO 
regulations does not, however, mean that the UK is powerless to protect its domestic industries 
from lower-welfare imports. One solution would be to enact high tariffs on all animal products 
to render the import of lower-welfare goods nonviable, before negotiating trade deals which 
grant higher-welfare animal products favourable access to the UK market.85 
This strategy could even strengthen UK animal product industries in the wake of Brexit. In 
certain areas, UK welfare standards are more stringent than the EU’s. For instance, sow stalls 
are banned in the UK (and Sweden), but can be used in other EU member states from the 
weaning of the previous litter until the end of the first four weeks of pregnancy (CIWF 2019). 
EU competition law prevents the protection of domestic industries against other member states, 
however, which prohibits the UK from banning EU imports that fail to meet its domestic welfare 
standards (Stevenson 2018: 17). Consequently, cheaper EU imports undercut the British pig 
farming industry and lessen the incentive to enact further farm animal welfare legislation in 
other areas. Well-handled post-Brexit trade deals could enable the UK to become a world leader 
in farm animal welfare while maintaining a thriving domestic industry. Without import 
restrictions on lower-welfare goods, however, domestic producers are likely to call for existing 
welfare standards to be weakened in order to remain competitive. 
To be effective, animal welfare regulations must therefore be carefully worded, robustly 
supported by legal sanctions for noncompliant producers, and (ideally) applied to imported 
products. When these concerns are met, legislation promises to be a powerful tool that can 
prevent cruel practices and buttress a society’s ethical codes.  
Even when implemented effectively, however, legislation targeting low-welfare production can 
still produce negative effects. Legislation that limits market freedom can harm people’s utility 
by reducing the range of products they can buy. Amartya Sen (1988: 290-92) argues that the 
ability to make choices has intrinsic value and can be understood as central to personal 
 
85 The EU appears to be adopting a similar strategy, with a recent free trade deal with Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay allowing eggs to be imported duty-free only if they meet the EU’s animal welfare 
standards (Busby 2019). 
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development; consequently, reductions in market freedom may be viewed as prima facie 
undesirable. J.C. Harsanyi (1977a: 652-54) makes a similar point from a preference utilitarian 
perspective, recognising that having free personal choice can be utility-enhancing. 
Additionally, as higher-welfare production is generally more expensive than lower-welfare 
production, unfunded mandates can be expected to disrupt consumption patterns. This will 
disproportionately affect those on lower incomes. For one, people in higher income brackets are 
more likely to already buy higher-welfare goods, meaning that reducing the availability of lower-
welfare options will be less disruptive to their consumption habits, but more disruptive to those 
on lower incomes, who are more likely to buy lower-welfare animal products (IGD 2007: 31; 
Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 42). Additionally, wealthier consumers will be better-able to absorb 
higher prices, while lower-income consumers may struggle to maintain their existing 
consumption patterns.  
Consequently, policymakers ought to be disciplined in their use of unfunded mandates, and 
restrict this policy to targeting cruel practice. Given that farm animal welfare is a matter of 
concern to almost everyone in the UK, and given that animal cruelty faces almost universal 
opposition, the benefits of using unfunded mandates to tackle cruel practice will likely outweigh 
the costs of reduced choice and higher prices. It is when unfunded mandates are used to ban 
practices at higher levels of welfare that the benefits may be outweighed by limitations to 
market freedom, which disproportionately affect those on lower incomes. 
 
6. Taxes 
One of the criticisms I made of unfunded mandates was that they can lead to higher prices when 
they require producers to make costly capital investments. This issue can be mitigated by public 
good taxes. Public good taxes are one form of funded provision that eradicates the free-rider 
problem by making participation in the supply of a public good involuntary: people no longer 
choose whether to contribute to a good’s provision, but are compelled to by law (Salvatore 2003: 
614). 
It is useful to highlight the differences between public good and externality taxes. The two 
policies have different goals and are levied on different groups: externality taxes attempt to 
make prices reflect the full social value of a good; they are thus levied on participants in the 
externality-producing market. Public good taxes, on the other hand, seek to ensure the 
provision of a good that benefits almost everyone in a society, and so are levied on the whole 
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society. Where animal welfare is a matter of concern for almost everyone in a society, i.e. at 
levels of cruel practice, policymakers may be justified in levying taxes on the entire population. 
At higher levels of welfare, however, there may be significant groups of people who are 
uninterested in the further provision of animal welfare, meaning that a mandate for direct 
government action, which would impose costs upon the entire population, is weaker. Other 
forms of intervention may still be desirable though, particularly if they make markets more 
reflective of society’s preferences for animal welfare. 
There appear to be two plausible ways of using a farm animal welfare public good tax. One use 
is to support farm animal welfare research with the aims of developing new technologies and 
informing government recommendations about how animals should be kept. Alternatively, tax 
money could compensate producers for making welfare improvements, in what we may choose 
to call a funded mandate (Blandford and Fulponi 1999: 417-18). 
Both uses of a public good tax face informational issues in determining the optimal level of 
supply. As discussed earlier, the optimal supply of public goods is determined by summing 
people’s willingness to pay for a given level of provision, which thus requires knowledge of each 
person’s demand curve. The information issues that affect a government’s attempts to calculate 
the optimal supply of psychological externalities – discussed in the previous chapter (p.81) – also 
pertain here. In addition, there are incentives to provide misleading information about demand 
for public goods. If, as proposed in the Lindahl model, a public good tax charges people 
according to their personal demand, they have an incentive to underreport. This allows them to 
pay a lower level of tax whilst free-riding off the contributions of others (Nicholson and Snyder 
2010: 540). If, for instance, a public good tax was introduced to provide laying hens with access 
to free range, some people might choose to state a lower willingness to pay in the belief that 
others will reply honestly, allowing them to enjoy living in a society where laying hens have 
access to free range without having to pay as much for it. 
Alternatively, if tax payments are independent of an individual’s demand, people have an 
incentive to exaggerate personal benefits, which would encourage governments to provide more 
of a public good while placing the greater part of the burden upon the rest of the population. 
As Begg et al. (2000: 282) put it: ‘[w]e are all for safer streets if we do not have to contribute to 
the cost’. Returning to our public good tax to provide laying hens with access to free range, 
animal lovers may choose to exaggerate the value of their personal benefit: doing so causes the 
government to overestimate the public good’s value and supply more of it, while the cost burden 
of this additional supply would be spread over the entire population. These informational 
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difficulties mean that public good taxes are unlikely to be suitable policy tools for ensuring a 
socially-optimal level of supply for public goods. 
As argued earlier, however, the aim of public good policy with respect to farm animal welfare 
should not be to achieve a socially-optimal level of supply, but rather to eradicate cruel practice. 
At the level of cruel practice, policymakers can be confident that the costs of prohibiting animal 
cruelty will be outweighed by the benefits, namely a reduction in negative psychological 
externalities and an increase in positive ones. While externality policies, which seek to provide 
a socially-optimal level of animal welfare, are more likely to be hindered by informational issues, 
the aims of public good policy in farm animal welfare are less ambitious and so largely avoid 
these informational issues. 
Despite circumventing these informational difficulties, there are two areas where animal welfare 
public good taxes may be vulnerable to criticism. First, opposition to this policy can be expected 
from many in society, as new costs framed as taxes are often unpopular with the public 
(Carattini et al. 2017: 1). Unfunded mandates are likely to be more acceptable to the public than 
funded ones as they are not presented in the form of a direct tax, though they too are likely to 
lead to higher consumer expenditure, albeit through price rises. Additionally, public good taxes 
may be opposed on ethical grounds, particularly by animal abolitionists such as Gary Francione 
and Anna Charlton (2015), who oppose all forms of animal ownership: these taxes effectively 
force animal abolitionists to make financial contributions to an institution they regard as 
morally repugnant.86  
Second, producers who already use higher-welfare systems may oppose a public good tax. The 
tax provides no benefit to them, but creates new competitors in markets for higher-welfare 
goods, which increases competition and may force some out of business. Given that one aim of 
an animal welfare public good tax is to improve farm animal welfare, using it in a way that could 
harm existing higher-welfare producers is inappropriate. Even producers who use conventional 
or low-welfare production methods, and thus stand to be the primary beneficiaries of a funded 
mandate, might have cause for concern. Although a funded mandate would cover the capital 
costs of new housing, many higher-welfare production systems have higher running costs87  
 
86 Any policy that incentivises certain forms of animal product production, be it a tax, subsidy or new 
legislation, will also be subject to this criticism. A discussion of the viability of the abolitionists’ argument lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis, which is concerned with making society more reflective of public concern for 
farm animal welfare. Implicit in this is the assumption that consumers are free to make their own minds up 
about the acceptability of consuming animal products, which runs counter to the animal abolitionists’ claims. 
87 Exceptions to this rule do exist, for instance in pig farming, where some forms of group housing are cheaper 
than lower-welfare sow stalls (Stevenson 2011: 5-6). 
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than lower-welfare alternatives or cause overall productivity decreases (Stevenson 2011: 5-7). 
While the expected cost increase of moving from low-welfare to higher-welfare production may 
amount to just a few pence per unit, this could still push some producers out of business if it 
leads to higher prices and reduced consumer demand (McInerney 1998). In such cases, 
consumers would be effectively hit twice by the funded mandate: once by the cost of the tax 
itself, and again by the subsequent increase in product prices. 
 
7. Summary 
I have considered a range of ways that farm animal welfare is affected by, and can in turn affect, 
public goods. Although the public’s benefit from farm animal welfare is better understood as a 
psychological externality and not as a public good in the technical sense, it may be worth 
continuing to treat it as one from a policy perspective, at least at the level of animal cruelty. At 
its lowest levels, i.e. cruel practice, direct government intervention to secure the provision and 
protection of farm animal welfare can be justified as being in almost everyone’s interests. 
Government action might take the form of legislating in defence of animal welfare; most people 
in society would prefer to have laws that enshrine ethical proscriptions against cruel practice. 
These laws could be combined with public good taxes in order to either develop a stronger 
understanding of farm animal welfare through scientific research or lessen the financial burden 
upon producers who are required to change their production methods. 
Care must be taken, however, to ensure that public good policies are effective in achieving their 
aims. Poorly-worded laws, or ones that are not applied to imports, may have little impact on 
overall animal suffering, and are thus unlikely to ease public discontent. Tax-funded welfare 
improvements must be considered carefully in order to avoid harming existing higher-welfare 
producers. 
Despite the UK having some of the most robust anti-cruelty measures in the world, there 
appears to be scope for further development. In some areas, new laws may be appropriate. This 
was illustrated by the public outcry that accompanied the release of footage taken by animal 
campaign group Animal Equality, who investigated three farms owned by Moy Park, a British 
chicken producer that supplies 30% of the UK market, and sells to retailers including Tesco, 
McDonald’s, Co-op, Ocado and Sainsbury’s. The footage showed chickens suffering from skin 
irritation, breathing difficulties and leg injuries that left them unable to stand, lame birds 
collapsing under their own weight and carcasses mouldering among the flock. Importantly, the 
public outcry did not relate to legal violations on the part of Moy Park, who appears to have 
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broken no laws (Animal Equality 2019; Grant 2019; BBC 2019). This indicates that public appetite 
exists for further government action, perhaps relating to the use of fast-growing species that are 
susceptible to health problems. Additionally, public awareness of production practices and 
interpretations of cruel practice can evolve, which may require new policy interventions, while 
the changing political landscape, namely the challenges posed by Brexit, means that care must 
be taken to ensure that existing anti-cruelty measures are not undermined. 
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Chapter 6 
Information Asymmetries 
 
In this Chapter 
• An introduction to information asymmetries. 
• A discussion of how labelling can overcome information asymmetries. 
• An assessment of welfare labelling in the UK. 
• A defence of the claim that logo welfare labels could be crowding out higher-welfare goods 
through adverse selection. 
• A proposal for a more effective welfare label. 
 
1. Introduction 
In May 2019, the value of star fund manager Neil Woodford’s Woodford Equity Income Fund 
plummeted £600m after a series of investments failed to perform, prompting customers to 
withdraw their money. Woodford was forced to suspend further withdrawals, effectively 
trapping customers’ money in an undesirable fund. The investment group Hargreaves 
Lansdown had confronted Woodford with concerns about the state of the fund in November 
2017, yet continued to recommend it to new investors (Makortoff 2019a, 2019b; Farrell 2019). 
In short, investors knew less about the state of the fund than Hargreaves Lansdown and 
Woodford. This asymmetric information led people to make investments they would not have 
otherwise made, which both trapped and devalued their money. Asymmetric information thus 
caused many investors to act in ways that were not reflective of their preferences. 
Information asymmetries create suboptimal outcomes in a range of markets, including those 
for animal products. I begin this chapter by detailing how information asymmetries in animal 
product markets produce suboptimal outcomes, before considering how information provision 
in the form of welfare labelling can overcome this market failure. I analyse the RSPCA Assured 
label and build upon this analysis to propose a more effective welfare label. 
 
6 | Information Asymmetries 
130 
 
2. Farm Animal Welfare as a Product Attribute 
Information asymmetries exist when producers and consumers possess different levels of 
information about a good or a market. Markets afflicted with information asymmetries will 
inefficiently allocate resources because consumers (and producers) are liable to unintentionally 
behave in ways that do not reflect their interests (Begg et al. 2000: 48). Asymmetries tend to be 
of particular disadvantage to consumers: producers are likely to at least possess complete 
information about their own goods (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 328). Information asymmetries can 
be attributed to the existence of different types of product attributes. 
There are three main classes of product attribute. Search attributes are characteristics that can 
be identified in a good before purchase, such as shape, size and colour. If you have a preference 
for apples that are red or shirts that are medium-sized, a cursory examination of a product will 
likely tell you whether it will satisfy this preference. Given that information about search 
attributes is available at points of purchase, most consumers will possess full information about 
these qualities and will make choices that satisfy their preferences for search attributes.88 
A second class of product attribute is the experience attribute, which delineates qualities, such 
as taste and comfort, that can only be identified after a product’s use or consumption. 
Determining your favourite brand of, say, canned tuna will require the purchase of several 
brands to compare taste (Nelson 1970: 311-12), but once you have found your favourite, you are 
unlikely to intentionally buy a brand that you believe to be inferior, price considerations etc. 
notwithstanding. In cases such as these, experience attributes are unlikely to contribute to 
market inefficiencies in the long run. There are circumstances, however, where experience 
attributes may cause inefficient outcomes. If a good is expensive, for instance, it may not be 
feasible for a prospective consumer to sample all available options, although consumer and 
industry reviews may enable them to make a more informed choice about a product’s experience 
attributes. 
The last class of product attribute is the credence attribute, which is a quality, such as nutritional 
profile and environmental impact, that is not easily identifiable either before purchase or after 
consumption (Darby and Karni 1973: 68-69; Wirth et al. 2011: 49). Credence attributes are likely 
to be significant sources of market inefficiency because consumers are dependent upon external 
assistance if they are to possess information about these attributes. 
 
88 One exception is price: consumers may not possess information about how a good is priced elsewhere, and 
so may inadvertently pay more for a good than they need to. The rise of online shopping and price comparison 
websites has, however, mitigated this to an extent.  
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Credence attributes are the most relevant type of product characteristic for this thesis, as they 
abound in food markets. Qualities such as nutritional profile, food safety, environmental 
impact, origin, production methods and the ingredients used to process goods could all be 
regarded as credence attributes (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996: 1250-51; Moser et al. 2011: 122-28; 
Blythman 2015: 79). Farm animal welfare is also a credence attribute (Fearing and Matheny 2007: 
165; McInerney 2004: 12; FAWC 2006: 5): examining an animal product before purchase will 
rarely yield an insight into how the animal lived, and, in many cases, people cannot taste the 
difference between lower- and higher-welfare goods (Haspel 2010; López-Alt 2010; Dransfield et 
al. 2005: 68; Jonsäll et al. 2002: 77). Consequently, consumers may struggle to identify a 
product’s animal welfare or other credence attributes at points of purchase and may make 
purchases that violate their preferences for these qualities. 
Informational issues can also negatively affect producers, because, when consumers lack 
information about a product’s credence attributes, their behaviour does not reliably signal to 
producers the extent of demand for these attributes, causing gaps in the market to be left 
unfilled (Fearing and Matheny 2007: 164). Although market research can help producers 
ascertain what consumers want, it may not be as reliable as evidence derived from consumer 
behaviour, especially in matters of farm animal welfare. As discussed in Chapter 5 (p.120), 
research conducted in 1999 suggested that British consumers would support the domestic pork 
industry if prices increased as a result of a ban on sow stalls. The research was unduly optimistic: 
after the ban was introduced, consumers turned to cheaper German and Danish imports, 
contributing to a decline in the number of British pig farmers, from 10,000 in 1999 to 6,000 in 
2009. The country’s self-sufficiency in pork similarly declined, from over 80% at the end of the 
decade to under 50% in 2018 (Levitt 2018b; AHDB 2018).89 Care must therefore be taken when 
using market research to reveal consumers’ preferences for credence attributes. 
In short, inefficiencies in animal product markets can be caused by consumers’ inability to 
identify a product’s animal welfare attributes, and consequent inability to signal preferences for 
these attributes to producers. Governments and producers can respond to this form of market 
failure by providing external cues such as product labels to assist consumer decision-making 
(FAWC 2006: 5; IGD 2007: 36). 
 
89 We also saw in Chapter 5 that this decline may have been the result of inadequate product labelling, which 
left consumers unable to discern which products had been made according to standards that were prohibited 
in the UK. We might therefore conclude that consumer research may be an effective way to learn about 
consumer attitudes, but not necessarily barriers to purchase. 
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3. Welfare Labelling 
Labels provide information about product attributes that may not otherwise be readily-
accessible. At their most effective, labels reduce uncertainty and enable consumers to reliably 
form expectations about a good’s credence characteristics, while also assuring them that these 
expectations are justified (Napolitano et al. 2010: 537; Fearing and Matheny 2007: 165; Tonsor 
and Wolf 2011: 431; Blandford and Harvey 2014: 36). They thus transform experience and 
credence attributes into search attributes (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996: 1251). From a 
behavioural perspective, labels can be a particularly effective way of influencing behaviour 
because they operate at the point of purchase, which reduces search costs – the time, effort and 
money expended examining different options – for consumers with preferences for a product’s 
credence attributes (Tonsor and Wolf 2011: 431). 
Labelling programmes have desirable attributes for consumers. First, labels preserve a high 
degree of market freedom. While they help consumers with preferences for credence attributes 
to identify the products that satisfy these preferences, they do little to disrupt the consumption 
patterns of those uninterested in the labelled attribute (Harper and Henson 1999: 14; Caswell 
and Mojduszka 1996: 1250). Labels thus have option value – they offer assistance only to those 
who wish to use them. Second, labels have existence value: their mere presence can allay fears 
about product quality and safety (Caswell and Padberg 1992: 465). Reliable and trustworthy 
labelling programmes require a network of regulation and inspection, and thus can reassure 
consumers that products are being monitored and assessed. Labels can thus facilitate trust in 
food systems even to consumers who do not use them in their decision-making.  
Labels can also benefit producers. By enabling consumers to reliably express preferences about 
credence attributes, labels help producers to derive information about consumer preferences. 
This allows producers to identify potential gaps in the market where demand is unmet. In 
addition, labelling programmes may foist fewer costs upon producers than other policies 
(Tonsor and Wolf 2011: 430). Just as labelling schemes have option value for consumers, some 
also have option value for producers: labels managed by the RSPCA, Red Tractor and Soil 
Association are all voluntary, enabling producers to opt in if they can afford to make the 
investment necessary to meet the requisite standards, but not forcing them to do so. 
Because product labelling offers benefits to both consumers and producers, it deserves 
consideration as a means of tackling asymmetric information in animal product markets. There 
are numerous factors that influence the effectiveness of labels, however. Not just anyone can 
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reduce inefficiencies by creating a welfare label: consumers will not rely upon a label they deem 
to be untrustworthy, and so any effective label must be supported by credible institutions 
(Blandford and Fulponi 1999: 414-15). 
Numerous studies have been conducted about the relative trustworthiness of labelling 
institutions. The government is generally not seen as a suitable institution for developing and 
managing a labelling scheme (Harper and Henson 1999: 21; Harper and Henson 2001: 26). This 
perception may stem from the fact that labelling programmes must monitor subscribing 
producers; this can be resource-intensive and thus may be perceived to be beyond the powers 
of the government. Instead, labels might be better-run by the private sector (Codron et al. 2005: 
278). 
This does not, however, mean that producers or food industries are viewed as trustworthy 
industries in this context. These organisations are frequently regarded as the least credible 
sources of information about animal welfare (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 37). In the United States, 
the United Egg Producers (UEP), the industry’s trade association representing many of the 
country’s egg producers, released its ‘Animal Care Certified’ label in 2002. Despite the name 
implying a higher level of welfare for egg-laying hens, its standards did little to improve upon 
existing practices, allowing producers to continue using low-welfare husbandry practices such 
as beak trimming and forced moulting. The label also required birds to be provided with 67 
square inches of space, while a member of the UEP’s advisory committee described a provision 
of 80 inches as meagre. After legal action claiming that the label amounted to false advertising, 
the label was replaced with one stating ‘United Egg producers Certified: Produced in compliance 
with UEP animal husbandry guidelines’ (Singer and Mason 2006: 40-41). In the UK, the Red 
Tractor and Lion Mark labels are also industry-led. 
While consumers do not trust governments or the food industry to run welfare labels, survey 
respondents often state the belief that the most trustworthy labels will be administered and 
monitored by independent groups such as animal protectionists, consumer rights organisations 
and organisations specialising in food issues (Harper and Henson 2001: 22, 26; Grunert 2006: 
152; Kjaernes and Lavik 2007: 24; Toma et al. 2012: 598). This does not, however, mean that there 
is no role for governments to play in supporting labelling programmes. Government regulation 
may be necessary to ensure that labelling organisations can be held accountable for the 
provision of full and accurate information, even if it may be preferable to leave the monitoring 
of labels to private bodies (Caswell and Padberg 1992: 461). Governments may also be able to 
offer support through funding, as many organisations that run labelling schemes, such as the 
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RSPCA and Soil Association, are charities.90 A trustworthy labelling scheme could therefore be 
run by a charity specialising in issues of animal welfare, but supported by a government (FAWC 
2006: 25; Blandford and Fulponi 1999: 415). 
The RSPCA Assured label therefore has significant potential to become an effective labelling 
scheme as it is managed by a type of organisation that is widely regarded as credible in this 
domain – in one focus group, participants even singled out the RSPCA as an organisation that 
would be well-suited to running an animal welfare label (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 64) – and is 
thus worth examining in greater detail. 
 
4. The RSPCA Assured Scheme 
The RSPCA Assured label, originally launched as Freedom Food in 1994, is a voluntary 
programme that claims to be the only labelling scheme in the UK specifically dedicated to farm 
animal welfare (Food Ethics Council and Pickett 2014: 3; RSPCA Assured 2018; FAWC 2006: 12). 
The label appears on products in the form of a logo (see Figure 6), which indicates that the 
product in question has met RSPCA Assured welfare guidelines. The RSPCA has standards for 
the raising of pigs, laying hens, chickens, turkeys, ducks, beef cattle, veal cattle, sheep, dairy 
cattle, trout and salmon. In 2017, the organisation claimed that over 279 million animals – 73% 
of which were salmon – were covered by the scheme (RSPCA Assured 2017a). 
There are at least two ways that the RSPCA Assured label enables consumers to express 
preferences for animal welfare. First, the label is relatively extensive, as it can be found on a 
range of products from multiple species. This enables consumers to more broadly express 
welfare preferences. Second, the scheme covers multiple facets of animal welfare, including 
non-production elements such as transport and slaughter, meaning that consumers with 
preferences in these areas can use the label to inform their purchase decisions.  
With consumers better-able to express welfare preferences, production-side inefficiencies may 
also be reduced: the label enables producers to form a better idea of demand for higher welfare 
in a range of product categories. In theory, the RSPCA Assured scheme should help producers 
be more responsive to welfare preferences and empower consumers to express preferences for 
farm animal welfare. 
 
90 Government-charity co-operation in animal welfare issues is not unheard of: the Labour Party’s 50-point 
Animal Welfare Manifesto (2019) committed the party to working with groups such as the People’s Dispensary 
for Sick Animals (PDSA) to expand access to affordable veterinary care and the Dogs Trust to tackle puppy 
smuggling. 
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Figure 6 – The RSPCA Assured Label 
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In practice, however, there are two reasons why these benefits may not be fully realised. First, 
the RSPCA Assured label (and other logo labels) might be limiting the production of the highest-
welfare goods by reducing incentives for producers to go beyond a scheme’s minimum 
requirements. This occurs through a process called adverse selection, where higher-quality 
goods are forced out of the market despite there existing substantial demand for them (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld 2013: 634; Schotter 1997: 540; Blandford and Fulponi 1999: 414). A producer of 
extremely high-welfare pork can differentiate her product from lower-welfare alternatives by 
subscribing to the RSPCA Assured scheme. She cannot, however, distinguish her product from 
competitors that merely meet the scheme’s minimum requirements: both products will be 
labelled as RSPCA Assured. For convenience, I will refer to extremely high welfare products as 
RSPCA Assured+. It is likely that RSPCA Assured+ products will cost more to produce and will 
therefore be more expensive than RSPCA Assured products. The higher-welfare attributes of 
RSPCA Assured+ products, however, will not be evident to consumers: the nature of the RSPCA 
Assured scheme means that RSPCA Assured+ pork can only be advertised as RSPCA Assured. 
Consumers are also unlikely to adjust their purchase behaviour in response to their experience 
of the product: blind taste tests have found consumers are unable to distinguish between a range 
of animal products produced at different levels of welfare (Haspel 2010; López-Alt 2010; 
Dransfield et al. 2005: 68; Jonsäll et al. 2002: 77). 
Consequently, a consumer with a preference for extremely high animal welfare faces a choice 
between the more expensive RSPCA Assured+ pork or cheaper RSPCA Assured pork, both of 
which they encounter as ‘RSPCA Assured’. They therefore cannot tell whether an RSPCA 
Assured+ product satisfies their preference for extremely high welfare or is merely an expensive 
product that meets the minimum RSPCA Assured requirements. Rather than risk spending a 
larger sum of money on a product that may possess the same welfare attributes as its 
competitors, the consumer is likely to choose the cheaper RSPCA Assured pork. When this 
behaviour is repeated, RSPCA Assured+ producers are crowded out of the market, even if there 
exists demand for their products (Akerlof 1970: 488-89; Salvatore 2003: 641; Caswell and 
Mojduszka 1996: 1250; McMullen 2016a: 53-54). In essence, consumer risk aversion reduces 
willingness-to-pay for attributes that consumers cannot identify. This creates a vicious cycle 
where producers of the highest quality goods are driven out of the market, which further 
increases the risk of buying a lower quality good or ‘lemon’. This leads consumers to place an 
even lower value on the good, which prices more producers of higher quality goods out of the 
market. Eventually, the only producers left are those who meet the minimum requirements for 
the RSPCA Assured scheme, despite there existing demand for products that exceed these 
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standards. To address the problem of adverse selection, a label must therefore be capable of 
recognising different levels of animal welfare. 
Second, for the RSPCA Assured label to realise its potential to enable consumers to make 
informed and welfare-motivated purchases, it is surely necessary for consumers to possess at 
least some awareness of its underlying standards (Duffy and Fearne 2009: 672-73; McEachern 
and Seaman 2005: 582). One precondition for understanding a label’s welfare standards is 
recognition of the label itself, and the limited research in this area paints a pessimistic picture. 
In one survey, just 22% of respondents recognised the RSPCA Assured label (McEachern and 
Warnaby 2004). With many consumers failing to identify the RSPCA label, it is little wonder 
that just 9% of respondents in another survey claimed familiarity with its underpinning 
standards (McEachern et al. 2007). Due to low familiarity and even lower awareness of the label’s 
standards, it is unlikely that many consumers are using the RSPCA Assured label to make 
informed and welfare-motivated purchases. 
To develop a more effective welfare labelling programme, it is necessary to understand why so 
few consumers have familiarised themselves with the standards of the RSPCA Assured label. 
First, it is possible that many consumers do not wish to be informed about the detail of modern 
animal agriculture, and instead prefer to trust the labelling organisation to deliver ‘high welfare’ 
goods, where high welfare conforms to whatever interpretation consumers hold of the concept. 
In support of this idea, a Brook Lyndhurst survey (2012: 23) found that 86% of respondents who 
were aware of the Freedom Food (now RSPCA Assured) label believed that it represented higher 
animal welfare. When contrasted with the 9% of respondents who claimed awareness of the 
label’s standards in McEachern et al.’s study (2007), it is likely that some consumers associate 
the RSPCA Assured label with high welfare without direct knowledge of its standards. When 
these consumers use the label to make welfare-motivated purchases, they are thus trusting the 
RSPCA to deliver their preferred level of animal welfare: they are using the RSPCA label to 
express uninformed welfare preferences.91 
Using welfare labels to express uninformed welfare preferences may be a useful strategy: animal 
welfare is a complex issue and most consumers do not have the time to become knowledgeable 
in this field (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 337) – the RSPCA label’s lack of on-product information 
 
91 Trusting labels to deliver high welfare may not always lead to ideal outcomes, as there will be cases where a 
label does not deliver upon a consumer’s interpretation of high welfare: the RSPCA Assured label, for instance, 
permits beak trimming on free-range chickens. Presumably, consumers who place their trust in labels prefer to 
take the risk that their preferred welfare outcomes will not be delivered rather than take the time to engage 
with a label’s standards. 
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compounds this issue. Additionally, many consumers do not want to engage rationally with 
animal welfare, as they find this distressing. Instead, as seen in Chapter 1 (p.26), engagement 
with farm animal welfare often takes place on an emotional level, with consumers seeking cues 
that an animal has lived a happy life (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 40; Harper and Henson 2001: 19). 
By allowing consumers to make quick purchase decisions without having to engage with the 
uncomfortable details of animal agriculture, logo labels thus facilitate emotional engagement 
(the logo suggests an animal has lived a happy life) and discourage rational engagement (no 
information about animal agriculture is provided on-product). An effective labelling scheme 
must therefore cater to the needs of those wishing to express uninformed welfare preferences: 
many consumers want to use labels as a beacon for quick decision-making, without having to 
engage with its underlying standards. 
Trusting labelling organisations to deliver good animal welfare transfers responsibility for 
securing animal welfare from consumers to the labelling organisation, which saves consumers 
time and energy in their decision-making. Some consumers, however, will want to know more 
about a label’s underlying standards. This does not necessarily mean that they want to possess 
a full understanding of a label’s requirements, but rather that they want to know whether it 
satisfies their particular welfare concerns: these consumers want to use labels as a way of 
expressing informed welfare preferences. The most effective labels will also facilitate this form of 
engagement, and must therefore strike a balance: labels must provide a cue for consumers who 
prefer to trust the labelling organisation to deliver high welfare, while also making it easy for 
interested consumers to access and engage with their standards.  
There are at least three reasons why the costs of engaging with the RSPCA Assured label’s 
underlying standards are prohibitively high for many consumers: first, the label appears on a 
product as a small badge or stamp, which indicates that the product has been produced in 
accordance with its welfare standards, but conveys no information about these standards at 
points of purchase (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 37). Anyone who wishes to understand the labels’ 
welfare criteria must therefore expend considerable effort to do so, which raises search costs. 
Those interested in learning more must first navigate their way through the scheme’s website. 
If they want to identify the areas in which the scheme’s standards exceed legal minimum 
requirements, they must also consult the relevant legislation and regulations. The curious are 
thus forced to consult numerous – often highly technical – sources, further increasing search 
costs. 
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Second, the RSPCA Assured standards are not consistent, which facilitates consumer confusion. 
This is perhaps best-illustrated by the different requirements for free-range eggs and chicken 
meat. Consumers could not be blamed for assuming that, given that both chicken meat and 
eggs are produced by birds of the species Gallus, chicken meat described as free-range would be 
produced to the same welfare standards as free-range eggs. This is not so: RSPCA standards 
diverge considerably in key areas, notably beak trimming: free-range laying hens may only be 
debeaked before they are one day old, while meat chickens may be debeaked at up to ten days 
of age (RSPCA 2017a: 42; RSPCA 2017b). This might represent a significant difference in welfare: 
it appears that beak trimming at an earlier age produces less pain, both in the short and long 
term, than when the procedure is conducted later. De Mol et al.’s FOWEL account (2006) ranks 
beak trimming as the fifth most significant element of laying hen welfare (behind access to food, 
space per hen, availability of perches and water, and access to nests), and finds that welfare is 
most adversely affected when the procedure is carried out on chicks of eight days of age or older. 
In contrast, the model finds that welfare is at its highest when the procedure is conducted on 
chicks younger than eight days. Consumers who mistakenly conflate free-range egg and meat 
standards in RSPCA Assured goods may therefore end up buying goods produced with practices 
they do not support.92,93 
Third, UK animal product markets feature multiple labels with differing animal welfare criteria 
(e.g. British Lion, Red Tractor and Soil Association). These different standards can further 
contribute to consumer confusion (Passantino et al. 2008: 398; Verbeke and Viaene 1999: 61).  
When combined, the need to actively seek out information, consult multiple sources and avoid 
confusion with rival labels may mean that the costs of becoming informed are simply too high 
for many consumers. 
Several ways of reducing these search costs have been proposed. Gemma Harper and Spencer 
Henson (2001: 29) suggest that combining simple label logos with education campaigns about 
a label’s standards will help consumers make informed and welfare-motivated purchases. For 
this to work, however, consumers must both be exposed to and pay attention to the information 
campaign, and must also remember the logo and recall its standards at points of purchase. Given 
that modern grocery shopping is often rushed and viewed as a chore (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 5), 
 
92 It is likely that very few people will be affected by this particular issue – opposition to beak trimming seems 
to largely be targeted at the entire practice (see Heng et al. 2013 and Nicol 2018), rather than its use on chicks 
of eight days or older. Nevertheless, the point of this argument is to show that using the same descriptor to 
denote different standards in different products is likely to cause confusion. 
93 Additional differences can be found in relation to maximum flock size, the use of colonies, the extent of 
perch availability and environmental enrichment (RSPCA 2017a: 42; RSPCA 2017b). 
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these assumptions are perhaps optimistic: consumers may easily overlook a small welfare logo, 
and, as I will argue in the next chapter, may be deterred by their decision-making environment 
from actively considering ethical issues at points of purchase. Consequently, a logo label and 
education campaign combination may not be successful in enabling consumers to express 
informed welfare preferences; a more effective alternative will likely make welfare information 
more readily available and easier to access, ideally at points of purchase.  
One way of providing more welfare information at points of purchase has been trialled in some 
Danish supermarkets, which have added a welfare barcode to packaged meat. When scanned at 
an in-store kiosk, this barcode provides detailed welfare information, relating to factors such as 
the animal’s genetics, feed, medication and slaughter date, as well as showing pictures of the 
farm upon which the animal was raised (Pollan 2011: 244). Although this is an interesting 
example of how technology can address market failures, the welfare barcode may not 
sufficiently reduce search costs to the extent that consumers regularly engage with animal 
welfare standards. Due to the rushed nature of the modern grocery shop, expecting consumers 
to take the time to scan and read the information on a welfare barcode may simply be 
unrealistic.  
In short, an effective label must enable the expression of both uninformed and informed welfare 
preferences. Consumers who use labels to express uninformed welfare preferences do not want 
to engage with a label’s underlying standards, but instead trust labelling organisations to deliver 
good animal welfare. These consumers engage with animal welfare on an emotional level and 
use labels as cues that an animal has lived a happy life. To this end, labels should be simple in 
appearance and not contain detailed information about animal agriculture. Logo labels may be 
well-suited to this purpose. 
Welfare labels can also be used as a means of expressing informed welfare preferences. 
Consumers who use welfare labels to express informed welfare preferences might also engage 
with animal welfare on an emotional level, but have strong feelings about the use of certain 
practices. Due to a lack of on-product information, which can contribute to consumer confusion 
about underlying standards, logo labels are not well-suited to facilitating the expression of 
informed welfare preferences. Attempts to resolve these issues through education programmes 
and technological solutions fail to appreciate the nature of purchase environments, where 
consumers are frequently rushed and primed to focus on the economic aspects of purchase 
decisions. Asking consumers to take the time to scan a barcode, or expecting them to recall 
welfare information in an environment that discourages them from thinking about such things 
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is thus unlikely to resolve the problem. A more plausible solution is to reduce search costs by 
directly providing welfare information on the product (Hoogland et al. 2007). 
 
5. Textual Labels 
Textual product labels provide information about a range of product attributes. In the UK, the 
Food Standards Agency requires all food labels to state the product name, list of ingredients, 
allergen information, date of minimum durability, country of origin, and more (FSA 2018). With 
regards to animal welfare, EU law requires table eggs to provide textual information about the 
production system, i.e. enriched cage, barn, free range or organic (Commission Regulation 
589/2008; FAWC 2006: 9). Labels on table eggs are not required to provide information about 
other features of welfare, and other animal products and products containing animal material, 
including eggs, do not require any form of welfare labelling. Producers of other animal products 
can use marketing terms including ‘free range’, ‘organic’ and ‘cornfed’, provided they meet 
certain production conditions (Council Regulation 834/2007; Commission Regulation 
543/2008). 
Although limited, the textual labels currently required by law may offer a more effective means 
of enabling consumers to express informed welfare preferences than their logo counterparts. 
The information provided by textual labels makes it easier for consumers with preferences for 
broad production systems and organic produce to express these preferences in the market, and 
allows producers to reliably identify the strength of demand for different modes of production. 
Indeed, the long-term trend of increasing sales of free-range eggs in the UK, increasing from 
32.4% of production in 2008 to 53% by Q2 2019 (DEFRA 2019b; CIWF 2013; DEFRA 2013) has 
surely been at least partially facilitated by the introduction of mandatory labelling of production 
systems (FAWC 2006: 9). 
On the other hand, it is clear that current textual labels are inadequate in three ways. First, the 
information provided by these labels is incomplete, as it only covers broad production methods. 
Consumers thus lack the requisite information to express informed welfare preferences about 
issues including the use of specific production practices, transport and slaughter (FAWC 2006: 
20). Without this information, consumers are likely to make choices that violate their welfare 
preferences, resulting in markets providing suboptimal outcomes. 
Second, the limited nature of current textual labelling may distort public understanding of 
animal welfare. Although textual labels enable consumers to reliably express preferences for the 
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use of particular systems in egg production, this may lead people to overemphasise the 
importance of broad production systems as a constituent of animal welfare; textual labels may 
encourage people to place a greater emphasis on the importance of access to free range and may 
even lead people to equate access to free range with high welfare. Although we cannot be certain 
that labelling has influenced public perceptions of hen welfare, it appears that many people do 
equate free-range and high-welfare: in group interviews led by Gemma Harper and Spencer 
Henson (1999: 14; 2001: 25), participants identified free-range eggs as their most common ‘high-
welfare’ purchase, indicating an association between free-range and high welfare. A further 
study by Pettersson et al. (2016) lends support to this idea, finding that, when consumers of free-
range eggs were asked to rate the welfare of free-range hens on a scale of one to ten, the mean 
score was 8.7, with 85.9% of respondents providing a score of eight or above. Many people also 
believe that free range is the most important constituent of hen welfare: 56.1% of participants 
in the Pettersson et al. study considered access to an outdoor space to be the most important 
general factor affecting hen welfare.94 
Scientific opinion, however, disagrees: access to free range is generally considered to be a minor 
constituent of laying hen welfare. Pettersson et al. repeated their survey with a group of animal 
welfare specialists at the University of Bristol, whose answers differed markedly from the 
public’s. The mean welfare score was 5.9, and only 14.7% rated access to an outdoor space as the 
most important constituent of welfare. Perhaps most tellingly, not a single specialist scored free 
range systems 8 or above. Their responses accord with De Mol et al.’s FOWEL model of laying 
hen welfare (2006), which ranks access to free range as the 19th most significant element of hen 
welfare out of 25. While access to an outdoor space does make a positive contribution to welfare, 
its impact may be far lower than many other factors. Free-range production is also compatible 
with a range of practices that are detrimental to hen welfare, such as large flock sizes, 
suboptimal space per hen and beak trimming, meaning that access to free range may not be a 
guarantee of high welfare. 
Irrespective of whether the current state of labelling is responsible for the exaggerated 
importance given to free-range production in hen welfare, attention appears to be diverted away 
from other important areas of welfare: many consumers focus on broad production systems at 
the expense of specific production practices and issues in transport and slaughter (Brook 
Lyndhurst 2010: 39). Lack of awareness of welfare issues in these areas may contribute to market 
 
94 The authors (2016: 2011) recognise the limitations of their survey, which was sent out to subscribers to the 
e-mail list of a free-range egg company. Consequently, respondents were surely more likely to hold a 
favourable opinion of free-range production systems. 
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inefficiencies if consumers buy free-range products in the mistaken belief that they are 
supporting higher welfare standards; because their understanding of animal welfare is limited, 
their actions may be less effective than intended. These consumers may also be vulnerable to 
manipulation by producers, who, by emphasising the free-range aspects of production, could 
mislead them into thinking that their purchases are of greater benefit to farm animal welfare 
than they actually are. 
Given that purchases informed by existing textual labels are not reliable indicators of 
preferences for many elements of animal welfare, producers may struggle to discern demand for 
contributors to welfare beyond production systems. A consumer who is opposed to, say, beak 
trimming, or one who prefers hens to be provided with sufficient space for effective dust 
bathing, cannot currently identify products that satisfy these preferences, and so will be unable 
to signal their demand for these goods. This in turn hides the true demand for the use or disuse 
of individual production practices from producers and prevents markets from efficiently 
satisfying consumers’ preferences. 
Third, as with logo labels, the process of adverse selection can reduce producers’ incentives to 
exceed minimum welfare requirements demanded by textual labels. Producers who exceed the 
requirements for, say, free-range production may struggle to advertise this fact to consumers, 
who may be unwilling to pay more for products when the benefits of doing so are uncertain. 
In short, current textual labels do little to enable consumers to express informed welfare 
preferences. These labels only enable consumers to express welfare preferences for broad 
production methods and are thus incomplete. They may also distort consumers’ understanding 
of animal welfare and limit producer incentives to exceed minimum standards.  
One possible way of responding to the limitations of existing textual labels is to expand them 
to cover other elements of welfare across a range of species. More on-product information could 
provide consumers with a more balanced understanding of welfare, encourage producers to 
implement welfare improvements across a range of attributes and, most importantly, enable 
consumers to express welfare preferences for these attributes. 
There are at least three reasons why an expansion of textual welfare labelling cannot resolve the 
informational issues discussed in this chapter, however. First, there may not be enough space 
on a product’s packaging to provide detailed welfare information: De Mol et al.’s FOWEL model 
(2006) identifies 25 constituents of laying hen welfare, Bracke et al.’s SOWEL model of pregnant 
sow welfare (2002) recognises 37, and Ursinus et al.’s COWEL model of dairy cattle welfare 
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(2009) contains 42. Product labels must already carry information about numerous other 
product attributes, including brand name, product description, ingredients, nutritional profile, 
disposal information, weight, storage and use instructions, returns policies, best before / use by 
date, allergy information and country of origin. Consequently, there simply may not be enough 
space on a product to provide such a level of detail about farm animal welfare. 
Second, expanded textual labelling is likely to be incompatible with the expression of 
uninformed welfare preferences. Many consumers do not want to receive detailed information 
about animal agriculture, and, when exposed to such information, will simply ignore or 
otherwise fail to engage with it (Brook Lyndhurst 2012: 7). Information presented this way 
simply does not resonate with the emotional nature of many consumers’ engagement with farm 
animal welfare. These consumers instead want welfare labels to provide a simple visual cue that 
an animal has lived a happy life, rather than detailed textual information (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 
58).  
Third, a mass of detailed textual information could also lead to information overload, where, 
overwhelmed by information, consumers disengage with an issue and ignore all available 
information. This issue is especially pertinent in supermarket choice environments, which 
already provide consumers with a deluge of information (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 38). In addition, 
consumers are forced to choose between a barrage of similar products and tend to view grocery 
shopping as a chore to be completed in the face of time pressures. The sheer quantity of 
information on display, in conjunction with the limited time committed to grocery shopping, 
makes it likely that many consumers make only limited use of information on product labels 
(Caswell and Padberg 1992: 462). In short, modern shopping environments can largely be 
characterised as ones of information overload (Grunert 2006: 154; Tonsor and Wolf 2011: 434). If 
handled badly, welfare labelling will merely exacerbate this information overload and will be 
consequently overlooked by consumers (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 38). Welfare labels must 
therefore be selective about the information they provide. 
An effective welfare label must therefore balance the interests of consumers with informed 
welfare preferences and those with uninformed welfare preferences. To enable the expression 
of uninformed welfare preferences, labels must provide a simple visual cue and cannot present 
too much information. To enable the expression of informed welfare preferences, labels must 
enable consumers to recognise multiple levels of welfare provision and provide easy access to 
detailed information about how a good was produced. 
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6. An Effective Welfare Label? 
In light of the above analysis, an effective welfare label must distinguish between different levels 
of welfare and must make it easy for consumers to access detailed information about the label’s 
standards. 
 
a. Tiered Labels 
A tiered label is one which utilises a colour-based (bronze, silver and gold, or red, amber and 
green) or numerical tiered structure to denote different levels of welfare. A tiered label can cater 
to consumers with uninformed welfare preferences, who can use the label as a cue that farm 
animals have lived good lives, while avoiding engagement with its underlying standards. The 
label also offers value to producers, who can move up the welfare scale when they exceed certain 
standards. This thus reduces the impact of adverse selection, although we can still expect 
producers to cluster around the minimum requirements for each tier. 
This is not an ideal outcome, as it does not entirely remove the problems posed by adverse 
selection. It is likely to be the best outcome, however. The only system that would be immune 
to adverse selection is a continuous scale label, perhaps based on species-specific models of 
animal welfare that lend themselves towards a 0-10 scoring system, such as De Mol et al.’s 
FOWEL model (2006), Bracke et al.’s SOWEL model (2002) or Ursinus et al.’s COWEL model 
(2009). Consumers with informed welfare preferences would likely encounter difficulties with 
these labels, however, as it would not be obvious what a score represents, making it hard to 
recognise whether a product satisfies specific welfare preferences. A score of say, 5, could be 
reached using multiple production systems (e.g. a higher-welfare enriched cage system or a 
lower-welfare free-range system), and so a continuous scale scoring system provides little 
information about the trade-offs made to achieve a given level of welfare. Consequently, despite 
being unable to entirely banish adverse selection, a tiered system likely creates a label that 
consumers can easily interpret. 
Tiered labels are not widely used in UK animal product markets, although a similar model is 
used to inform consumers about products’ nutritional content. Inspiration for a tiered label in 
an animal welfare context can be drawn from the United States, where the high-end food retailer 
Whole Foods worked with the subsidiary non-profit Global Animal Partnership (GAP) to 
implement a five-step welfare labelling programme. All fresh beef, pork, chicken, lamb and 
turkey (except kosher turkey) sold at Whole Foods is graded using the GAP label. Relevant 
products must reach Step 1 to be eligible for sale: this requires that no cages or crates are used 
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in production, and also that some stipulations about population density and diet are met. Step 
2 requires animals to be raised in an enriched environment that encourages natural behaviours, 
Step 3 requires outdoor access and Step 4 can be reached if animals are raised on pasture year-
round. Step 5 requires an animal-centred approach to husbandry: no physical alterations 
(mutilations) are permitted. Step 5+ recognises producers whose animals spend their entire lives 
on the same farm, which means they are also slaughtered on-farm (Whole Foods Market 2019; 
GAP 2019a; GAP 2019b). 
The labels themselves, as seen in Figure 7, indicate the tier in which the product falls, and also 
supply a brief description of what this means. The use of colour distinguishes between the 
different levels, but not in a way that might deter consumers from buying lower-tier products: 
consumers have stated an unwillingness to buy products with a red or bronze label, even when 
these colours signify a level of welfare above legal minimums (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 60). In 
short, consumers with uninformed welfare preferences can seek products marked out with a 
colour or a number, or use the textual descriptions to identify products made using processes 
that accord with their interpretations of ‘happy animals’ without having to engage in the 
minutiae of animal husbandry.  
Producers can also use the 5-Step label to identify consumer demand and willingness to pay for 
certain aspects of welfare. Although the 5-Step label clearly states whether a producer has 
provided their animals with amenities such as access to pasture or environmental enrichment, 
there are limits: the more distasteful elements of animal agriculture, such as the use of 
mutilations, are not explicitly addressed. If they were, they might deter some consumers from 
paying attention to the label, and could even drive consumers away from a product (Brook 
Lyndhurst 2010: 59).  
Consequently, it seems that no labelling solution can fully-rectify the informational failures in 
animal product markets. Consumers might have informed welfare preferences for the disuse of 
Figure 7 – The GAP Animal Welfare Certified Label                                                                             
(GAP 2019a) 
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certain practices, and so would benefit from labels that make it clear which products were not 
produced using these methods. On the other hand, other consumers are likely find labels that 
mention these practices to be distasteful and so would be unlikely to pay attention to other 
welfare issues addressed by the label, including those that they support.  
Interested consumers must therefore do their own research to determine a label’s specifics: for 
instance, the euphemistic Step 4 label (‘Animal Centred’) prohibits beak trimming in laying 
hens (GAP 2019c). Given that providing on-product information about the use of mutilations 
and similar practices would damage a label’s effectiveness among consumers with uninformed 
welfare preferences, an effective label must compensate by making this information easy to 
access and understand. 
 
b. Access to Information about Labelling Standards 
To engage consumers with informed welfare preferences, an effective label must make its full 
standards readily available and easily understood. This allows consumers to identify which tier 
best satisfies their preferences, and then subsequently use the label as a beacon. A consumer 
with a preference for eggs produced by hens with intact beaks saves time in the supermarket 
once she learns that products with a Step 4 label come from animals that have not been 
subjected to mutilations, as she no longer has to examine multiple products until she finds one 
that satisfies her preferences. 
It is imperative that efforts are made to reduce the search costs of finding this information in 
supermarkets, however: because shopping is viewed as a chore, and, as I argue in the next 
chapter (p.159), consumers tend to operate automatically in supermarkets, they will generally 
avoid effortful actions in supermarket, including seeking out welfare information. Eye-catching 
shelf displays and banners that provide information about a label’s standards may draw 
consumer attention if designed appropriately, however. Advertising and information campaigns 
could be more effective around tills, where consumers are likely to spend time waiting:  
consumers face lower search costs when queuing, as they have reduced opportunities to spend 
their time elsewhere, meaning they may engage more with leaflets.95 
Perhaps the most important component of a label that responds to the needs of consumers with 
informed welfare preferences, however, is its online presence. A label’s website needs to be easy 
 
95 The aim of providing information at tills is not to encourage immediate purchases, but rather to inform 
consumers so that they may be more receptive to welfare labels in the future. 
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to navigate. The requirements for each tier must be easy to understand, and, ideally, the label’s 
position relative to legal minimum standards will be made clear. The website itself must be well-
advertised, to enable consumers with informed welfare preferences to access it outside the 
supermarket, when they are not performing the consumer role and may therefore be willing to 
spend more time learning about a label’s standards. 
Once again, Whole Foods’ Animal Welfare Certified label provides plenty of inspiration in this 
area. The label itself prominently advertises its website, which is easy to navigate and provides 
both a brief overview of what each step entails for different species (see Figure 8) and a detailed 
guide of every standard that producers must meet. It does not, however, show where these 
standards diverge from legal minimum standards. The label is also advertised in-store in 
appropriate locations (Whole Foods 2019).  
 
c. Limitations 
Despite being superior to the RSPCA Assured label in several ways, the label proposed in this 
chapter – based upon the Animal Welfare Certified label – encounters at least three limitations. 
First, there is limited scope to apply it to all products sold in a market. As discussed in Chapter 
5 (p.122), a welfare label imposed upon imports may be perceived as a technical barrier to trade 
and so could violate WTO regulations (WTO 1995: 118; FAWC 2006: 7). Such a label could be 
imposed upon domestic producers, and retailers could insist that imported products subscribe 
to the label, but it is unclear whether a government could mandate that imports display this 
label. 
Second, labelling schemes carry costs relating to the development and maintenance of 
standards, in particular in relation to monitoring and enforcement of standards. These costs are 
borne by producers, who generally pay a fee based on the quantity of product sold, and passed 
on to consumers. These costs need to be low, as they will be paid by all consumers who buy 
labelled products, not just those who have preferences for the label. As discussed in Chapter 2 
(p.61), however, there does appear to be substantial willingness to pay for farm animal welfare, 
and, given that welfare labels can possess existence value through the trust they inspire in food 
systems, there may be willingness to pay for welfare labels among consumers who do not 
directly use them in their decision-making. The RSPCA Assured label charges £36.00 as a joining 
fee, plus varying fees depending on the product. Table eggs are charged at £142.80 for the first 
6,000 hens and £68.40 for each subsequent 6,000 hens. A further 5p per 30 dozen eggs sold is  
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Figure 8 – Explaining the Animal Welfare Certified Label                                                                                                                                                                                                               
(GAP 2019c) 
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charged as a license fee (RSPCA Assured 2017b).96 Any competing tiered label would surely need 
to approximate the costs of its rivals. 
Third, it is unclear how the label proposed in this chapter, or any welfare label for that matter, 
should be applied to processed foods. Processed foods such as bacon quiches are composed of 
multiple animal products, and if some adhere to a label’s standards and others do not, or if 
different ingredients comply with different tiers, it is not apparent how the product should be 
labelled (FAWC 2006: 14). To label a product according to its highest-welfare ingredient may be 
misleading, especially if the ingredient is present only in small quantities. For the same reason, 
labelling according to a product’s lowest-welfare ingredient could also mislead consumers. This 
concern is not insurmountable, but must be addressed before welfare labels can be applied to 
processed goods. 
 
7. Summary 
To summarise, the issue of welfare labelling is multi-faceted and complex, and an effective label 
must balance a range of competing interests and concerns. It is important that efforts are made 
to develop effective labels, however, as an ineffective label can exacerbate market failures. 
Without labels, or with inadequate welfare labelling, consumers may struggle to express 
preferences for welfare and their understanding of welfare may be warped by a focus on a single 
issue, while producers may struggle to discern consumer demand for certain practices and have 
little incentive to exceed a label’s minimal requirements. 
There does not appear to be a perfect solution, although there are clear steps that can be taken 
to improve upon the UK’s existing welfare labels. A successful welfare label must balance the 
interests of both consumers with uninformed welfare preferences, who want a broad indicator 
that an animal has lived a happy life, and consumers with informed welfare preferences, who 
may care strongly about certain welfare issues and require easy access to information about a 
label’s standards. 
I argued that, due to the emotional nature of consumer engagement with animal welfare, a 
simple logo provides the most effective foundation for a welfare label. Such a label serves as a 
beacon for consumers with uninformed welfare preferences, and, if information about the label 
 
96 In comparison, the Soil Association charges an annual membership fee of £750, plus 0.03 multiplied by sales 
between £250,001 and £2,350,000, plus 0.0015 multiplied by sales between £2,350,001 and £4,350,000, plus 
0.001 multiplied by sales between £4,350,001 and £22,500,000, plus 0.0003 multiplied by sales over 
£22,500,001 (Soil Association 2019). 
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is made readily-accessible and easily-digestible, also to consumers with informed welfare 
preferences. 
The question of how to provide this information is a difficult one. Displaying detailed welfare 
information about potentially distasteful practices may negatively impact the use of labels by 
consumers with uninformed welfare preferences, due to the emotional nature of their 
engagement with animal welfare and the risk of information overload. On the other hand, the 
search costs of finding detailed welfare information are often prohibitively high for consumers 
with informed welfare preferences. Perhaps the best solution is to reduce search costs for 
consumers with informed welfare preferences by providing a small amount of information about 
carefully-selected production practices on the product itself, and supplementing this with clear 
advertising for an easy-to-understand website. 
On the production side, the problem of adverse selection is difficult to eradicate, although the 
use of a tiered label will at least increase consumer choice. Production is likely to cluster around 
the minimum standards for each tier, as producers have little incentive to bear the increased 
production costs associated with welfare improvements when they cannot advertise this to 
consumers. Providing more tiers increases the range of standards around which producers are 
likely to cluster, enabling a greater range of welfare preferences to be expressed. This is not a 
perfect solution – consumers with preferences for levels of welfare between the tiers and beyond 
the top tier will struggle to find products that fully satisfy their preferences – but it still 
represents an improvement upon the existing state of affairs. 
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Chapter 7 
A Trip to the Nudge Supermarket 
 
In this Chapter 
• An assessment of how far the axioms of rational preferences reflect decision-making. 
• An introduction to Daniel Kahneman’s dual-system theory of decision-making. 
• Support for the claim that choice environments can influence automatic behaviours. 
• The proposal that supermarket design influences consumer behaviour by encouraging the 
expression of self-interested preferences. 
• A discussion of how nudges can be used to support farm animal welfare. 
 
1. Introduction 
What you intended to buy when you go into IKEA is rarely all you leave with. Somehow, almost 
everyone reaches the checkout pushing trolleys laden with things they did not know they 
needed, or even wanted, when they entered – as many as 60% of IKEA purchases were not on 
people’s shopping lists when they entered the store (Penn 2011). This is no coincidence: IKEA 
stores are designed to increase impulse purchases. Stores have no windows, which disorients 
shoppers and discourages them from thinking about time, the outside world and everyday life. 
This confusion and disorientation make it difficult for consumers to think rationally; their 
behaviour becomes more automatic and more emotional, which increases impulsive tendencies. 
IKEA seeks to take advantage of this shift to automatic behaviours. Its stores utilise a one-way 
system, which makes it difficult to turn back and encourages shoppers to pick up items as they 
see them out of fear that they will have no other opportunity to do so. The labyrinthine weaves 
and bends in the route make it impossible to see what is coming next and lends an air of mystery 
to the IKEA experience. Mystery increases consumer liking, which encourages shoppers to delve 
deeper into the heart of the store. This, along with the fact that the one-way system forces 
shoppers to wend their way past every available item, increases the probability that customers 
will buy more (Jansson-Boyd 2018; Zambasri 2017; Mitchelson 2018; Tucker 2011). 
IKEA designs its stores with the intention of nudging shoppers to make impulse purchases. The 
company’s ability to do this flies in the face of mainstream economic theories of rationality, 
which assume that preferences are relatively fixed and well-defined, and obey the axioms of 
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transitivity, independence, completeness and continuity. In this chapter, I consider challenges 
to these axioms, in particular the continuity axiom – if a is preferred to b, then situations 
appropriately similar to a will be preferred to b. With reference to Daniel Kahneman’s influential 
dual-system theory of decision-making and priming, I argue that, as IKEA knows, choice 
environments can influence consumer behaviour and expressions of preferences, leading to 
violations of the continuity axiom – a might be preferred to b in one type of choice environment, 
but b will be preferred to a in another. 
I contend that the influence of choice environments renders preferences for farm animal welfare 
unstable. I propose that supermarket choice environments discourage the expression of ethical 
concern and encourage self-interested attitudes, with implications for the expression of 
preferences for farm animal welfare. I then consider how policy can integrate nudge principles 
in supermarket design for pro-animal welfare ends, with particular attention paid to the People’s 
Supermarket in Holborn, which, in summer 2019, joined forces with the Royal Society for Public 
Health and Slimming World to nudge customers to make healthier choices. 
 
2. Irrational Preferences 
We saw in Chapter 3 (p.67) that one of the characteristics of a perfectly competitive markets is 
that consumers behave competitively. Competitive behaviour requires not only that consumers 
seek lower prices, but also that they behave rationally. A rational consumer’s preferences will 
satisfy four assumptions. Her preferences will be transitive, meaning that if she prefers a to b, 
and b to c, she will prefer a to c. Her preferences will also be independent: her preference for a 
over b is not affected by the presence or absence of alternatives. Her preferences sets will be 
complete: she will be able to rank all possible alternatives and so, for any two options, will either 
prefer one over the other or be indifferent between the two. Last, the rational agent’s 
preferences are continuous, meaning that, if she prefers a to b, states of the world appropriately 
similar to a will be preferred to b.  
In the real world, however, people’s preferences and preference sets often do not obey these 
axioms. First, using multiple criteria to assess options can cause people’s preferences to become 
intransitive (May 1954: 7; Lewis 2017: 103-5). Intransitive preferences are often considered 
irrational because they can lead to a ‘money pump’ outcome, where consumers are willing to 
pay to swap x for y, y for z, but also z for x, ad infinitum (Davidson et al. 1955: 145-46). In a 1954 
study, Kenneth May identified one instance of intransitive preferences. May presented 62 
college students with three hypothetical marriage partners, x, y and z. Each was described in 
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terms of three qualities: wealth, intelligence and attractiveness. Candidate x was described as 
highly intelligent, plain looking and reasonably well off; y was intelligent, very good looking and 
poor; z was fairly intelligent, good looking and rich. None of the options were described as so 
poor, unintelligent or unattractive as to be immediately eliminated. The students were 
repeatedly presented with two of the three candidates, and asked to rank them in order of 
preference, i.e. they were asked if they preferred x to y, or y to z, or z to x, but were never asked 
to rank all three simultaneously. May found that 17 of the 62 students (27%) held intransitive 
preferences.97 
Second, the use of ‘decoy options’ by marketers undermines the strength of the independence 
axiom. Dan Ariely (2008: 1-22) identifies a decoy option used as a marketing device by The 
Economist magazine. The magazine offers a website subscription for $59, and a combination 
print and website subscription for $125. Ariely asked 100 students which option they preferred: 
68 preferred the online subscription and 32 preferred the combination subscription. Ariely then 
introduced The Economist’s third subscription option: a print-only subscription, which cost 
$125. We can (rightly) predict that no student would prefer this new subscription as it is inferior 
to the combination subscription. If preferences are independent, the introduction of the new 
option should be irrelevant. In fact, whereas 32 students preferred the print and online 
subscription in a two-option choice, 84 preferred it when the inferior print-only subscription 
was introduced. In contrast, of the 68 who initially preferred the online subscription, only 16 
continued to do so when also offered the combination subscription. The introduction of an 
inferior third option caused preference reversals by making the combination subscription 
appear better value relative to the print-only subscription (Tversky and Simonson 1993: 1181).98 
Third, the assumption of completeness is not always reflective of how people make choices: in 
situations such as Sophie’s Choice-style moral dilemmas, a person simply cannot choose 
between a and b. In Sophie’s Choice (Styron 2004), the eponymous character is sent to the 
Auschwitz concentration camp. Upon arrival, she is presented with a grisly dilemma: one of her 
two children will be sent to the gas chambers, while the other will be allowed to continue living 
in the camp. Sophie must choose who will be condemned to an immediate death, and who will 
be spared. If she refuses to decide, both children will be executed. Many people in such 
situations, like Sophie, simply cannot choose. This inability to choose should not be confused 
 
97 Another instance of intransitive preferences was discovered by Amos Tversky (1969), who found that similar 
gambles were ranked according to payoffs, while more extreme gambles were ranked by probability, leading 
to intransitive orderings. 
98 Tversky and Simonson (1993), Huber et al. (1982) and Wedell and Pettibone (1996) provide further 
examples of violations of the independence axiom. 
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with indifference: if it were, the addition of a trivial sum of money to one of the options would 
tip the balance. Sophie’s choice would be no easier if she had to choose between (a) sparing Eva 
and sending Jan to the gas chamber, or (b) sparing Jan, sending Eva to the gas chamber and 
receiving a token sum of money (Feldman and Serrano 2010: 11). It thus appears that Sophie’s 
preference ranking for the lives of her children is incomplete. 
In short, there are certain, predictable situations where people’s preferences are unlikely to obey 
the axioms of transitivity, independence and completeness. So far, however, I have not reviewed 
whether the continuity axiom – which states that if a is preferred to b, then situations 
appropriately similar to a will be preferred to b – is ever predictably violated. This review will 
occupy me for the remainder of this chapter. I will evaluate the influence of choice 
environments on consumers’ preferences, thought processes and decision-making, and argue 
that choice environments can affect the kinds of values that we express towards goods such as 
farm animal welfare. I propose that the influence of choice environments can lead consumers 
to prefer a to b in one context, but prefer b to a in another. The two options have not changed, 
only the context in which consumers make their decisions, and so this likely represents a 
violation of the continuity axiom. As such, in contrast with the assumptions of economists and 
philosophers of economics (see Varian 2010: 118 and Reiss 2013: 35 for instance), I propose that 
preferences for some goods, including farm animal welfare, can be unstable. 
To understand the mechanisms which lead to continuity violations, I must adopt a theory of 
consumer decision-making. To this end, I will turn to the dual-process theory advanced by 
Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist whose research into decision-making, largely conducted with 
Amos Tversky, laid the foundations for behavioural economics and earned Kahneman the 2002 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. 
In his 2011 book Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman proposes that thought processes can be 
divided into two categories. System 1 processes are fast, emotional, automatic and effortless. 
System 2 processes, on the other hand, are slower, rational, conscious and use up cognitive 
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resources (Kahneman 2012: 20-21).99,100 In the following sections, I discuss Kahneman’s account 
of mental processes in greater detail, and show how environmental cues found in supermarkets 
can influence both System 1 and System 2 processes in ways which hinder the expression of 
altruistic preferences for farm animal welfare. I then discuss how policy can nudge consumers 
to express altruistic preferences for farm animal welfare in supermarket environments. 
 
3. Thinking, Fast: Choice Environments and System 1 Processes 
Kahneman proposes that System 1 processes are responsible for activities including: detecting 
that one object is more distant than another; orienting to the source of a sudden sound; 
completing the phrase ‘bread and …’; making a disgust face when shown a horrible picture; 
detecting hostility in a voice; answering 2 + 2 = ?; reading words on large billboards; driving a 
car on an empty road; identifying a strong move in chess (if you are a chess master); 
understanding simple sentences; and recognising that a ‘meek and tidy soul with a passion for 
detail’ resembles an occupational stereotype (Kahneman 2012: 21; Norman 2013: 206). 
In short, System 1 processes require little effort and generally occur automatically, although 
some, such as those responsible for chewing, can be brought under voluntary control. System 1 
processes can be innate, such as those responsible for perceiving the world around us, orienting 
attention and avoiding losses, or they can become automatic through practice, as with reading, 
understanding social nuances and making associations between ideas (e.g. knowing the capital 
of France) (Norman 2013: 45-47). 
 
99 Dual-system theories of thinking have been hugely influential in both psychology and numerous other fields. 
Professor Steve Peters, a sports psychologist who has worked with British Cycling, British Athletics, Liverpool 
Football Club and the England football team, proposes a dual-systems theory similar to Kahneman’s in his The 
Chimp Paradox (2012); Professor Robert Cialdini (2016) uses dual-system thinking in the context of the 
influence literature to explain marketers’ persuasion tactics; Don Norman (2013) discusses dual-system 
thinking in relation to product design; and dual-system thinking has been used by marketers to explain why 
people make impulse purchases, and how they can be encouraged to make these purchases (Xiao and 
Nicholson 2013). 
100 Although popular in both psychology and economics, dual-systems theories have nevertheless been subject 
to criticism. First, research indicates that System 1 and System 2 are not in fact discrete parts of the brain, but 
instead share neural pathways to complete different tasks. There may also be far more than two systems that 
influence our thinking. These are hardly fatal flaws in the model: some writers (e.g. Evans and Stanovich 2013) 
now refer to Type 1 and Type 2 to distinguish between different types of mental processes without implying 
that these processes are performed by distinct systems or parts of the brain. Of greater concern are criticisms 
that dual-process theories only explain how people solve puzzles and complete computational tasks in 
laboratory conditions, and offer little about how we reason on a day-to-day basis (Grayot 2019). Nevertheless, 
given the popularity of dual-process theories in behavioural economics, I will continue to use Kahneman’s two-
system model, but recognise that these theories can be criticised. 
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System 1 processes are responsible for many of our quotidian actions and behaviours. When 
crossing a road, we do not have to think about stepping down off one kerb and up onto another; 
System 1 processes allow us to automatically identify the slight changes in elevation and 
recognise the need to step down and then up. These processes let us navigate and interact with 
our environments smoothly and with little effort, which saves our cognitive resources for more 
strenuous tasks. 
Many System 1 processes are thus responsive to environmental cues. For the most part, this is 
extremely useful, as it allows us to navigate the world around us with little cognitive strain. On 
occasion, however, the automaticity and responsiveness to external cues that are hallmarks of 
System 1 processes lead to undesirable outcomes. A prime example is provided by the so-called 
Norman door, named after author Don Norman, who highlighted the phenomenon in his 1988 
book The Design of Everyday Things. Almost everyone will be familiar with the Norman door, 
although they may not recognise it by name. They will also likely have been frustrated by one 
at some point in their lives. A Norman door features a long, vertically-oriented cylindrical 
handle, of the kind shown in Figure 9. People who wish to pass through the Norman door are 
thus generally inclined to grab the handle and pull it – the handle is perceived to signify that 
the door opens inwards (Norman 2013: 18). Alas, the Norman door opens outwards, and 
therefore requires a push – some will even be adorned with a push sign, although these signs 
are generally ignored due to the strength of the victim’s automatic response to the ‘grab handle’. 
The Norman door’s design unintentionally exploits people’s automatic response to a grab 
handle to produce an unwanted outcome – a futile tug on an uncooperative door (Norman 2013: 
1-2). By putting human-centred design at the heart of choice architecture, for instance by 
building doors that use push plates on the push side, we can create choice environments that 
nudge people to make better automatic choices (pushing rather than pulling) and produce 
better outcomes (frustration-free door encounters) (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 89-90).   
 
4. An Introduction to Nudge 
The concept of nudge, also referred to as libertarian paternalism, was popularised in a 2008 
book by Nobel-winning economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein. Nudge 
theory recognises that our automatic behaviours are affected by the contexts in which we make 
decisions (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 3). Thaler and Sunstein propose that we should adjust 
choice architecture to encourage people to make better choices and produce better 
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Figure 9 – The Dreaded Norman Door 
 
Despite many of its buildings having won architectural awards for design, even the University of Durham 
is not immune to the allure of a Norman Door. 
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outcomes in ways that do not limit or burden consumer choice (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 5-
6).  
The question of what constitutes a better choice or outcome is a contentious one. To avoid 
charges of paternalism, Thaler and Sunstein argue that policy nudges should not pursue some 
independent or ‘objective’ conception of the good, but rather ought to help people better satisfy 
their preferences (Thaler and Sunstein 2009: 5-6). 
Nudges are increasingly becoming as part of the policymaker’s toolkit. In the UK, the 
Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), often referred to as the Nudge Unit, was established in 2010 
with the task of using research from the behavioural sciences to develop more effective policies 
(Halpern 2015: 8-9). One of its best-known interventions was introduced in 2012, where 
workplace pension sign-ups were changed from an opt-in to an opt-out. By 2015, more than five 
million additional UK workers had signed up for pensions. A similar scheme in the United States 
has proved hugely popular, with 9 out of 10 workers affected by the policy supporting it, and 7 
out of 10 of those who choose to opt out also supporting it (Halpern 2015: 62-65). Shifting the 
default option to automatic enrolment did not limit choice or coerce people, but rather took 
advantage of inertia to better-satisfy stated preferences to be part of a pension plan. 
As the pension interventions show, nudges typically seek to influence automatic behaviours. 
Nudges are therefore undoubtedly relevant to this thesis: in addition to contributing to 
frustrating encounters with Norman doors, System 1 processes are also a major driver of 
consumer behaviour in supermarkets. For many people, the weekly supermarket shop is a chore 
(Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 5) that they want to deal with as quickly as possible; consequently, they 
seek to limit mental engagement with the task. System 1 processes are faster and more effortless 
than System 2 processes, and thus allow people to be cognitively disengaged in the supermarket 
(Kahneman 2012: 46). Heuristics are hallmarks of System 1 thinking and are often used to 
streamline supermarket decision-making. For instance, if you are looking to buy toothpaste or 
shampoo, you may automatically simplify your decision-making process by considering only 
those products that are on offer. When buying bread, you may stick to the brand or particular 
product that you always choose – doing so requires less time and effort than considering every 
available option (Binnekamp and Ingenbleek 2006: 173; McEachern and Schroeder 2004: 500; 
Verplanken and van Knippenberg 1998; Just 2011: 101). 
Using heuristics to streamline decision-making in supermarkets may be necessary, especially 
under time constraints that limit consumers’ opportunities to engage in reflective decision-
making. People make an average of 200-300 decisions regarding food consumption every day 
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(Just 2011: 99), but, in 2012/13, the average supermarket trip took just 47 minutes (Statista 2018). 
Given this, and the sheer variety of goods that most supermarkets now sell – the average 
supermarket offers over 30,000 items (Schwartz 2005: 12), while a search for ‘tea’ on the Tesco 
website yields 176 items – using slower System 2 processes is simply not a viable way of 
conducting an entire grocery shop under time pressures. Instead, automatic System 1 thinking 
is likely to dominate consumer decision-making in the supermarket, with System 2 processes 
contributing intermittently. 
In the same way that the Norman door’s choice architecture influences people’s automatic 
behaviours, a supermarket’s choice architecture – the way it is designed, how products are 
displayed and distributed around the store and how products are marketed in-store – can 
influence automatic behaviours. Many supermarkets have realised this, and, like IKEA, adjust 
their choice architecture in ways that increase revenue, often to the detriment of consumers 
(Evans and Stanovich 2013: 229). Some of these strategies, which nudge consumers to make 
unhealthy choices, were outlined in a 2019 report published by the Royal Society for Public 
Health (RSPH) and Slimming World. The report also proposed a range of design features that 
could nudge consumers to make healthier choices. Many of this report’s recommendations were 
implemented by the People’s Supermarket, a community interest company based in Holborn, 
London. Together, the report and the supermarket provide insights into how supermarkets can 
be designed to promote animal welfare, by guiding automatic behaviours towards higher-
welfare products and away from lower-welfare ones. 
 
5. System 1 Nudges 
The RSPH and Slimming World report identifies three areas where supermarket design 
encourages consumers to automatically engage in unhealthy behaviours, of which two are 
relevant for our purposes.101 First, the use of offers such as ‘buy one get one free’ on unhealthy 
products encourages consumers to make unhealthy purchases that they may not have otherwise 
made. This strategy is highly effective: 36% of respondents in the RSPH’s report claimed to have 
bought unhealthy food simply because it is on offer, while 33% of 18-24 year-olds stated that 
offers have led them to consume unhealthy food, even though they were not hungry (RSPH and 
Slimming World 2019: 3, 12). 
 
101 The third technique is to place healthy foods next to unhealthy ones, encouraging consumers to ‘treat’ 
themselves for making healthy choices. 
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These outcomes can be attributed to System 1 rather than System 2 because, at the point of 
purchase, these consumers have not recognised that they have a choice. System 1 processes do 
not allow for ambiguity or alternative interpretations (Kahneman 2012: 80), meaning that 
factors such as the feeling or absence of hunger and preferences for healthy living are not 
considered in decision-making – as we will see below, making trade-offs between competing 
values is a function of System 2. Instead, heuristic-driven consumers respond to cues such as 
brightly coloured sale signs or discount banners, and, when their heuristics relate to price or 
value considerations, it appears that healthfulness and hunger do not enter their decision-
making processes. The upshot is that the use of offers can exploit heuristic decision-making by 
nudging consumers to buy goods without considering whether they actually want them or if 
they cohere with lifestyle preferences. 
Discounts and offers could be used to encourage consumers to act on their preferences for 
higher-welfare products. Applying discounts and offers to higher-welfare goods will attract the 
attention of consumers whose purchase decisions are primarily motivated by price heuristics, 
and thus encourage purchases. Conversely, an absence of discounts and offers on lower-welfare 
goods will diminish the likelihood that these goods trigger value and price heuristics, and will 
nudge consumer away from these products. 
The second way that supermarkets nudge people to buy unhealthy goods is by placing high-
profit items, often branded goods, in areas that are most likely to attract consumers’ attention. 
Consumers’ attention is typically drawn to eye-level items (Hidayatno and Komarudin 2009) – 
one marketing adage runs ‘eye level is buy level’ – and products placed in highly-visible locations 
such as end-of-aisle displays and checkouts. Additionally, many supermarkets use attentional 
strategies to target children, who are more likely to request that their parents buy products 
located at their eye level. At checkouts, a remarkable 89.5% of foods situated at a child’s eye 
level are unhealthy (RSPH and Slimming World 2019: 7; Horsley et al. 2014).  
Many purchases of eye-level goods can be attributed to System 1 thinking. Consumers who are 
acting on autopilot are liable to satisfice, because satisficing requires less cognitive effort than 
maximising. Consequently, consumers acting on autopilot will be more likely to select the first 
product that conforms to their purchase heuristic. When attention is initially drawn to eye-level 
products, the likelihood of these products being chosen increases. 
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The People’s Supermarket drew attention away from unhealthy foods by placing them on the 
top and bottom shelves, out of consumers’ direct eyelines.102 Healthier foods were positioned in 
multiple prime locations, including at consumers’ eye levels, in end-of-aisle displays and by the 
checkout. To further draw attention away from unhealthy foods, healthy products were afforded 
a greater allocation of shelf space.103 When healthy foods are displayed in multiple and more 
prominent locations, they are easier to find and consumer attention is more readily drawn to 
them, encouraging purchases. Similarly, when unhealthy foods are displayed in less-prominent 
locations, they become harder to find and consumers’ attention is focused elsewhere.  
These insights can also be used to nudge for farm animal welfare. Consumer attention will be 
drawn away from lower-welfare goods when they are placed above and below eye level, 
decreasing the likelihood of automatic purchases. Similarly, placing higher-welfare goods at eye 
level draws consumer attention and increases the likelihood of automatic purchases. 
Many retailers combine discounting and visibility strategies, for instance by placing sale items 
at eye level or on end-of-aisle displays. These strategies are also combined by online grocery 
retailers: Figure 10 shows how Tesco use brightly-coloured offers and discounts to attract 
consumers’ attention. The first image is taken from the Tesco groceries homepage, where sales 
and deals are advertised prominently using bright colours. The second image is taken from a 
search for ‘pizza’, and there are two features worth noting: first, four sale items are listed among 
the first eight results, and so will receive higher levels of consumer attention; the ordering of 
search results affects which products a consumer sees first. Second, offers are effectively 
advertised twice, once in yellow and once in red, to maximise the chance of attracting consumer 
attention.  
To summarise, System 1 processes are automatic, fast and require little cognitive engagement. 
Consumers often view the supermarket shop as a chore, and, when they face time constraints 
and potentially thousands of choices, may let System 1 processes govern their decision-making. 
A consequence of this reliance upon heuristic-driven System 1 thinking is that consumer 
behaviour is vulnerable to influence by supermarket choice architecture. The use of offers plays 
upon price and value heuristics by encouraging consumers to both impulse 
 
102 See Appendix IV for images of this, as well as other design features implemented by the People’s 
Supermarket. 
103 Some of these changes were later reversed to improve consumer experience. The People’s Supermarket is 
located close to the Great Ormond Street children’s hospital, and staff informed me that chocolate and sweets 
were returned to a more visible location by the checkout to assist people in need of comfort food. 
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Figure 10 – Using Discounts to Grab Online Shoppers’ Attention 
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buy and consume goods with little regard for broader lifestyle preferences, while shelf and 
website design can guide consumer attention towards more profitable products.  
The People’s Supermarket shows that these design features can be used for other purposes, 
including pro-animal welfare ends. Discounting higher-welfare products and positioning them 
in highly-visible locations, such as at eye level or on end-of-aisle displays, could nudge 
consumers to buy these products over low-welfare alternatives.  
 
6. Thinking, Slow: Choice Environments and System 2 Processes 
In contrast to fast and automatic System 1 processes, System 2 processes are slow and effortful. 
These processes are responsible for a range of behaviours, including: focusing on a particular 
person’s voice in a noisy room; looking for a woman with white hair in a crowd; searching your 
memory to identify a surprising sound; maintaining a faster walking speed than what comes 
naturally; monitoring the appropriateness of your behaviour in a social situation; counting the 
occurrences of the letter a in a page of text; parking in a narrow space; comparing two washing 
machines for overall value; filling out a tax form; and checking the validity of a complex logical 
argument (Kahneman 2012: 22). Because System 2 processes are effortful, they will be disrupted 
should our attention be drawn away. 
Importantly, System 2 processes can be influenced by System 1 processes. For instance, your 
System 1 processes will orient you towards an unexpected loud noise, allowing System 2 
processes to identify the noise and attend to its source. System 1 can also generate the attitudes, 
impressions, intuitions, intentions and feelings that constitute the building blocks of System 2 
decision-making (Kahneman 2012: 24; Norman 2013: 47). This occurs because System 2 is often 
lazy: exercising self-control – which includes monitoring and controlling intuitive System 1 
responses and reactions – is mentally taxing. Consequently, the path of least resistance, in this 
case uncritically accepting the inputs generated by System 1, is often preferred (Kahneman 2012: 
44-46). 
The significance of System 1 influence on System 2 processes is magnified when we introduce 
the System 1 phenomenon of associative priming. Associative processes are hugely useful tools 
that allow us to make sense of our environments and anticipate likely events based on current 
situational knowledge. Hearing the sound of barking behind you, for instance, will prime the 
concept of a dog, meaning that you will not be surprised when you turn around and see a dog 
(Kahneman 2012: 51). 
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These associations spread like ripples: an environmental cue primes one concept, which in turn 
primes another, which may in turn prime a host of other related concepts, albeit less strongly 
than the initial prime (Kahneman 2012: 52-53). These concepts may be related to beliefs, feelings, 
attitudes, values and impressions, as well as more concrete objects (Kahneman 2012: 58; Fazio 
et al. 1986), and can influence reflective decision-making and behaviours. 
The influence of primes upon System 2 thinking was illuminated in a study conducted by Moss-
Racusin et al. (2012), where science faculties at over 100 universities were asked to rate an 
application for the position of laboratory manager. The applications were identical in all 
respects save one: the name. Half of the applications came from a male student (John), while 
the other half came from a female student (Jennifer). 
Despite the applicants being identical in all relevant respects, John was perceived to be more 
competent and hireable than Jennifer, and was offered a higher starting salary and more 
mentoring. Notably, this bias persisted regardless of whether the application was assessed by a 
man or a woman. To frame these results in terms of dual-systems thinking, assessing the 
applications required reflective System 2 thinking, but System 1 processes may have influenced 
these assessments. These System 1 processes may have introduced unconscious biases in System 
2 thought: if someone holds an association between STEM subjects and males, for instance, they 
are likely, when asked to think of the archetypal scientist, to imagine a man. This can influence 
attitudes and behaviours: when hiring someone to work in a laboratory, applicants who 
resemble an assessor’s stereotype of a scientist are likely to be received more favourably.  
Because System 2 is often lazy, the reviewers may not have considered what characteristics their 
archetype of a laboratory manager might possess, and whether they were relevant to the role. 
Consequently, biases that originated in the knowledge structures primed by associative System 
1 processes may have bled into System 2 processes and influenced reflectively-held perceptions 
and attitudes, and therefore responses to the applications. 
A helpful way of understanding these knowledge structures is to frame them in terms of schema 
theory. 
 
a. Schema Theory 
The bundle of impressions, attitudes, feelings, beliefs and associations activated by a prime can 
be referred to as a schema. Schemas contain ‘the general rules and information necessary for 
interpreting situations and for guiding [behaviour]’ and ‘lend a sense of order, structure, and 
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coherence to social stimuli that otherwise would be complex, unpredictable, and overwhelming’ 
(Norman 2013: 128; Fiske and Taylor 1991: 150); they are heuristics that allow us to understand 
the world despite our limited informational processing capacities (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 97-98). 
Schemas influence what we notice, how quickly we perceive objects – with an emphasis on 
noticing and recalling schema-consistent information104  – how we interpret what we notice and 
what we expect from a situation (Flaherty and Mowen 2010: 256; Leung and Morris 2015: 1031). 
They therefore enable us to ‘discriminate among individuals, interpret information, and 
evaluate others’ (Flaherty and Mowen 2010: 255), and thus influence our social perceptions, 
evaluations and behaviours. 
There are numerous types of schema. Person schemas allow us to understand particular 
individuals through their traits and goals. We form unique schemas for friends, colleagues, 
family members and others, which are populated with beliefs about their characteristics and 
motivations and colour how we perceive them and their actions. If Rachel perceives Stiofan to 
be a malicious person, she may think he has acted deliberately when he spills her drink. If she 
thinks Stiofan is clumsy or good-natured, she may instead be inclined to think that her drink 
was spilled accidentally. In short, her ‘Stiofan schema’ colours her perceptions of Stiofan’s 
actions. 
Self schemas relate to self-perceptions of characteristics and traits and help us manage 
information relating to ourselves. The economic and citizen schemas, which are the focus of 
much of this chapter, are types of self schema. Event schemas help us to organise expectations 
and navigate probable sequences of events in frequently occurring situations, such as ordering 
food in a restaurant (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 117-18). Role schemas help us to manage information 
and expectations related to the performance of certain roles. There are two types of role: 
achieved roles are those positions intentionally and effortfully attained, such as career-related 
roles; ascribed roles are acquired at birth or without effort, and relate to characteristics such as 
age, sex and race (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 119). If we recognise that someone is performing a 
familiar role, our interactions with them will be guided by beliefs about what this role entails. 
In schematic terms, role-associated stimuli (for example, a firefighter’s uniform and a fire 
engine) are categorised in a way that activates a specific role schema (firefighter), influencing 
 
104 This is the case only when schemas are well-developed; when schemas are weak, attention tends to be 
drawn to inconsistent information (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 128). 
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interactions with the individual (they may be asked to help rescue a cat from a tree) (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991: 105).105 
Individual schemas are not always active, but are instead primed by features of the environment. 
There are many forms of priming, but two are especially relevant to this chapter. Schemas can 
be activated through semantic priming, the use of tasks that engage directly-related schemas 
(Leung and Morris 2015: 1031). Exposure to relevant concepts can trigger the activation of the 
corresponding schema. For instance, Carver et al. (1983) primed test subjects with a video of 
hostile behaviour and word scramble puzzles which featured hostility-themed words. They 
found that, compared to a control group, participants were more likely to both behave in a 
hostile manner and attribute hostile attitudes to a fictional character in an ambiguous passage 
of text, indicating that the video and word scramble tasks had primed a hostile self schema, with 
implications for participants’ beliefs and behaviours. 
Alternatively, schemas can be activated through associative priming, the use of images, sounds, 
smells or tastes that are not directly connected to a schema but may still be reminiscent of it 
(Leung and Morris 2015: 1032). Research by Nicolas Guéguen (2012) indicates that exposure to 
the smell of freshly-baked bread can promote prosocial behaviour. Although it is tenuous to 
claim a direct association between a bakery smell and a prosocial schema, the smell of fresh 
bread may have elicited a good mood, which in turn primed a prosocial schema (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991: 146). 
Whether a schema influences behaviour depends upon three factors. First, the schema must be 
accessible, meaning it has the potential to be activated (Higgins 1996: 134). Accessibility is 
connected to recency and frequency. Recently activated schemas are more accessible than those 
that have not been activated for some time (Carver et al. 1983: 404-7; Fiske and Taylor 1991: 146). 
When there is a sufficient temporal delay between schema activation and stimulus exposure, 
however, people tend to fall back on frequently utilised schemas (Higgins et al. 1985: 66; Higgins 
1996: 139).  
Second, a schema must be applicable to a given context. The greater the overlap between the 
features of a schema and the stimulus, the more applicable the schema is (Higgins 1996: 135). If 
an activated schema is not relevant to a situation it will not influence behaviour (Macrae and 
Johnston 1998: 403). Similarly, schemas will only influence behaviour in those contexts where 
 
105 There may be a degree of overlap between role and self schemas; people performing certain roles may find 
that their expectations and beliefs regarding those roles influence perceptions of self, at least while the role is 
being performed. 
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they are deemed to be applicable: priming an economic schema, for instance, can reduce 
empathy, but only in economic contexts. Beyond this domain, the schema is not perceived as 
applicable and so will not influence behaviour (Molinsky et al. 2012: 34). 
Third, a schema must be deemed appropriate (Higgins 1996: 136). There may be inhibitory 
factors, both internal (goals or morals) and external (contexts and situational cues) that cause 
people to view schema-driven behaviours as inappropriate (Macrae and Johnston 1998: 403-4). 
Many people are averse to acting on stereotypes about characteristics such as gender and race, 
so may resist using active and applicable schemas.106 Some may even overcompensate in the 
opposite direction rather than act upon stereotype beliefs (Leung and Morris 2015: 1032). In 
short, it is only when schemas are accessible, applicable to the given context and deemed 
appropriate to use that they are likely to be activated. 
When they are activated, however, schemas can explain many features of human psychology. 
Environmental cues that subconsciously activate an applicable stereotype can affect self-
perceptions (Fine 2012: 9). Schemas can also influence behaviours. In one of the classic studies 
in this field, Bargh et al. (1996: 236-37) primed a group of undergraduates with words relating 
to an elderly stereotype. Unbeknown to the participants, the researchers then timed how long 
they took to walk down a corridor at the end of the experiment. The researchers found that 
subjects primed with the elderly stereotype, of which slowness is associated, walked 
significantly slower than those in the control group, despite words directly relating to slowness 
not being included in the priming stage of the experiment. Similar effects have been observed 
when trait schemas, a form of self schema, are primed. Bargh et al. (1996: 235-36) subjected 
volunteers to a scrambled sentence test intended to prime either a polite schema, a rude schema 
or nothing. Subjects primed with the rudeness stimuli were more likely to interrupt in a 
subsequent conversation than those primed with the neutral stimuli, who were in turn more 
likely to interrupt than those exposed to the polite stimuli.107  
In sum, exposure to schema-related stimuli activates schemas, which can prime people to make 
decisions and behave in ways congruent with the beliefs, values, expectations and preferences 
associated with the activated schema. Our environments can thus prime us to think, feel, behave 
and make decisions in particular ways. This is especially significant when we consider the 
influence of economic schemas upon consumer decision-making. 
 
106 People who do this may be using System 2 processes to evaluate the impressions generated by System 1 
processes. 
107 See Bargh and Ferguson (2000) for further examples of priming behaviours through schema activation. 
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b. Economic and Citizen Schemas 
The most relevant schema to this thesis is the economic self schema. Multiple studies have 
suggested that unobtrusive exposure to economic concepts primes ‘economic’ attitudes and 
behaviours.  
Research by Molinsky et al. (2012) indicates that exposure to economic concepts led to 
dampened feelings of empathy. One common economic prime is money, exposure to which108 
has been claimed to prime numerous behaviours and attitudes, including: self-interested 
behaviours at the expense of regard for others (Kouchaki et al. 2013); the prioritising of self-
interest and preferences for distance from others, and the performance of ‘socially insensitive’ 
actions (Vohs et al. 2006); and a business-like mindset, which leads people to both adopt an 
impersonal approach to social interactions and hold a negative view of the expression of 
emotions in themselves and others (Jiang et al. 2014). Kay et al. (2004) suggest that other objects 
associated with business, such as boardroom tables and briefcases, are also economic primes 
that can encourage competitive behaviours. Similarly, Liberman et al. (2004) conclude that 
calling a Prisoner’s Dilemma game ‘The Wall Street Game’ elicited significantly more 
competitive behaviours, i.e. defections, than when it was referred to as ‘The Community Game’, 
indicating that the reference to Wall Street, an institution explicitly associated with business 
and economics, primed self-interested behaviours. Moreover, Wang et al. (2011) conclude that 
having an education in economics, which is likely to make economic schemas more accessible, 
correlates with more positive attitudes towards greed. Research conducted by Frank et al. (1993) 
supports this idea, finding that economics students, once again a group which is likely to possess 
accessible economic schemas, are more likely to adopt self-interested behaviours in Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games than non-economists.109 
 
108 Effective exposure techniques have variously made use of scrambled sentence tasks that evoke the concept 
of money, images of money (Kouchaki et al. 2013), and even Monopoly money (Vohs et al. 2006). 
109 Many priming studies have been criticised for a lack of academic rigour due to their use of small sample 
sizes. When combined with relatively marginal results, many of these studies lack explanatory power and there 
is a statistically significant chance that their results will not be replicated in repeat experiments (Lodder et al. 
2019). In fact, Chapter 4 of Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, which focuses on associative priming, has 
been criticised for referring to studies which lack sufficient rigour (Schimmack et al. 2017). The replication 
crisis does not undermine the claims made in this chapter, however: as Kathleen Vohs (2015), who has 
extensively researched money primes, points out, evidence for the existence of economic primes has been 
found in 165 studies conducted across 18 countries. Additionally, Lodder et al.’s meta-analysis (2019) 
concludes that a statistically significant money priming effect has been observed in some word scramble and 
money handling experiments.  
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In short, these studies suggest that exposure to economic concepts can prime an economic 
schema which promotes self-interested values and attitudes while dampening expressions of 
emotion, empathy and other-regarding values (Wang et al. 2011: 645-46; Molinsky et al. 2012: 
28). Additionally, the attitudes and values primed by economic stimuli appear to bleed into 
System 2 decision-making in games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where participants with a 
primed economic schema prioritised self-interest and a calculative mindset over prosocial 
behaviours (Vohs et al. 2008: 209-10). 
The economic schema, primed by exposure to economic concepts, contrasts with the citizen 
schema, which, when primed, prompts prosocial behaviours that are more strongly influenced 
by social values and consideration of what is best for the wider community (Conner 2004: 28). 
A range of studies lend credence to the existence of a prosocial citizen schema and shed light 
on its nature. Abbate et al. (2013a, 2013b) propose that exposing participants to help-related 
words in a scrambled sentence task primed prosocial schemas that led people to more-readily 
offer assistance and also to donate more when requested. Similarly, Macrae and Johnston (1998: 
408) contend that scrambled sentence tasks can prompt helpful behaviour, provided the costs 
of helping were not too great. Research by Van Tongeren et al. (2018) indicates that exposure to 
superhero images primes a prosocial schema (superheroes are generally regarded as paradigms 
of altruism and prosociality), which led to higher levels of both self-reported intentions to help 
others and actual helping. Greitemeyer (2009) noted that priming test subjects with songs 
featuring prosocial lyrics increased feelings of empathy and helping behaviours. Additionally, 
the aforementioned Liberman et al. study (2004) concluded that referring to a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game as ‘The Community Game’ encouraged more cooperative behaviour than 
referring to it as ‘The Wall Street Game’.110 In short, exposure to prosocial words, lyrics and 
paragons of prosociality can prime prosocial (citizen) schemas, which lead to more other-
regarding and prosocial behaviours. 
Due to their respective emphases on self- and other-regarding behaviours, economic and citizen 
schemas will often conflict and thus elicit different and opposing judgements and behaviours in 
response to similar objects. Mark Sagoff (2001: 468) illustrates: ‘I speed on the highway; yet I 
 
110 Ideally, this study would have had a neutral third category that did not attempt to prime a citizen or 
economic schema. Without this, there are three possible explanations for the results: (1) exposure to ‘The Wall 
Street Game’ primes an economic schema, leading to increased competitive behaviour, but exposure to ‘The 
Community Game’ does not prime a citizen schema; (2) exposure to ‘The Wall Street Game’ does not prime an 
economic schema, but exposure to ‘The Community Game’ primes a citizen schema, leading to increased 
cooperative behaviour; (3) both schemas are activated, leading to increased competitive or prosocial 
behaviour depending on which prime the subjects were exposed to. 
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want the police to enforce laws against speeding. I used to buy mixers in returnable bottles – 
but who can bother to return them? I buy only disposables now, but, to soothe my conscience, 
I urge my state senator to outlaw one-way containers’. Similarly, we may ‘protest to try to block 
Wal-Mart from coming to our town and send letters demanding human rights in China and 
Myanmar, then turn around and buy cheap sweatshop-produced trinkets at these big box retails 
stores’ (Conner 2004: 28-29). These examples may represent violations of the continuity axiom: 
we prefer cheap clothes to workers’ rights when in a superstore, but our preferences are reversed 
in a community context. 
 
c. Schemas and Preferences for Farm Animal Welfare 
So far, we have seen that exposure to relevant stimuli can prime schemas, which are knowledge 
structures containing impressions, attitudes, feelings, beliefs and associations. Primed schemas 
can feed into System 2 decision-making. We have also seen that exposure to money and other 
economic concepts can prime self-interested values and ways of thinking, while exposure to 
prosocial concepts can activate an other-regarding citizen schema.  
Modern supermarkets are filled with money-based cues including prices, deals, bargains and 
commodities, and are therefore likely to prime economic schemas. Consequently, shoppers may 
be more self-interested and less attentive to other-regarding concerns in supermarkets. In 
Chapter 1 (p.23), we saw that there are a range of reasons for consumers to hold preferences for 
farm animal welfare. Some preferences are motivated by self-interest, often connected to a belief 
that farm animal welfare contributes to a range of other desirable product attributes. Greater 
attention may be paid to self-interested preferences for farm animal welfare when consumer 
schemas are active. Other consumers hold altruistic preferences for farm animal welfare, 
however, and, regardless of whether these preferences are motivated by ethical concern or mere 
liking for some types of animal, their expression is likely to be dampened in economic choice 
environments. 
This hypothesis is supported by a range of survey and focus group results. When asked to 
consider why they would buy higher-welfare products, participants in one focus group stated 
that they were generally only willing to pay more for higher-welfare goods when these goods 
produced direct benefits, such as healthfulness, for themselves (Harper and Henson 2001: 11). 
Being asked to view animal welfare as a product attribute led to its commodification and 
activated an economic schema, which caused participants to give priority to their self-interested 
values. 
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These findings are corroborated by the 2007 Eurobarometer survey, which asked respondents 
to choose three of nine possible reasons for purchasing high-welfare goods. Health concerns 
dominate, with 15% of UK respondents choosing ‘they come from healthier animals’111 as their 
first choice, and another 15% holding that high-welfare goods are healthier for consumers. A 
further 11% stated that high welfare entailed higher quality and 10% equated high welfare with 
better taste. In contrast, the two options that appear to be most indicative of an intrinsic 
valuation of animal welfare, ‘they come from happier animals’ and ‘they help farmers treat their 
animals better’, were chosen by 13% and 12% of respondents respectively (Eurobarometer 2007: 
78). The survey therefore finds that less than 40% of high-welfare purchases112 are primarily 
motivated by concern for animal welfare for the sakes of the animals themselves: instead, most 
high-welfare purchases appear to be primarily motivated by an instrumental valuation of animal 
welfare. When asked to think of animal welfare in relation to animal products, thus priming an 
economic schema, initial responses appear to be motivated primarily by self-interested 
preferences for high-quality, safe and healthy food. 
In contrast, stimuli that prime citizen schemas (or at least do not prime economic schemas) 
appear to encourage more altruistic and other-regarding attitudes towards farm animal welfare. 
The 2016 Eurobarometer survey asked respondents to choose two of five statements that best 
reflected their understanding of farm animal welfare. Among UK respondents, the statement 
‘[animal welfare] contributes to better quality animal products’ received the lowest number of 
selections, with just 14%. In contrast, ‘[animal welfare] concerns the way farmed animals are 
treated, providing them with a better quality of life’, and ‘[animal welfare] refers to the duty to 
respect all animals’ were selected by 42% and 40% of respondents respectively (Eurobarometer 
2016: 7). Respondents were therefore more likely to perceive farm animal welfare as being of 
intrinsic rather than instrumental value when discussing it in a setting that did not prime 
economic schemas through associations with commodities. 
 
111 This option is not particularly helpful for our purposes, as the contribution of higher-welfare goods to animal 
health could be viewed as desirable for both instrumental and intrinsic reasons. For instrumental reasons, it 
may be believed that healthier animals produce products that are higher-quality, more nutritious or simply 
better-tasting, although such thoughts may be better-expressed by selecting these options in the survey. 
Alternatively, greater animal health may be viewed as desirable for altruistic reasons, for the sake of the 
animal itself. 
112 This figure is composed of the 13% who chose ‘they come from happier animals’, the 12% who chose ‘they 
help farmers treat their animals better’, and also the 15% who chose ‘they come from healthier animals’, 
charitably assuming that all did so out of concern for animal welfare rather than a belief that healthier animals 
make better produce. Although the limitations of the survey mean we cannot ascertain precisely how many, it 
is likely that some proportion of that 15% valued animal health instrumentally. 
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In short, priming and schema theory suggest that choice environments can influence the 
weights given to criteria used in decision-making, with implications for reflective System 2 
thinking. System 2 processes are used to compare goods according to multiple criteria; when 
exposure to economic primes influences the weights given to these criteria, the subsequent 
assessments will also be affected. Suppose you are looking to buy a new washing machine, and 
are concerned with two attributes: price and energy efficiency. You have identified two 
candidates: a is cheaper than b, but less energy efficient. Reading a leaflet about a social cause 
that you support is likely to prime a prosocial citizen schema, and prompt you to afford greater 
significance to prosocial values such as environmental concern. Reading a leaflet about the 
successes of a famous entrepreneur may instead prime a consumer schema, causing you to give 
greater weight to price concerns. 
Different choice environments appear to evince divergent and context-sensitive preference sets: 
what I prefer when immersed in economic stimuli may not be what I prefer when surrounded 
by prosocial stimuli. When the citizen schema is activated, other-regarding values dominate, 
encouraging people to act on preferences for workers’ rights in China and Myanmar over cheap 
clothes, or preferences for higher animal welfare over cheaper low-welfare produce. These 
preferences may be reversed, however, when the self-interested economic schema is activated 
in an economic choice environment such as a supermarket. The context-sensitive nature of 
some preferences may therefore cause violations of the continuity axiom. 
 
7. System 2 Nudges 
Policymakers can use nudges to influence the building blocks that are often used unreflectively 
in System 2 processes. Drawing from the RSPH and Slimming World report, the People’s 
Supermarket introduced ‘nudge points’, bright yellow signs displayed in prominent positions 
that were intended to catch consumers’ attention.113 The People’s Supermarket’s nudge points 
drew consumers out of automatic modes of thinking and encouraged them to be more mindful 
of preferences for healthy living at points of purchase by providing relevant health information 
and encouraging healthy behaviours. The content of the nudge points is intended to activate 
schemas associated with healthy living and thus encourage consumers to consider values 
associated with health in their decision-making. This strategy is supplemented with the 
provision of in-store nutritional guidance. 
 
113 See Appendix IV for images. 
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A similar policy could also be used to encourage consumers to consider a range of ways of 
valuing farm animal welfare at points of purchase. Information could be provided to promote 
the consideration of animal welfare at points of purchase, inform consumers about animal 
welfare issues and empower consumers to make welfare-motivated decisions. An animal welfare 
nudge point would therefore seek to prime citizen schemas – and thus encourage consumers to 
consider prosocial values, namely concern for farm animal welfare – in economic choice 
environments.  
Policymakers must, however, be mindful of how consumers engage with farm animal welfare 
when deciding what kinds of information should be presented on nudge points. Responses to 
the meat paradox – discussed in Chapter 1 (p.30) – indicate that many consumers will avoid or 
ignore information that makes them uncomfortable; consequently, information about low-
welfare animal agriculture, or those practices used in higher-welfare animal agriculture that 
elicit discomfort, will not be effective drivers of higher-welfare purchases.  
Instead, effective information provision will focus on the idea of happy animals, tapping into 
the emotional nature of consumer engagement with farm animal welfare. This entails an 
emphasis on the positive aspects of higher-welfare production, such as access to outdoor spaces 
and freedom to exercise natural behaviours. This information could be linked to a welfare 
labelling scheme of the kind outlined in the previous chapter (p.145). 
Alternatively, information provision could focus on social norms, a key pillar of the influence 
literature, which was overlooked in the RSPH and Slimming World report. 
 
a. Social Norms 
Social norms are implicit in human interactions, and specify which actions are deemed proper 
or correct, and which are improper or incorrect (Coleman 1994: 242-9; Young 2015: 360). They 
are wide-ranging in scope, covering everything from how to answer the phone to proscriptions 
against littering to appropriate behaviour in a zoo. Norms play an important role in regulating 
social behaviour and may therefore be a valuable policy instrument. 
The use of social norms as an influence tool relies upon the idea that people will do and buy as 
others do and buy. Social norms affect both System 1 and System 2 processes: television 
executives have long known that canned laughter causes viewers to laugh longer and more often 
and rate the material as funnier, while advertisers’ claims that a product is best-selling may give 
us reason to trust the quality of their goods (Cialdini 2007: 115-17). Social norms also offer an 
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explanation for the bystander effect, where a group of otherwise good people stand idle as an 
atrocity is committed in front of them, simply because everyone else is doing the same (Cialdini 
2007: 128-36). In short, we often look to others to guide our actions, and policymakers can use 
this tendency to encourage prosocial behaviours by drawing attention to what other people are 
doing. 
The viability of social norm policies as a tool for promoting farm animal welfare, however, is 
dependent upon the existence of prosocial norms; if people generally do not behave prosocially, 
there will be no social norms to appeal to. Evolutionary psychology provides a theoretical basis 
for the idea that co-operative and reciprocal norms are an innate part of human psychology that 
may have contributed to our species’ survival in times of scarcity (Saad 2011: 121-22; Singer 2011: 
23-53). Robert Trivers (1971) proposes that natural selection promotes non-kin reciprocal norms 
when members of a species repeatedly interact with one other and have a long lifespan (to allow 
debts to be repaid), and live in small, stable social groups. These norms improve a being’s (and 
a species’) chances of survival by nurturing friendships, establishing mutually-beneficial 
relationships with strangers and creating stable norm-following societies by ostracising or 
otherwise punishing norm-breakers. 
Experiments by behavioural economists lend further credence to the existence of co-operative 
and reciprocal norms. Kahneman et al. (1986) ran a series of experiments where participants 
were asked to play the dictator game. In this game, one player is asked to propose a division of 
a sum of money between themselves and a partner, which the partner must accept. In 
Kahneman’s experiment, proposers had two choices: they could split $20 evenly or keep $18 for 
themselves and leave their partner with $2. As the game was played anonymously, meaning that 
the influence of reputational concerns can be discounted, a purely self-interested player would 
choose the uneven split. 
Players were generally not purely self-interested, however: despite the impossibility of having 
their offer rejected, 76% of proposers chose to split the money evenly (Kahneman et al. 1986: 
S291). Kahneman’s findings are generally replicated in the literature: one meta-analysis found 
that 64% of dictators make a positive offer, and 30% offer at least half the endowment (Engel 
2011: 589).114 
The existence of co-operative and altruistic social norms cannot be definitively divined from 
these results, however. The learning hypothesis, which states that people might behave 
 
114 Henrich et al. (2001: 75) found that positive offers in dictator games were common in a range of societies. 
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generously simply because they do not fully understand the game, provides a plausible 
alternative explanation. The learning hypothesis predicts that the dominant strategy of non-co-
operation will be learned with experience, and is lent credence by two pieces of evidence. First, 
in Kahneman et al.’s dictator game (1986), commerce students were less likely to offer an even 
split (63%) than psychology students (80%). This indicates that economics training, which often 
includes a study of game theory, encourages economically ‘optimal’ behaviours, a finding 
replicated in the literature (see Marwell and Ames’ 1981 paper ‘Economists Free Ride, Does 
Anyone Else?’ for instance). Those without economics training are perhaps more likely to 
instead learn the optimal strategy by repeatedly playing the game.  
Results from non-punishment treatments of public good games115 could be interpreted as 
supporting the learning hypothesis. In numerous studies of multiple-round public good games, 
average contributions have been found to decay over time, converging on total free-riding by 
the game’s end (Ledyard 1995: 121; Fehr and Schmidt 1999: 844-45; Fehr and Gächter 2000: 985-
6).116 The learning hypothesis appears to offer an explanation for these behaviours: as people 
become more familiar with public good games, they learn economically-optimal strategies and 
accordingly become less co-operative. 
Further public good games conducted by James Andreoni (1988b) cast doubt upon the learning 
hypothesis’ explanatory power, however. Andreoni’s study began with a basic ten-round public 
good game, with the composition of four-person groups remaining fixed throughout. Although 
participants knew that their partners would not change throughout the game, they did not know 
who their partners were, thus eliminating reputational motivations for co-operation. Andreoni 
found that, as with the other studies, levels of co-operation decayed over the ten rounds of the 
public good game. After the tenth round, however, he informed his subjects that the game 
would restart, with participants continuing to play in the same groups as before.117 
If the learning hypothesis explains decay in public good games, we would anticipate the new 
game to feature low levels of co-operation from the outset, as participants would by now have 
arrived at a strategy of non-cooperation. Instead, participants largely reverted to their levels of 
co-operation in the corresponding rounds of the first game, with a significant proportion even 
increasing their initial contributions. This finding surely invalidates the learning hypothesis, 
 
115 See Chapter 5 (p.102) for more on public good games. 
116 This decay is evident both when subjects are aware of how many rounds there are in the game and when 
they are not (Isaac et al. 1984; Isaac et al. 1985). 
117 Due to budget constraints, only three rounds of the new game were played, although players were told they 
would be playing ten. 
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which predicts that experienced players will start new games at low or non-existent levels of co-
operation. To further reject the learning hypothesis, Marwell and Ames (1981: 302-3) invited 
participants from an earlier public good experiment to play again, and found that levels of co-
operation were largely unchanged and in line with those of inexperienced players, at about 47% 
of resources.  
With the learning hypothesis rejected, it is appropriate to return to social norm theory. 
Although co-operative norms can explain why people are so often generous in dictator games, 
and why initial contributions in public good games tend to be significant, they do not obviously 
explain why co-operation decays in multiple-round public good games. Public good games 
conducted by Keser and van Winden (2000) may provide an answer by revealing the nature of 
co-operative norms. The researchers conducted a 25-round public good experiment (rather than 
the usual ten) which split participants into two conditions: those in the partner condition played 
in the same four-person group for the entire game, while people in the stranger condition were 
randomly allocated to four-person groups every round. After each round, participants were told 
how much their group had contributed in that round, but not how other groups, or any 
particular individual, had behaved. The authors found that, across all rounds, partners 
contributed more to the public good than strangers. In addition, there was no decay in the 
contribution of partners until the last rounds of the game, in contrast to the strangers condition, 
where decay was evident throughout.118  
Keser and van Winden propose that prosocial norms are governed by two principles, which 
together compose the theory of conditional co-operation (Keser and van Winden 2000; Dawes 
and Thaler 1988: 191). The first of these principles is future-oriented behaviour, which means that 
behaviour is influenced by expectations of future interactions. Future-oriented behaviour 
explains why co-operation dropped off towards the end of the game, as participants either 
believed it was no longer worth continuing to invest in their relationship with other group 
members, or believed that other players would feel this way.119 This also explains why there were 
lower levels of co-operation in the strangers condition: participants could not form expectations 
 
118 This result conflicts with Andreoni (1988b), who found decay set in early in his study, rather than towards 
the end. One explanation for this is that Andreoni’s experiment used games of only ten rounds, in contrast to 
the 25-round games used by Keser and van Winden. In Keser and van Winden’s study, decay appeared to set in 
in the last six rounds, while in Andreoni’s study decay was most evident in the last seven rounds. It may simply 
be that using fewer rounds gave the impression of constant decay in Andreoni’s study, when it is in fact a 
purely end-game phenomenon in partner conditions. 
119 In keeping with Isaac et al. (1994: 30), who found that having more rounds in a game correlated with a 
slower rate of decay, Keser and van Winden hold that people are myopic, looking only a few rounds ahead 
instead of using a backwards induction strategy. This leads to decay setting in only when the game’s end 
comes into view, rather than a total absence of co-operation. 
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of other players’ future behaviour and did not have a relationship with other group members to 
invest in, and so had less incentive to co-operate at the beginning. 
The second element of conditional co-operation is reactive behaviour, where people are 
influenced by the average group behaviour in the previous round. In both conditions of Keser 
and van Winden’s experiment, participants tended to decrease their contributions if they scored 
above the group average in the previous round and increase them if below.120 In short, the decay 
witnessed by Andreoni may not be as prevalent as first believed, and can be explained by players 
putting less value on maintaining their relationship with the rest of the group as the endgame 
comes into view, and other players responding in kind. These lower levels of co-operation begot 
even lower levels, contributing to an eradication of co-operative norms by the game’s end.  
To summarise, experiments using several types of competitive games have produced results 
which cohere with research from a range of other disciplines to support the existence of social 
norms that favour co-operative and altruistic behaviours. Alternative explanations for these 
findings, such as self-interest and the learning hypothesis, can be dismissed. By considering the 
nature of prosocial norms, we see that co-operation is often not unconditional, but instead 
dependent upon beliefs and expectations relating to the contributions of others. 
 
i. Social Norms as Policy Instruments 
Prosocial norms have the potential to be effective policy tools for improving farm animal 
welfare. If policymakers can prime citizen schemas, they may be able to promote norm 
following: research in this area indicates that conformity primes, such as reminders of social 
norms, can induce people to conform to group norms (Epley and Gilovich 1999). By nudging 
people to conform to these norms, the rate of norm following increases, which in turn could 
encourage others to become norm-followers. Social norm nudges thus have the potential to 
create a virtuous cycle of norm-following by encouraging people to afford greater significance 
to other-regarding values. 
The effectiveness of a social norms policy for encouraging purchases of higher-welfare goods 
will, however, be affected by whether pro-animal welfare norms exist. Research by Bennett and 
Blaney (2002) provides evidence for these norms: when told that there existed a social consensus 
against a given animal welfare issue, participants stated both stronger opposition and a higher 
 
120 Because similar levels of reactive behaviour were observed in both conditions, we can rule out the 
possibility that strategic behaviour, intended to encourage others to contribute more, motivates this 
phenomenon. 
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willingness to pay to resolve it. This indicates that there are descriptive norms pertaining to 
farm animal welfare, which, by informing people about what others feel and do, influence 
attitudes and behaviours. 
The existence of pro-welfare norms sheds light on several focus group studies which examined 
barriers to purchasing higher-welfare products. These studies found that many people chose 
not to buy higher-welfare goods because they believed that, in isolation, their purchases had 
little impact on farm animal welfare (Brook Lyndhurst 2010: 33-34; Schröder and McEachern 
2004: 174; Harper and Henson 2001: 10; Harper and Henson 1999: 17-19). These consumers were 
unwilling to take a stand on animal welfare issues when they believed that they were acting on 
their own, and so appear to be conditional co-operators. Consequently, if they could be 
reassured that they are acting as part of a group, these consumers may be more willing to buy 
higher-welfare goods. Social norm nudges may therefore have a dual effect: they can both prime 
prosocial schemas that indirectly affect System 2 processes, and also inform consumers about 
the extent of adherence to social norms, which can directly affect reflective System 2 thinking. 
The insight that some consumers are conditional co-operators in matters of farm animal welfare 
can provide the basis of a policy response. Inspiration for such a policy can be drawn from the 
UK’s BIT, which was tasked with increasing responsiveness to letters requesting the payment of 
late taxes. Although most people eventually pay, speeding up the process can advance millions 
of pounds to the government. 
Drawing on the work of psychologist Robert Cialdini, the BIT drafted three letters. The control 
was a simple letter explaining how the tax bill could be paid, which elicited payment in 33.6% 
of recipients over the following twenty-three days. This letter obeyed the behavioural economic 
principle that if you want someone to behave in a certain way, you should make it easy (Halpern 
2015: 65; Thaler 2016: 313); the letter had been stripped of unnecessary detail and simplified.121 
The first treatment added the (true) sentence ‘nine out of ten taxpayers pay on time’. This 
treatment was inspired by Cialdini’s recognition of the power of social norms, that people are 
more likely to do or buy something if they are made aware that others are doing or buying the 
same thing (Cialdini 2007: 116). This social norm letter was more successful than the control, 
eliciting payment from 35.1% of recipients.122 The second treatment added the sentence ‘most 
 
121 In this respect the control was not actually a control. Unfortunately, the experimenters did not release any 
data about responsiveness to the original, more technical letters. 
122 Although the difference between the two letters is just 1.5%, considering that the policy was essentially 
costless to implement and brought forwards £9 million of revenue in 23 days, it can be deemed successful 
(Thaler 2016: 337). 
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people in your local area pay their tax on time’, which drew on Cialdini’s insight that the 
influence of social norms is enhanced when the other person or people are similar to us: we 
have greater liking for people who are like us, and are more likely to want to do as they do 
(Cialdini 2007: 140-42). This treatment was even more effective, with 35.9% of recipients of the 
local norms letter paying their tax (Halpern 2015: 112-15). In short, when people are conditional 
co-operators, informing them that other people – especially people like themselves – are norm-
followers may encourage them to behave in a similar way. 
Policymakers can draw from the BIT experiment to design nudges that encourage conditional 
co-operators to purchase higher-welfare goods. The BIT’s experiment indicates what kinds of 
information might be effective. The control in the tax experiment was a letter explaining how 
the tax bill could be settled, i.e. it informed people how they could perform the desired action. 
An effective labelling scheme that helps consumers identify higher-welfare goods would play an 
equivalent role in animal product markets. 
The BIT’s first treatment provided information about other people’s behaviour. In an animal 
welfare context, this may involve providing information about other consumers’ purchases of 
higher-welfare goods, either by informing consumers about the market share of higher-welfare 
products and welfare labelling schemes or, in those cases where market share is low, providing 
information about growth trends in higher-welfare markets. This information could be 
displayed on nudge points, supermarket displays, or even on the products themselves, with 
taglines such as ‘one in two people buy free-range meat or eggs for environmental / animal 
welfare reasons’ (Ethical Consumer 2018).123 Similar information could be put on fish products 
and meat substitutes: ‘one in three people are switching out meat for vegetarian and pescatarian 
alternatives’ (Harmston 2017).124 
Drawing on the tax experiment’s second treatment, which provided information about how 
similar people behaved, information about higher-welfare purchases could be tailored to the 
local area: supermarket displays could display the percentage of egg-buyers in their store who 
buy free-range or organic over caged eggs, for instance. Compared to the other options, 
however, this would likely come at a significantly higher cost to retailers, who would have to 
monitor and analyse the relevant data. Given that the local norms treatment was only 
 
123 Ideally, these taglines would be more precise and simpler in presentation, but due to the nature of existing 
research the ones proposed in this chapter are somewhat mealy-mouthed. 
124 Admittedly, more research needs to be conducted to determine the level of norm-following that will 
encourage conditional co-operators to comply; if rates of norm-adherence are low, consumers could be 
deterred from buying higher-welfare products. Framing effects may also influence consumer responses. 
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marginally more successful than the social norms treatment in the tax letter experiment, it is 
likely to be more cost-effective to use social norms rather than local norms to nudge for farm 
animal welfare. 
There is scope to be sceptical about social norm policies in animal product markets, however. 
First, we may be doubtful that the policy will have much impact: in the BIT experiment, for 
instance, the difference between the rate of tax repayment in the control and local norms 
treatment was just 2.3%. Although we do not know the extent to which the so-called control 
represented an improvement over the pre-experiment letter, which was more technical and thus 
harder to understand, we might expect a social norms policy to have a relatively small effect 
upon consumer behaviour. In terms of animal welfare, however, these small percentages 
represent meaningful improvements to the lives of hundreds of thousands of animals: a 2.3% 
shift towards higher-welfare egg production could improve the lives of over 900,000 laying hens 
in the UK (DEFRA 2019a: 6), and even more in the long run. 
Second, it is not clear that this use of social norms constitutes a viable policy. There are 
numerous steps, several of which could be resource-intensive, that a government would need 
to take to ensure the policy’s success. To ensure the provision of accurate information, 
governments would need to conduct research into consumer behaviour in animal product 
markets. This research would also need to be regularly updated in order to remain relevant. The 
Food Standards Agency currently conducts a yearly Food and You survey that collects data on 
consumer attitudes and concerns relating to food, and so questions about animal welfare 
purchase habits could be included here. Legislation would also be necessary to ensure that 
packagers or retailers display survey results on products or product displays, and oversight and 
enforcement would be required to ensure that legislation is adhered to. It may therefore be 
more appropriate for social norms nudges to be voluntarily enacted by the private sector. In 
particular, social norms policies may be particularly advantageous for producers of higher-
welfare goods and welfare labels: these nudges could be added to their higher-welfare products 
as a means of increasing sales. 
 
8. Summary 
In this chapter, I have argued that, due to the influence of choice environments and choice 
architecture on preferences for farm animal welfare, consumer behaviour in animal product 
markets frequently violates the continuity axiom. I introduced Kahneman’s dual-process theory 
of decision-making, and argued that environmental cues in supermarkets can influence both 
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System 1 and System 2 decision-making. Attention plays a significant role in automatic decision-
making, and so products placed at eye level are more likely to be bought than others. 
Additionally, automatic decision-making typically relies upon heuristics such as price and value 
concerns, which can be triggered by offers to drive impulse purchases that consumers would 
not have made upon reflection. 
The role of environmental cues in System 2 decision-making is more subtle, and is best-
appreciated with an understanding of priming. Exposure to relevant cues triggers bundles of 
associated concepts, beliefs, values and attitudes, which I describe as schemas. Active schemas 
influence consumers’ priorities, which can affect their reflective decision-making. Economic 
schemas are primed by exposure to economic concepts such as money, and can encourage self-
interested behaviours at the expense of other-regarding ones. Supermarkets are filled with 
economic primes, such as commodities, prices and discounts, and so likely activate economic 
schemas. This means that supermarket choice environments could be suppressing ethical 
concern for farm animal welfare in reflective decision-making. 
Behavioural nudges can encourage consumer purchases of higher-welfare goods in two ways: 
first, they can influence automatic behaviours by directing consumer attention and shopping 
heuristics towards higher-welfare goods; second, they can introduce prosocial values into 
reflective decision-making. This second objective is achieved through information provision, 
although care must be taken about what information is provided. The emotional nature of 
consumer engagement with animal welfare suggests that a focus on the positive aspects of 
higher-welfare animal agriculture – which could also be linked to a welfare labelling programme 
– could achieve this aim. Additionally, appeals to social norms may prime other-regarding 
citizen schemas that encourage prosocial behaviours, while information about the extent of 
these norms can also influence reflective decision-making. 
This chapter, along with the previous three, has demonstrated how market failures suppress the 
expression of concern for farm animal welfare. We have also seen how a range of policies can 
address these issues. What remains to be seen is how these responses can be drawn together to 
construct a coherent policy framework for farm animal welfare.
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: Building an Economic Farm Animal Welfare Policy 
Framework 
 
In this Chapter 
• An outline of John McInerney’s (2004) three-tier policy framework. 
• Three criticisms of this framework. 
• A proposal to move away from a preference satisfaction approach to economic farm animal 
welfare policy and towards a values-based approach. 
• A proposal for a three-tier policy framework based on public values. 
 
1. Introduction 
I began this thesis by outlining two key concepts in welfare economics, utility understood as 
preference satisfaction and efficiency. I showed that these concepts come together to justify 
improvements in farm animal welfare only where there is sufficient consumer demand, and I 
argued that, in the UK, there appears to be substantial willingness to pay for farm animal 
welfare. An effective market would be able to satisfy consumer preferences for farm animal 
welfare, but I contended that markets in animal products are instead characterised by market 
failures. 
I proceeded to discuss the four forms of market failure that have significant bearing on the 
provision of farm animal welfare. Animal agriculture produces numerous externalities, 
including the satisfaction and dissatisfaction felt by people as a consequence of facts about farm 
animal welfare in society. Farm animal welfare also shares much in common with public goods, 
as people can enjoy its benefits without contributing to its provision. In addition, farm animal 
welfare is a credence attribute, meaning that markets are vulnerable to the effects of information 
asymmetries. I also proposed that consumer behaviour can be influenced by environmental 
cues, which, given that farm animal welfare is typically engaged with in economic environments, 
may hinder the expression of altruistic preferences for animal welfare. 
I also considered how policy could be used to ameliorate the impact of market failures. Each 
type of market failure warrants different policy responses. While, for instance, public goods may 
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require direct government provision, information asymmetries are best dealt with by 
introducing effective product labelling. 
In this chapter, I draw upon the work of the preceding seven to develop a framework for 
economic farm animal welfare policy. I propose that policy should be determined by facts about 
animal welfare in society and how they relate to public values. I begin with a discussion of John 
McInerney’s (2004) three-tier policy framework. Although McInerney’s framework is helpful, 
we will see that there are three reasons why, in light of this thesis’ analysis, his interpretation is 
ill-suited to my ends: first, McInerney relies upon an interpretation of social utility that is 
untenable; second, the instability of many people’s preferences for farm animal welfare limits 
the usefulness of efficiency as a policy goal; third, preference instability raises problems for 
preference satisfaction theories of welfare. In response to these criticisms, I propose that public 
values, rather than preference satisfaction, provide a more plausible basis for economic farm 
animal welfare policy, and argue that the aim of economic farm animal welfare policy should be 
to afford appropriate representation to different ways of valuing animal welfare. Accordingly, I 
develop my own three-tier framework that places public values at the heart of economic farm 
animal welfare policy. 
 
2. The Need for a Policy Framework 
Some writers (see Norwood and Lusk 2011: 310-11 and Sumner et al. 2011: 249 for example) do not 
explicitly recognise that policymakers’ responsibilities towards farm animal welfare may change 
according to its current level of provision. This is an inadequate stance to take, however, and its 
flaws are best exposed by considering the provision of public goods. The provision of public 
goods is often regarded as a government responsibility, but it would be absurd to suggest that 
governments are obliged to provide public goods ad infinitum. Instead, they should do so insofar 
as the felt benefits outweigh the costs of provision (McInerney 2004: 45). 
In relation to farm animal welfare, this means that – from an economic policy standpoint – it is 
inappropriate to treat animal welfare equally at all levels of provision. There will exist some level 
of supply at which the overwhelming majority of the public will be largely satisfied with the 
provision of farm animal welfare and public demand for further welfare improvements will be 
muted. It might therefore be inappropriate for governments to directly supply extremely high 
levels of animal welfare, as to do so would impose costs upon the public but provide few benefits. 
Consequently, policy ought to be influenced by both facts about animal welfare in society and 
public attitudes towards farm animal welfare. As farm animal welfare improves in a society, 
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public preferences for welfare are likely to be satisfied and, from a policy perspective, there is a 
less urgent need to make further welfare improvements. 
For this reason, it may also be useful for policymakers to change the economic classification of 
farm animal welfare according to facts about its provision in society. This claim lies at the heart 
of McInerney’s (2004) three-tier policy classification. At the lowest levels of provision, 
McInerney argues, we should treat farm animal welfare as a public good. The lowest levels of 
animal welfare are characterised by neglect and uncaring management and will be universally 
regarded as unacceptable to society – as stated in Chapter 5, these husbandry methods, defined 
in terms of their almost universal public opposition, can be described as cruel practices.125 
Although McInerney does not make this claim, it is implicit in his thought that, because cruel 
practice is almost universally regarded as unacceptable, people will be willing to pay to prohibit 
it. For this reason, policymakers possess a mandate for direct action: as, by definition, almost 
everyone prefers there to be no animal cruelty in society, and people are willing to pay to 
prohibit cruel practice, the costs of government action to directly protect farm animals from 
cruel practice will be outweighed by the benefits. 
Although we have seen that farm animal welfare is not best understood as a public good in a 
technical sense, from a policy perspective it may be appropriate to treat it as one at this level of 
provision. Policymakers are justified to take direct action against animal cruelty as doing so 
satisfies nearly everyone’s preference to live in a society free of animal cruelty and markets may 
not be an effective way of satisfying these preferences. The direct provision of a good is a 
hallmark of public good policy, and so the use of public good policies is appropriate here too 
(McInerney 2004: 44; Fearing and Matheny 2007: 164).  
It would be inappropriate, however, to treat farm animal welfare as a public good in contexts 
where animal cruelty does not exist. Because cruelty is defined in terms of almost universal 
public opposition to a practice or set of practices, the provision of farm animal welfare just above 
this level will not be met with the same degree of public opposition: there will be significant 
groups of people whose preferences for farm animal welfare will be satisfied at the point where 
cruelty is eradicated. While policymakers possess a mandate for direct intervention against 
animal cruelty, their mandate for intervention above this level is weaker: the costs of direct 
interventions will be borne by everyone in society but significant groups of people will not 
derive any benefit. 
 
125 It is a policymaker’s responsibility to create a social definition of cruel practice by drawing together the 
range of public opinion. 
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Nevertheless, policymakers might think that the further provision of farm animal welfare 
beyond levels of cruel practice is desirable. This could be because of beliefs held by opinion 
formers or a growing public interest in farm animal welfare, or the belief that a majority of 
people have preferences for farm animal welfare that have not yet been satisfied. For these 
reasons, the further provision of farm animal welfare could be viewed as being of overall benefit 
to society, despite the apathy felt by significant groups of people. 
At these levels, policymakers may therefore view farm animal welfare as a merit good, a good 
that is beneficial to society beyond its aggregate demand (McInerney 2004: 44; Fearing and 
Matheny 2007: 164; Musgrave 1959: 13). Because the provision of merit goods is to society’s 
benefit even if some people do not hold preferences for them, and because policymakers lack a 
mandate for directly providing farm animal welfare at merit good levels, the aim of policy here 
is to encourage people to support higher farm animal welfare and deter them from producing 
and consuming lower-welfare products. These policy aims have much in common with 
externality policy aims, and for good reason: as with merit goods, goods that bear positive 
externalities provide benefits to society beyond their aggregate demand.  
At the highest levels of farm animal welfare, McInerney contends, we will find that most 
preferences for farm animal welfare will be satisfied and further government intervention, either 
through public good or externality policies, will come at an overall cost to society. Public good 
and externality policies are costly, and, when most people’s preferences for farm animal welfare 
have been satisfied, the benefits of further intervention are limited. Nevertheless, some people 
will still prefer higher levels of farm animal welfare. McInerney states that there is no role for 
policymakers here, as farm animal welfare should be treated as a private good: if people continue 
to prefer higher levels of farm animal welfare, they should act on these preferences in the market 
(McInerney 2004: 46; Vetter et al. 2014: 120).  
In short, McInerney’s policy framework proposes that policymakers’ responsibilities towards 
farm animal welfare are influenced by both facts about animal welfare in society and consumer 
preferences for animal welfare. Where practice is deemed to be cruel, public opposition – and 
willingness to pay to eradicate the practice – will be almost universal, and policymakers can use 
public good policies to protect farm animal welfare. Just above the level of cruel practice, 
significant numbers of people will be satisfied with the provision of farm animal welfare, but 
further provision may nonetheless be of overall benefit to society. Policymakers lack a mandate 
to directly protect farm animal welfare at this level but can use externality policies to encourage 
markets to supply higher levels of farm animal welfare. At the highest levels of provision, 
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however, further market intervention by policymakers comes at an overall cost to society, and 
further contributions to farm animal welfare should be left to consumers. 
The analysis I have conducted in this thesis reveals three flaws in the foundations of McInerney’s 
framework, however. First, his justification of merit good interventions relies upon an account 
of social utility which, in Chapter 1 (p.37), I argued is untenable. Second, the instability of many 
people’s preferences for farm animal welfare, as discussed in the previous chapter, creates 
problems for policymakers hoping to ground economic farm animal welfare policy in theories 
of efficiency. Third, McInerney incorporates preference satisfaction at the heart of his 
framework, which, in light of the analysis conducted in the previous chapter, I propose provides 
a theory of welfare that is ill-suited to conducting economic farm animal welfare policy. 
Fortunately, by moving to a values-based policy framework, all three concerns can be overcome. 
 
3. Cracks in the Foundations 
a. Social Utility 
McInerney claims (2004: 47) that interventions at a merit good level, where significant groups 
of people are uninterested in the further provision of farm animal welfare, can be justified as 
being in the public interest. Because some people are uninterested in the further provision of 
welfare and some merit good policies are costly, it is likely that merit good policies will make 
some people better-off and others worse-off. By stating that these policies are in the public 
interest, McInerney implicitly invokes a conception of social utility that permits interpersonal 
utility comparisons: he is claiming that the costs incurred by those who are uninterested in the 
further provision of farm animal welfare are outweighed by the benefits received by others. 
Part of why McInerney’s framework produces this outcome is because it relies upon the concept 
of merit goods, those goods whose further provision is deemed advantageous to society beyond 
the public’s demand for them.126 The concept of merit goods was first proposed by R.A. 
Musgrave in his 1959 The Theory of Public Finance, where he provided two reasons why 
governments might intervene in markets producing merit goods. First, merit goods produce 
positive externalities, meaning their social benefits are greater than their private benefits. 
Consequently, Musgrave argued that intervention in merit good markets could be advantageous 
to social utility (Musgrave 1959: 13; Pulsipher 1971: 267). 
 
126 The counterpart to the merit good is the demerit good, one whose further provision is viewed as 
detrimental to society, irrespective of preferences for it. If good animal welfare is viewed as a merit good, then 
poor animal welfare would be the corresponding demerit good. 
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This justification for merit good interventions, however, is not compatible with the arguments 
presented in this thesis. In Chapter 1, I outlined the theory of preference utilitarianism and 
showed how it underpins the concept of efficiency. In short, people can place a subjective 
monetary value on utility gains and losses, and, if policy losers are compensated to the extent 
that nobody is made worse-off by a reallocation of resources and somebody is made better-off, 
we can identify an improvement in efficiency and social utility. Due to different marginal 
utilities of wealth, compensation must be paid, otherwise we cannot be certain of the overall 
effects of a reallocation upon efficiency. 
By the concept’s definition, there are significant groups of people who are uninterested in the 
further provision of merit goods. These people will be policy losers when policymakers 
encourage markets to provide more farm animal welfare: they bear the costs of these 
interventions but experience no benefit.127 When compensation is not paid, the effects of merit 
good policies upon efficiency and social utility remain uncertain. It is also surely unfeasible to 
pay compensation to policy losers in these cases, due to the range of informational difficulties 
outlined in Chapter 4 (p.81): it is difficult to identify policy winners and losers, establish reliable 
figures for WTP and WTA and extract payment from policy winners. Given the interpretation 
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency adopted in this thesis, an appeal to social utility cannot justify merit 
good interventions in animal product markets. 
Musgrave provides a second argument for justifying merit good interventions, one which moves 
away from social utility and instead focuses upon the individual’s utility. He states (1959: 14) 
that preferences can be based upon incomplete information, or unfairly swayed by advertisers 
and generally distorted by modern society. Consequently, people may not recognise the full 
value of a good until after they have consumed it. Government intervention to encourage the 
supply of merit goods might therefore be justified from the perspective of individual utility: it 
is in each person’s interest to be encouraged to consume merit goods and avoid demerit goods. 
For this argument to provide a basis for merit good interventions in animal product markets, it 
could be argued that, if people were more aware of the lives lived by farm animals in low-welfare 
production, their preferences would change to be more supportive of higher-welfare production 
and less supportive of low-welfare production. Consequently, it could be claimed that any policy 
that sought to achieve the level of supply demanded by these informed preferences would be in 
 
127 There are rare exceptions: a tax on the demerit good of animal harm, levied on lower-welfare animal 
products, will impose costs only upon market participants. An animal abolitionist such as Gary Francione, for 
instance, would not participate in such markets, and may not be interested in the provision of farm animal 
welfare due to his opposition to all animal ownership. 
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an individual’s interests. The level of paternalism in this argument, however, as well as the 
assumption that consumers of low-welfare goods must be uninformed, surely renders this claim 
problematic. 
With a minor adjustment, Stefan Mann (2005b: 138) removes the paternalistic element of this 
argument while preserving its core assertion. He proposes that people have different types of 
preferences that are operative in different environments. Mann suggests that people have 
market preferences, which can be discerned by observing consumer behaviour, and reflective 
preferences, which reflect their moral attitudes, in keeping with the consumer and citizen 
schemas discussed in the previous chapter (p.169). These preferences can conflict, and, as we 
saw in Chapter 1’s discussion of the meat paradox (p.30), markets in animal products facilitate 
such a clash. Mann suggests that some people will be able to improve their utility by voting for 
governments that promise welfare-motivated merit good interventions in animal product 
markets. Such an argument loses its paternalistic overtones, but is applicable only to those 
people who hold reflective preferences for farm animal welfare above the level of cruelty. It 
remains possible that there are significant groups of people whose reflective and market 
preferences are aligned and are simply not interested in farm animal welfare beyond the point 
of cruelty, who will therefore still be left worse-off by merit good interventions. Consequently, 
preference-based justifications for merit good interventions appear largely incompatible with 
the account of social utility held in this thesis. 
 
b. Efficiency 
A second problem emerges when we recognise that preferences for farm animal welfare are 
often context-sensitive: this undermines the notion that markets are efficient institutions that 
enable consumers to satisfy their preferences for farm animal welfare. In the previous chapter 
(p.171), I argued that economic choice environments such as supermarkets are likely to prime 
people to view farm animal welfare through a consumer schema, which encourages self-
interested behaviours at the expense of other-regarding ones. In other types of choice 
environment, citizen schemas may be activated, encouraging other-regarding behaviours at the 
expense of self-interested ones. 
When preferences are context-sensitive, we may struggle to make reliable claims about 
efficiency. This is because a status quo reference point against which we assess potential states 
of the world lies at the heart of the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks theories, but we are denied this by 
the context-sensitive nature of many people’s preferences for farm animal welfare: the status 
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quo changes according to the environment in which people are asked to value farm animal 
welfare. This gives us good reason to reject Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as policy goals in 
this area. It is surely meaningless to talk of aiming for a state of the world in which someone is 
made better-off and nobody is made worse-off when preferences are built on unstable sands – 
each person’s interpretation of whether a policy has made them better or worse off is influenced 
by the environment in which they make their assessment. 
Similarly, the usefulness of willingness-to-pay studies is reduced in cases where answers are 
influenced by decision-making environments: their findings will have less relevance in other 
types of decision-making environments. Basing policy upon such studies could therefore be 
inappropriate: willingness to pay in a survey context may not be reflective of willingness to pay 
in a purchase environment, and we do not have good reason to afford greater significance to 
either citizen or consumer responses.128 
 
c. Welfare 
The third reason that McInerney’s framework is ill-suited to this thesis’ project is that it is at 
least partially grounded in preference satisfaction theories of welfare. This is explicit in 
McInerney’s discussion of farm animal welfare as a private good, where he argues that welfare 
standards will not figure in the ‘preference functions of the majority’ (McInerney 2004: 46).129 
The argument that many people’s preferences for farm animal welfare are context-sensitive 
renders preference satisfaction an unsuitable theory of welfare upon which to ground economic 
farm animal welfare policy. 
One of the arguments presented in favour of preference satisfaction theories of welfare is that 
they afford respect to the individual and what matters to them (Nussbaum 2001: 70). Because 
preferences for farm animal welfare can be unstable and their expression influenced by choice 
environments, however, it is unlikely that the preferences expressed for farm animal welfare in 
a supermarket environment will fully capture everything that matters to consumers. Instead, 
the economic choice environments that dominate interactions with farm animal welfare subtly 
prime self-interested preferences. This is likely to lead to the ‘crowding out’ of ethical concern 
 
128 As noted in Chapter 2 (p.59), however, the use of a ‘cheap talk script’, intended to remind respondents of 
the discrepancies often found between stated and revealed preference studies, can be sufficient to eliminate 
or at least greatly reduce these discrepancies. The script may be enough to spur System 2 processes into action 
and encourage participants to afford greater scrutiny to their answers. 
129 McInerney is more ambiguous in his discussion of public and merit goods, arguing that intervention at these 
levels is justified due to feelings of discomfort created by animal welfare (McInerney 2004: 46-47). 
8 | Conclusion 
191 
 
for farm animal welfare in quotidian interactions with animal products (Sandel 2013: 9), with 
implications for consumers’ welfare: what satisfies consumers’ preferences in the supermarket 
may leave them feeling worse-off elsewhere. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that there exists both substantial concern for farm animal welfare and 
willingness to pay to improve welfare. In the previous chapter (p.172), we saw that, in a survey 
environment, there is substantial altruistic concern for farm animal welfare. Consequently, we 
may be concerned that markets encourage the expression of self-interested preferences at the 
expense of altruistic preferences. Because markets in animal products are liable to thwart the 
expression of altruistic concern for farm animal welfare, interventions seeking to improve 
animal welfare may be welfare-increasing for both consumers and farm animals. Despite 
markets satisfying consumer preferences, interventions may nevertheless be welfare-increasing. 
 
4. Creating a Values-Based Policy Framework 
Because of these concerns about preference satisfaction theories of utility and welfare, it is 
desirable to develop a policy framework that moves away from preference satisfaction as a policy 
goal. If preferences do not offer a firm foundation for conducting economic farm animal welfare 
policy, we need to reconsider what policy should be grounded upon. 
Despite their flaws leaving them ill-suited to this thesis’ project, preference satisfaction theories 
of utility and welfare are valuable, as they put what matters to people at the heart of policy 
analysis (Norwood and Lusk 2011: 198). We can maintain this commitment to human-centred 
policy by focusing instead on people’s values. This may not appear obvious at first: as with 
preferences, the expression of values is also influenced by choice environments. The difference, 
however, is that choice environments seem to affect the weighting of values, rather than their 
nature. It is plausible to believe that the values themselves are not reversed as can be the case 
with preferences, but are instead afforded greater or lesser significance in decision-making. 
Policymakers may therefore find that values provide an appropriate basis for economic farm 
animal welfare policy. If so, policy ought to ensure that different ways of valuing farm animal 
welfare are afforded appropriate representation in society. When market norms are the 
dominant form of interaction with farm animal welfare, and ethical concern is suppressed, we 
can argue that ethical values are under-represented in society. In these cases, the role of policy 
is to afford greater representation to ethical ways of valuing farm animal welfare.  
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Significantly, this argument does not assume any normative position regarding the moral status 
of farm animals and does not attribute special significance to ethical values. Even if we believe 
that human interests take priority over all else and ethical values possess no special significance 
relative to other types of value, we can still be concerned that the preponderance of market 
interactions with farm animal welfare has crowded out the expression of ethical preferences; a 
consequence of this crowding out may be that human-farm animal interactions are not 
reflective of the range of ways that farm animal welfare matters to people. While a traditional 
preference satisfaction analysis struggles to acknowledge that this is problematic, a values-based 
approach to economic farm animal welfare policy recognises that market valuations of farm 
animal welfare are unlikely to fully-capture public concern for farm animals. This values-based 
approach might therefore be of benefit to society in the sense that it advocates outcomes that 
reflect what matters to the public in both market and non-market contexts.   
That said, there may be concerns about how we should, or even can, measure public values. 
First, different people value farm animal welfare in different ways and to different extents. In 
some respects, this presents a challenge to policymakers seeking to determine what the public’s 
values are, although, as I argue below, there are likely to be cases where there is a general 
consensus that the provision of farm animal welfare is either unacceptable or sufficient. As with 
preference satisfaction theories, the challenge is to identify appropriate policy goals in situations 
where there is no consensus, although I argue below that a values-based framework may be 
better suited to this task than a preference satisfaction framework. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, it is not clear how policymakers can determine what 
an individual’s values, let alone those of the public, are. Observing behaviour in an economic 
choice environment might provide an indication of a person’s consumer valuation of farm 
animal welfare, while surveys might provide an indication of their citizen valuation of farm 
animal welfare, but more work is needed to reconcile these two conflicting modes of thinking. 
Should policymakers weigh the citizen valuation more heavily than the consumer valuation or 
vice versa, or should they balance the two equally and seek a middle ground? There is no obvious 
answer, and it is not clear that a democratic deliberative process, whereby the public gets to 
decide the relative weights afforded to economic and non-economic concerns, would yield a 
satisfactory result: such a process is likely to afford undue significance to non-economic 
concerns. 
Nevertheless, a values-based framework still allows us to make some broad claims, and thus is 
still of use. We can recognise that the primarily economic nature of interactions with farm 
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animal welfare can deny people the opportunity to fully-express their concern for animal 
welfare. It is therefore likely that other-regarding concerns are being underrepresented in both 
regular interactions with farm animal welfare and its overall provision in society. Although 
further work is needed to determine how far non-economic valuations should be integrated into 
economic farm animal welfare policy, it appears that the prevailing preference satisfaction 
model does not afford due significance to non-economic values, which might justify at least 
some tentative steps towards some of the policies advocated in this thesis. 
With this in mind, it is appropriate to revisit the three-tier framework with the intention of 
producing a policy structure that does justice to the multiplicity of ways that people value farm 
animal welfare. 
 
a. Public Goods 
As McInerney recognises, the lowest levels of farm animal welfare – which are characterised by 
cruelty – are deemed unacceptable by almost everyone in society. While McInerney frames this 
in terms of the discomfort felt by people after becoming aware of animal cruelty in society, a 
values-based framework ventures deeper, and suggests that one of the causes of this discomfort 
is that animal cruelty is incompatible with how animal welfare is valued in a society. Although 
different people value animal welfare in different ways and to different extents, almost all agree 
that certain practices and production methods, defined as cruel practice, are unacceptable and 
thus incompatible with their values. 
From a policy perspective, nothing changes: because almost everyone in society is united in 
opposition to cruel practice and is willing to pay to eradicate it, and because markets are 
ineffective institutions for reflecting concern for farm animal welfare, policymakers have a 
mandate for direct intervention. Although farm animal welfare is not a public good in the 
technical sense, the aims of policy at this level – provision and protection – are shared with 
public good policies. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, policymakers may seek to achieve public good objectives through the 
use of legislation and taxes. Several factors must be considered when drafting effective animal 
welfare legislation. Ideally, welfare requirements will be applicable to both domestic and 
imported products. Failure to achieve this risks undermining the domestic industry’s 
competitiveness against cheaper, lower-welfare imports, and could effectively export cruel 
practices abroad. Alternatively, an effective labelling scheme could mitigate the impact of 
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imports by making it clear to consumers that domestic goods have been produced to higher 
standards of welfare.130 Additionally, the costs of making welfare improvements could be 
mitigated through public good taxes. 
There is also scope for animal welfare legislation to be supplemented with externality policies. 
In line with giving farm animals ownership of their own welfare, legislation could make a life 
worth living the minimum standard of acceptable welfare, thus putting animal interests at the 
heart of animal agriculture. Cap and trade could be used to phase out low-welfare practices in 
the run-up to a full ban, to ensure greater adherence to the law upon its introduction.  
 
b. Merit Goods 
A values-based framework differs significantly from McInerney at the merit good level. As 
discussed earlier, McInerney frames the justification for merit good interventions in terms of 
social utility by stating that merit good interventions are in the public interest. We can avoid 
McInerney’s problematic reading of social utility by justifying merit good interventions with an 
appeal to public values. 
A values-based framework shifts the focus away from satisfying preferences and towards the 
appropriate representation of different ways of valuing farm animal welfare in society. There are 
several reasons to contend that other-regarding values relating to farm animal welfare are 
underrepresented in society, all of which stem from the fact that the majority of interactions 
with farm animal welfare are facilitated by markets for animal products. Those who abstain from 
these markets, such as vegetarians and vegans, have limited opportunities to express other-
regarding values for farm animal welfare (McVittie et al. 2006: 6; Lusk 2011: 564). Those who 
care about animal welfare but cannot afford higher-welfare goods, which are typically more 
expensive, may also have limited opportunities to express their values (Fearing and Matheny 
2007: 165). Additionally, people who do participate in the market and have strong other-
regarding values relating to farm animal welfare are limited in the extent to which they can 
express these values by the quantity of animal products they can consume. Last, as proposed in 
Chapter 7 (p.171), markets discourage the expression of other-regarding values at the expense of 
self-interested ones. 
 
130 Requiring imports to display such a label may violate WTO rules, but it may be enough to require only 
domestic products to display this label. By focusing on positive elements of animal welfare, such a label may 
also successfully tap into consumers’ emotional engagement with farm animal welfare. 
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Intervention is therefore warranted because the market is failing in its aims. The market is feted 
as a tool that enables people to get what they want, but often fails to do so in the case of farm 
animal welfare. The market instead denies some people the opportunity to express concern for 
farm animal welfare and distorts the preferences of others. Intervention is thus justified at the 
merit good level because farm animal welfare is important to broad swathes of society for a 
range of reasons and markets currently fail to respond appropriately to this: in particular, other-
regarding values are underrepresented. Consequently, merit good interventions in animal 
product markets should increase the representation of other-regarding values. 
It must be recognised that some merit good policies have the potential to leave some people 
worse-off. A person who is indifferent to farm animal welfare improvements at the merit good 
level will be made worse off if taxes on low-welfare goods make his weekly shop more expensive. 
This is not as serious an issue for a values-based framework as it is for a preference-based 
framework, however: in a values-based framework, it is more acceptable for policy to make some 
people worse-off in pursuit of an appropriate representation of society’s values, while, in a 
preference-based framework, the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons makes it hard to 
justify making some people worse off and others better-off in the name of greater efficiency. 
That said, other public values, namely those connected to justice and food justice, must also be 
taken seriously at this level. Policies that leave people deprived of food or unable to participate 
in their food culture are unlikely to be compatible with public values, and so policymakers must 
be careful to recognise and balance considerations relating to a range of public values. 
This end can be achieved with complementary policies. Externality taxes on low-welfare goods 
can be combined with subsidies for higher-welfare goods to limit how these policies impact 
those on lower incomes. System 1 nudges, those which channel automatic behaviours towards 
higher-welfare purchases and away from low-welfare ones, might also be useful: a subsidy on 
higher-welfare goods could be advertised as a discount, which might appeal to consumers 
operating on price or value heuristics. Alternatively, System 1 nudges that placed higher-welfare 
goods in more prominent locations in supermarkets could guide consumer attention to these 
products. This would likely increase sales of higher-welfare goods but would not impose a 
financial burden upon consumers as prices and the availability of goods would remain 
unchanged. 
Similarly, a market for animal well-being units, which allows producers to sell credits received 
for implementing welfare improvements, could subsidise higher-welfare production without 
imposing costs upon society. Such a policy, however, cannot hope to internalise all 
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psychological externalities in this area: animal abolitionists will be unwilling to support policies 
that implicitly condone the continued ownership of farm animals and their use as mere means 
to human ends. This highlights the importance of tax relief for charitable donations: this policy 
allows people who care about farm animals but are unwilling to support institutions that 
condone animal agriculture to express their values. 
Of perhaps greater concern are the informational issues that prevent policymakers from 
identifying a socially-optimal level of farm animal welfare. Just as this issue plagued a 
preference-based policy framework, so it hinders the effectiveness of a values-based one. 
Nevertheless, policymakers can still use externality policies to seek a greater balance between 
self-interested and altruistic values, without being certain that a perfect balance has been 
achieved. 
 
c. Private Goods 
Finally, I depart from McInerney at the private good level of provision. McInerney states (2004: 
48) that animal welfare at the private good level is ‘not of relevance for public policy’, but I 
propose that policy has an important role to play here. 
My values-based framework supports the assertion that the highest levels of farm animal welfare 
either accord with or go beyond what is required by most people’s values. Direct provision 
through public good policies or market interventions through merit good policies are costly and 
therefore inappropriate. Further intervention may in fact deny appropriate representation to 
the public’s self-interested values, and so is inappropriate. Instead, those whose values are 
incompatible with the prevailing level of provision should be empowered to express their values 
through the market. 
Despite McInerney’s contention that there is no role for public policy at private good levels of 
provision, I disagree: policymakers should enable and empower consumers to reliably express 
concern for farm animal welfare. Two policies support this goal: labelling schemes allow 
consumers to reliably differentiate between higher- and lower-welfare goods; System 2 nudges, 
which influence the building blocks of reflective analysis, can encourage consumers to afford 
greater weight to their other-regarding values at points of purchase. The two policies can work 
in conjunction: appropriate in-store information provision could nudge consumers to seek out 
animal welfare labels. 
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5. Conclusion 
To conclude, when developing economic farm animal welfare policy, policymakers should 
consider both public values and facts about the provision of animal welfare in society. When 
almost everyone is opposed to prevailing welfare conditions, there is scope for direct 
intervention to provide and protect farm animal welfare, either through legislative prohibitions 
or publicly funded improvements. Where significant groups are uninterested in the further 
provision of animal welfare, policy may be used to encourage markets to supply higher levels of 
welfare in recognition of the facts that (1) animal product markets provide the primary mode of 
interaction with farm animal welfare and (2) many people cannot or do not fully express their 
values relating to farm animal welfare in these markets. Policies such as externality taxes and 
subsidies, market creation and behavioural nudges enable stakeholders to have their voices 
heard and their values represented in society. Last, when public values are largely compatible 
with a society’s prevailing levels of farm animal welfare, policy should enable and empower 
dissatisfied consumers to express their concern in the market through effective welfare labelling 
and nudges that encourage consumers to consider their other-regarding values in economic 
choice environments.
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Appendix I – A Comparison of Prices of Free Range and Caged or Barn Eggs
 
 
Mean % difference in price between free range and cage / barn eggs (2 d.p.): 62.29  
(Sources accessed 05/12/16) 
Iceland 12 Large Free 
Range Eggs 
15 Pack Medium Free 
Range Eggs (Aldi) 
ASDA 15 Mixed Weight 
Free Range Eggs 
Morrisons Free Range 
Eggs Mixed Weight 15 
per pack 
Sainsbury's Free Ranged 
Mixed Weight Eggs x15 
Tesco Mixed Sized Free 
Range Eggs 15 Pack 
Free Range Product 
150 
189 
200 
200 
200 
200 
Cost 
(pence) 
12.5 
12.6 
13.3 
13.3 
13.3 
13.3 
Cost per egg 
(pence) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iceland Class 'A' 15 Mixed 
Sized Fresh Eggs 
15 British Eggs (Aldi) 
ASDA Smartprice 15 Eggs 
M savers Eggs 18 per pack 
(Morrisons) 
Sainsbury's Barn Eggs, 
Basics x15 
Tesco Mixed Sized 
Everyday Value Eggs 15 
Pack 
Caged / Barn Product 
125 
119 
119 
143 
125 
125 
Cost 
(pence) 
8.3 
7.9 
7.9 
7.9 
8.3 
8.3 
Cost per egg 
(pence) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66.67 
62.96 
59.50 
59.58 
62.50 
62.50 
% Difference 
(2 d.p.) 
 
Appendix II 
201 
 
Appendix II – A Graphical Explanation of Externalities 
 
a. Negative Externalities 
This graph shows the supply (S) and demand (D) for Y, a good whose production creates a 
negative externality. The market equilibrium for Y is represented by quantity Q0 and price P0. 
However, because Y imposes a negative externality upon society, there are costs associated with 
it that are not factored into its market price. This means that the social costs of X are greater 
than its market price at equilibrium. The social cost of the good is represented by the marginal 
social cost curve (MSC), which is the sum of the market price and the value of the externality. 
The value of the externality can therefore be found by subtracting P0 (the private cost of the 
good, represented by its market price) from SC0 (the social cost); in the graph this is represented 
by the distance between A and B. When considering the full social costs, it is clear that market 
forces will cause Y to be oversupplied; because the externality does not have to be factored into 
(Adapted from Parkin 2000: 438) 
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the cost of production, firms have an incentive to use more of it than they would if it were a 
costly input. The socially-optimal quantity and price of Y can be found instead at Q1 and P1, 
where the MSC curve intersects the demand curve. At this socially-optimal level, the graph 
shows that the cost of the resources used in production is C1, and the cost of the externality can 
be calculated by subtracting C1 from P1. 
  
Appendix II 
203 
 
b. Positive Externalities 
This graph illustrates the supply (S) and demand (D) of X, a good that produces a positive 
externality. The market equilibrium prices and quantities are found where the supply curve 
intersects the demand curve, in this case at (P0, Q0). However, the externality effects are not 
factored into the market price and quantity supplied. The full benefit can be measured using 
the marginal social benefit (MSB) curve, with the value of the externality at the market 
equilibrium level of supply calculated by subtracting P0 (the private benefit, represented by the 
market price) from SB0 (the social benefit), which is represented in the graph as the distance 
between A and B. 
It can thus be seen that markets tend to undersupply goods that bear positive externalities; at 
the market equilibrium price of P0 the market provision of X is lower than the socially-optimal 
level. This socially-optimal level of X is found where the MSB curve intersects the supply curve, 
in this instance at price SB1 and quantity Q1, and the value of the externality is calculated by 
(Adapted from Begg et al. 2000: 268) 
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subtracting the private benefits of X, represented by the price paid by consumers (P1), from the 
total value of X’s benefits (SB1). 
In short, welfare is maximised in externality scenarios when all the costs and benefits provided 
by a good are considered, rather than just private ones. This requires the use of marginal social 
costs and benefit curves instead of the supply and demand curves, which capture only the 
private costs and benefits. Individual decisionmakers, however, are likely to only consider their 
private costs and benefits, leading to the undersupply of goods that carry positive externalities 
and the oversupply of goods that bear negative externalities.
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Appendix III – Externality Taxes and Subsidies 
 
a. Externality Taxes 
The market equilibrium for good X is found at the intersection between the supply (S) and 
demand (D) curves, at Q0, P0. The marginal social cost (MSC) curve lies above the supply curve, 
however, indicating that some of X’s costs are not factored into its market price, i.e. there are 
negative externalities. At the market equilibrium level of supply, the marginal social cost is SC0, 
while the buyer only pays P0. The socially-optimal supply of X is found where the demand curve 
intersects the MSC curve at Q1; left to its own devices, the market will therefore oversupply X. 
To rectify this, a purchase tax can be introduced to shift the equilibrium to the socially-optimal 
level.131 Calculating the optimal level of taxation, which is equivalent to the value of the 
externality, requires us to subtract C1 – the marginal private cost of X at the socially-optimal 
equilibrium – from P1 – the marginal social cost of X at the socially-optimal equilibrium. This 
 
131 A production tax could be levied instead; this would shift the supply curve left, so it lies on the MSC curve.  
Taxing Negative Externalities                                                                                                               
(Adapted from Parkin 2000: 438) 
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tax causes a leftward shift in the demand curve, from D to D1. A price increase would typically 
encourage sellers to supply more of a good. Because, however, this price increase is the result of 
a tax, sellers are not incentivised to increase supply as the amount they receive from each sale 
is unaffected by the change. Consequently, the supply curve remains unchanged, and the new 
market equilibrium is found where D1 intersects S, which corresponds with the intersection 
between D and MSC at Q1 (Schotter 1997: 564; Snyder and Nicholson 2012: 626; Nechyba 2017: 
747). 
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b. Externality Subsidies 
The market equilibrium for good Y occurs where the supply (S) and demand (D) curves intersect 
at (Q0, P0). Y produces benefits which are not factored into its price: we know this because Y’s 
marginal social benefit (MSB) curve, which captures the its full social benefits, lies above the 
demand curve, which represents Y’s private benefits. While firms receive the market 
equilibrium price of P0, the full value of Y’s benefits is greater, represented by SB0. The socially-
optimal level of provision is found at Q1, where the MSB curve intersects the S curve, but, 
because sellers cannot capture payment for all of Y’s benefits, they supply a lower amount. 
A subsidy, given to either sellers or buyers, can resolve this undersupply. This graph illustrates 
a seller subsidy; a buyer subsidy would simply shift the demand curve right to the MSB curve. 
The optimal level of subsidy is equal to the marginal value of the externality at the socially-
optimal level of production, which is represented by the distance between A (the marginal value 
of Y at the socially-optimal level 0f supply) and B (the marginal value of Y’s private benefits at 
the socially-optimal level of supply). In essence, the subsidy broaches the gap between Y’s 
private benefits and its social benefits at the optimal level of supply. A seller subsidy lowers 
Subsidising Positive Externalities 
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production costs, which encourages sellers to increase supply. The subsidy’s benefits are also 
enjoyed by buyers, as lower production costs translate into a lower price (P1), which increases 
demand for Y to Q1 (Nechyba 2017: 753). 
Appendix IV 
209 
 
 
Appendix IV – Nudges in the People’s Supermarket 
 
Using Eye-Level Product Placement to Nudge Healthier Behaviours 
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Using End-of-Aisle Displays to Nudge Healthier Behaviours 
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Information Provision through ‘Nudge Points’ 
 
Appendix IV 
 
212 
 
 
Encouraging Healthy Behaviours through ‘Nudge Points’ 
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Nutritional Information Provision 
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